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This dissertation focuses on assessing and questioning the perceived ‘politicisation’ of the 
non-racial South African Council on Sport (SACOS) in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
Through an institutional case study of the organisation’s largest provincial football 
association (the Western Province Football Board (WPFB)) and its implementation of the 
ostensibly political Double Standards resolution, it re-examines the concept that politics 
captured the sports movement.  Instead it is argued that sporting impetuses based in a 
desire for institutional survival retained primacy within the Board’s decision making.  In fact 
primarily, political ideologies were utilised to deliver sporting goals and not the other way 
around.  This analysis is then extrapolated to demonstrate far-reaching conclusions around 
the relationship of sport and politics, Coloured identity and the meaning of the anti-Apartheid 
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Notes on Terminology 
 
This work’s subject had three regularly used names – in official and non-official documents it 
is referred to indiscriminately as the Western Province Football Board, the Western Province 
Association Football Board and less commonly the Western Province Soccer Board.  In the 
interests of clarity the most common of these, the Western Province Football Board (WPFB), 
will be used exclusively unless quoted from elsewhere.    
The terms Coloured, White, Indian and African will be used in this work as written.  This will 
not refer to any innate concept of race, but rather to the classifications provided by the 
Apartheid government.  In respect of this, the terms will be capitalised and will not require 
inverted commas.  When the term Black is used, it is as a grouping term for Indians, 
Coloureds and Africans. 
The Maitland-based Board affiliate, the Western Province Football Association, had the 
same name as the amateur White Western Cape football association.  In the White press, to 
avoid confusion, the common practice was to change the name of the Maitland-based 
association to the Western Province Union.1  There is however no record of the Maitland-
based group using or even accepting this practice and therefore it is felt imprudent not to use 
this group’s official name.  To differentiate, the White amateur association will always be 
referred to as WPFA (Hartleyvale) after its home ground. 
  
                                                          







Some people believe football is a matter of life and death.  I am very 
disappointed with that attitude.  I can assure you it is much, much more 
important than that.1 
 
John Carlin described the story of the 1995 Rugby World Cup depicted in his monograph, 
Playing the Enemy,2 as a tale that ‘felt like a fable, or a parable, or a fairy story’.3  Many 
South Africans must have felt similarly on the 11th June 2010.  This was the day that South 
Africa, and Africa, first played host to the world’s largest single sport tournament, the FIFA 
World Cup.  South Africans of all races, classes, religions and genders tuned in expectantly 
to see their team take the field for the opening match against Mexico.  The game ticked by 
through a poor first half with Bafana Bafana4 mostly on the back foot.  Then in the fifty-fifth 
minute, Siphiwe Tshabalala broke clear of the Mexican defence and with his left foot 
unleashed a bullet of a strike which nestled perfectly into the top corner.  The roar was 
deafening.  The British newspaper, the Daily Express, described the reaction: 
We heard it (the roar) all right. We heard it blow away all the cynicism 
about bringing the World Cup to Africa.  We heard it roar the power of sport 
to do some good in what is often a difficult and troubled world.5 
In one moment, all of the fears and consternations held domestically and internationally 
about South Africa hosting the event – the finances, the crime, the lack of transport 
infrastructure – melted away.  Even the constant drone of the vuvuzela felt somehow less 
offensive.  In that moment, outside of Mexico, it would have been difficult to find anyone in 
                                                          
1 Attributed to Bill Shankly, various. 
2 John Carlin, Playing the Enemy: Nelson Mandela and the Game that Made a Nation (New York, Penguin Press, 
2008).  Also made into a 2009 film starring Morgan Freeman and Matt Damon.   
3 Carlin, Playing the Enemy, 5. 
4 Literally translated from Zulu as ‘the boys, the boys’.  It is the common nickname for the South African 
football team. 





the more than one billion global audience who was not willing South Africa to go on and win 
the game.   
For South Africans this was more than just a goal in a football match.  Twenty-four years 
earlier, as Diego Maradona’s heroics6 lifted Argentina to the 1986 World Cup, the prospect 
of hosting the tournament was inconceivable.  The racial policies of the Apartheid 
government had meant that South Africa’s membership of FIFA had been suspended since 
1961.7  The country had never taken part in a World Cup tournament, much less thought 
about hosting one.  While limited integration had taken place at the professional level, 
amateur football, despite official non-racialism, remained heavily divided by race.  The South 
African National Football Association (SANFA) catered primarily for Africans, the Football 
Association of South Africa (FASA) for Whites and the South African Soccer Federation 
(SASF) for Coloureds and Indians.8 
Historians generally view sport as a reflection of ‘the preferences and prejudices of those 
sections of society that nurture them’. 9   John Sugden and Alan Bairner describe its 
importance: 
sport has no intrinsic value structure, but it is a ready and flexible vehicle 
through which ideological associations can be reinforced.10 
On the 11th June 2010, sport transcended this narrow definition.  On this day a game 
momentarily at least, transformed South Africa.  The legacies of Apartheid, among them 
deep-seated racial divisions, scarcely seemed to matter; those previously classified as 
African, Coloured, Indian and White united in the celebration of Tshabalala’s goal.  
                                                          
6 And, from an English viewpoint, villainy.   
7 The suspension was temporarily lifted in 1963, but was re-imposed in 1964 and the country was formally 
expelled from FIFA in 1976.  
8 By 1986, all three of these organisations claimed to be non-racial and to accept all regardless of race, but 
they remained predominantly associated with these groups. 
9 Tony Collins, A Social History of English Rugby Union (London, Routledge, 2009), 213, cited in Albert 
Grundlingh, Potent Pastimes: Sport and Leisure Practices in Modern Afrikaner History (Pretoria, Protea Book 
House, 2013), 8. 
10 John Sugden and Alan Bairner, Sport, Sectarianism and Society in a Divided Ireland (Leicester, Leicester 





Economic inequalities, social prejudices and political cleavages were for an instant side-
lined.  For a fleeting moment, every South African felt the same. 
The euphoria lasted only briefly; South Africa went on to draw the game and be knocked out 
of the 2010 World Cup at the group stage.  As the tournament drew to a close, South 
Africans ‘returned to their ‘normal lives’.’11  Quickly the united voice that had characterised 
the 11th June and the World Cup in general dissipated.  Within a month, South Africa’s major 
cities had been rocked by a spate of xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals and a strike 
that involved more than a million public sector workers.12 
The impact of that Tshabalala goal should not however be forgotten.  Sport may have no 
‘intrinsic value structure’, it may have no practical application, but it has power.  For a myriad 
of reasons – some logical, some less so – people can identify with sporting teams in a way 
they do not with any other institution.  For many, life is dictated by sport as much as by 
economics, politics or religion; their money, their time, their passions are all invested into the 
field to an extent that, despite the absence of an ‘intrinsic value structure’, sport becomes 
their lifeblood.  For these people Shankly’s quote is not baseless aggrandisement.  Sport is 
the defining matter of their life.  
It is not that these people inhabit a fantasy world where the harsh realities of life are 
forgotten.  Sport, as South Africa realised swiftly at the end of the 2010 World Cup, is 
affected and shaped by a context from which it can never wholly escape.  It is that these 
people, a group that inhabits all social strata and all areas of the globe, identify more 
strongly with their sport than other socio-economic institutions.  This provides sport not only 
with the power to reflect its surrounding context, but to overshadow and shape it.  
Football, perhaps like no other sport, has proven able to inspire this kind of fanatical support. 
To an unrivalled extent this has transcended the traditional ruptures of society: class, 
                                                          
11 Eddie Cottle, “Introduction” in Eddie Cottle (ed.), South Africa’s World Cup: A Legacy for Whom? (Scottsville, 






religion, race area etc.  Football is perhaps unique in its simplicity, in terms both of rules and 
required equipment, and in its versatility.  It can range from the ‘tiki-taka’ style of Pep 
Guardiola’s Barcelona side which championed strong mental traits, particularly quick 
decision-making and football intelligence, right the way to the rugged style of the Don Revie-
led Leeds United teams which focused on utilising players’ physical traits, their size, power 
and speed.  Unpredictability, a communal nature and the capability for a multitude of 
different shapes and sizes to make it at the highest level have helped to make football not 
only the biggest sport in the world, but integral to the construction of identities across the 
globe.   
The Western Cape was not immune to the infectious nature of ‘the beautiful game’.  By the 
1970s, it had become the region’s true mass sport.  It was enthusiastically played, watched 
and administered by thousands – regardless of race, class, religion or area.  For most of the 
twentieth century, the Western Province Football Board (WPFB) was by far the largest 
football organisation in the Western Cape.  By the 1980s, with as many as 40 000 
members,13 the Board had become both the largest affiliate of the South African Soccer 
Federation (SASF) and the largest sporting body of any kind in the Western Cape.14  Indeed, 
it seems that it was the largest secular provincial Coloured organisation in the period. 
This thesis sets out to explain how the Western Province Football Board came to adopt the 
South African Council on Sport (SACOS) mandate of the Double Standards resolution.15    
The 1977 resolution, ideologically based around the phrase ‘no normal sport in an abnormal 
society’, was ratified by the WPFB in 1980.16  The resolution ruled that no member, player or 
administrator of the WPFB could take part in any non-SACOS affiliated sport, serve on a 
                                                          
13 Cape Herald 23/4/83.  There is some disagreement about quite how large the Board was.  Just one month 
later, in the same newspaper, it was described as having 30 000 members. Cape Herald, 28/5/83.   
14 Cape Herald 15/9/76. 
15 The origins of the term Double Standards are unclear, but the earliest use officially comes from a Statement 
by the SACOS executive from 6/4/77, reproduced in Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon, The South African 
Game: Sport and Racism (London, Zed Press, 1982), 332. 
16 SACOS had first implemented the policy in 1977, the SASF agreed to it in principle only in November 1978 
and the WPFB only agreed to the policy on 23/2/80 – UWC, Mayibuye Archives, Papers of the Western 





‘multi-national’ body (such as the Coloured Persons Representative Council and Local 
Management Committees) or, from 1982, have any child of theirs attend a private White 
school.   
The formulation of the Double Standards resolution has generally been viewed as an 
attempt by SACOS to transform sport into a weapon against Apartheid.  Douglas Booth 
described the context behind the resolution as: 
Failed negotiations (with White bodies), state harassment of SACOS 
leaders and a thorough analysis of the relationship between apartheid and 
sport, convinced SACOS that black sports people would continue to 
experience discrimination while apartheid existed … and in the late 1970s 
the sports boycott became a strategy against apartheid per se.17 
The implementation of the resolution, along with other anti-government measures, led to 
SACOS being recognised by the anti-Apartheid movement as ‘its domestic sports wing’.18 
On the face of it, the resolution’s implementation was a complete rupture with the past for 
the WPFB.  The Board’s less principled history had involved clauses banning Muslims and 
Africans, passing out parades19 which often rejected those with darker skins and a hierarchy 
who, almost to a man, have been termed ‘racist’ in interviews conducted by both the author 
and by the District 6 Museum.  The shift in strategic alignment to embrace the Double 
Standards resolution has generally been perceived to be the result of increasing 
‘politicisation’ and anti-Apartheid feeling within the Coloured community. 
This study will demonstrate that this ‘rupture’ cannot simply be explained by mounting anti-
Apartheid sentiment or a crude concept of ‘politicisation’ i.e. acts which actively involve 
                                                          
17 Douglas Booth, “The South African Council on Sports and the Political Antimonies of the Sports Boycott”, 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 23, 1 (1997), 51. 
18 Ibid. 





reference to governance or to the state.20  The WPFB did not fundamentally change its 
outlook or actions by implementing the Double Standards resolution.  The decision to follow 
its parent organisation, the SASF, and the latter’s governing body SACOS into 
implementation took the Board almost three years of debate.  Even then the Board stated 
that the SASF had given them ‘no alternative but to implement’.21  While the resolution was 
publicly embraced and applied, in private many WPFB members flouted its tenets and 
continued to act in a similar fashion to before.   
This thesis, through an analysis of the institutional framework of the WPFB and then an in-
depth study of the effects (or otherwise) of the implementation of the Double Standards 
resolution on these structures, demonstrates that within SACOS there existed a fundamental 
division – between the political and sporting perspectives.  Within the decision-making of the 
WPFB the sporting perspective, inherently connected to institutional survival, generally held 
precedence.  Sport was never completely politicised.  In fact, within the Board politics was 
more often utilised in order to fulfil sporting goals. 
 
Historiography 
Lurking beyond the boundaries of every game are interests, the focus of 
oppression: the economics of the owners, the politics of the government, even 
the passion of the fans.22 
 
There is now a widespread acceptance, which has permeated slowly since C.L.R. James’ 
authoritative 1963 work Beyond a Boundary, that sport is a ready breeding ground for 
academic investigation.  Subsequent works, such as Mike Cronin and David Mayall’s 
                                                          
20 Politicisation is a highly contentious term and many believe that no act is apolitical.  In this work, 
politicisation will be used only as it is defined here. 
21 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, Papers of the Western Province Association Football Board, MCH82-15-1-1, WPFB 
minute books, 23/2/80. 





Sporting Nationalisms,23 John Sugden and Alan Bairner’s Sport, Sectarianism and Society in 
a Divided Ireland,24 Timothy Chandler and John Nauright’s Making the Rugby World25 and 
William Baker and James Mangan’s Sport in Africa,26 have provided analysis of the way in 
which sport operates within and interacts with wider political and social society in a variety of 
contexts.  It is now widely accepted that sport is capable of reflecting, constructing and 
maintaining a multitude of identities. 
One of the earliest South African sports histories,27 written in 1981, was Robert Archer and 
Antoine Bouillon’s The South African Game.28  It provides a good introductory study of 
government sports policy and some analysis of the anti-Apartheid movement in sports.  
However, perhaps hamstrung by the fact that neither Archer nor Bouillon ever visited South 
Africa,29  it is deficient in analysing the complexities of either area.  Identity politics are 
touched upon, but little attention is drawn to the real and deep divides within the various 
sports organisations.  Grant Jarvie’s Class, Race and Sport in South Africa’s Political 
Economy30 followed soon after Archer and Bouillon’s work and is beset by similar problems.  
Its brevity leads to a very simplistic image of the Black sports scene.  For instance, the Black 
working-class is portrayed to be united behind SACOS and its decisions.  This at best can 
be termed a gross generalisation.  In football, for instance, the main association for Africans, 
SANFA, was not part of SACOS until 1988. 
                                                          
23 Mike Cronin and David Mayall (ed.), Sporting Nationalisms: Identity, Ethnicity, Immigration and Assimilation 
(London, F. Cass, 1998). 
24 Sugden and Bairner, Sport, Sectarianism. 
25 Timothy J. L. Chandler and John Nauright (ed.), Making the Rugby World: Race, Gender, Commerce (London, 
F. Cass, 1999). 
26 William J. Baker and James A. Mangan (ed.), Sport in Africa: Essays in Social History (New York, Africana 
Publishing Company, 1987). 
27 André Odendaal had released a self-published work on South African cricket in 1977: André Odendaal, 
Cricket in isolation: The politics of race and cricket in South Africa (Cape Town, A. Odendaal, 1977).  While 
radical for its time in that it detailed both White and Black cricket, it provides limited analysis of their 
structures, and was ultimately more of a political tract calling for the introduction of ‘mixed’ sport. 
28 Archer and Bouillon, The South African Game.  
29 Ibid., i.   






Despite their limitations, these works provided a framework for future studies on sport’s 
relationship with Apartheid.  Douglas Booth’s The Race Game31 remains a solid analysis of 
the way in which international and national movements affected sport in South Africa.  On a 
more local level, Christopher Merrett’s Sport, Space and Segregation32 delivers a detailed 
and nuanced analysis into the way in which Apartheid-era local governments racially 
controlled space and facilities in South Africa’s urban centres.   
Other works have shifted their focus from the government to the identities associated with 
South African sport.  The pre-eminent work in this respect remains John Nauright’s 1997 
monograph Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa.33  Nauright, focusing on rugby, 
cricket and football, demonstrates sport’s considerable effect in producing, facilitating and 
questioning unities and divisions within South Africa.  While it is weaker on Black than White 
identity formation,34 it provides a strong introduction to the topic.  Ashwin Desai et al.’s 
Blacks in Whites35 and André Odendaal’s Story of an African Game,36 the former a study of 
Black cricket in KwaZulu-Natal and the latter of African cricket across South Africa, have 
served to bridge some of the gaps in Nauright’s work.  Desai’s work in particular, focusing on 
Indian and Coloured cricket, gives a nuanced take on racial, class and religious identities 
within the KwaZulu-Natal context.  Religious divisions and conceptions of masculinity in 
Coloured Cape Town have also been studied through the prism of rugby by Nauright 
himself.37  More recently, Albert Grundlingh’s Potent Pastimes38 has questioned prevailing 
historical narratives on Afrikaner identity through an analysis of the community’s sporting 
practices.   
                                                          
31 Douglas Booth, The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa (London, F. Cass, 1998). 
32 Christopher Merrett, Sport, Space and Segregation: Politics and Society in Pietermaritzburg (Scottsville, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009). 
33 John Nauright, Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa (London, Leicester University Press, 1997). 
34 Particularly in the years after 1973, when SACOS first entered the scene. 
35 Ashwin Desai, Vishu Padayachee, Krishan Reddy and Goolam Vayed, Blacks In Whites: A Century of Cricket 
Struggles in KwaZulu-Natal (Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2002). 
36 André Odendaal, The Story of an African Game (Claremont, David Phillip, 2003). 
37 John Nauright, “Masculinity, Muscular Islam and Popular Culture: ‘Coloured’ Rugby’s Cultural Symbolism in 
Working-class Cape Town c.1930-70”, The International Journal of the History of Sport, 14, 1 (1997), 184-90. 
38 Albert Grundlingh, Potent Pastimes: Sport and Leisure Practices in Modern Afrikaner History (Pretoria, Protea 





While rugby and cricket have both received more academic interest, there is a growing 
historiography of South African football.  The foremost work, Peter Alegi’s Laduma! Soccer, 
Politics and Society in South Africa,39  attempts to analyse how ‘Africans transformed the 
British sport of football into a leading form of urban popular culture’.40  While Laduma! offers 
some interesting conclusions around the appropriation of football by Africans and the 
complex inter-relationship between the sport and identity formation, it loses its way 
somewhat in the Apartheid era.  Perhaps motivated by a desire to return ‘the agency of black 
South Africans in shaping their own sporting and leisure history’,41 Alegi too often creates a 
dichotomy between footballing bodies and the Apartheid state.  Partly due to a narrow focus 
on professional football and Rand-centrism, the inter-relationship is reduced to a simplistic 
level with African bodies portrayed as being engaged in a bitter battle for survival against an 
all-powerful enemy.  Black bodies, as will be seen with the Board, were happy to utilise 
Apartheid structures when it suited their goals.  Perhaps due to increased co-operation with 
the government, Alegi deals with the period 1967-1995, a period of immense change and 
dispute, in just nine pages in a short Epilogue.42   
In a further series of essays Alegi has expanded his examination of the identities created 
and reflected by professional, predominantly African, soccer in South Africa: noting changing 
identities in Playing to the Gallery,43 the impact of professionalism in ‘Amathe Nolimi’44 as 
well as dealing with the influence of commercialisation in an article co-authored with Chris 
Bolsmann called From Apartheid to Unity.45  Alegi and Bolsmann’s 2010 compendium of 
                                                          
39 Peter Alegi, Laduma! Soccer, Politics and Society in South Africa (2004, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 
Scottsville). 
40 Ibid., 1. 
41 Ibid., 3. 
42 Ibid., 136-45. 
43 Peter Alegi, “Playing to the Gallery? Sport, Cultural Performance, and Social Identity in South Africa, 1920s-
1945”, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 35, 1 (2002), 17-38. 
44 Peter Alegi, “Amathe Nolimi (it is saliva and the tongue): Contracts of Joy in South African Football, 1940-
1976”, The International Journal of the History of Sport, 17, 4 (2000), 1-20. 
45 Peter Alegi and Chris Bolsmann, "From Apartheid to Unity: White Capital and Black Power in the Racial 





essays South Africa and the Global Game 46  has also helped to highlight more issues 
surrounding football and South African society both before and after Apartheid.  
While Alegi and, to a lesser extent, Bolsmann have dominated the South African football 
historiographical scene, other authors have slowly started to emerge providing fresh insights.  
Oshebeng Alphie Koonyaditse has provided a cogent summary of South Africa’s relationship 
with FIFA which holds some good insights into the inter-play between the international 
football governing body, the Apartheid state and the various football organisations within 
South Africa.47  On a micro level, Sylvain Cubizolles’ study of the rise of the Mighty 5 Star 
football club in Stellenbosch48 utilises an intriguing approach.  By focusing on the case of 
one club, Cubizolles is able to draw a multitude of suppositions around the effects of 
immigration, racial politics, class and commercialisation on football in the African township of 
Kayamandi.  A series of biographical works have also provided some interesting if specific 
conclusions.  For instance, Peter Alegi’s work on Darius Dhlomo49 and Stephen ‘Kalamazoo’ 
Mokone’s autobiography50 are valuable studies of the trials and tribulations that faced the 
limited number of South African footballers who played abroad.  Farouk Abrahams’ 
autobiography provides an interesting account of his experiences growing up Coloured in 
Cape Town and playing and coaching in the Federation Professional League (FPL).51 
Less academic monographs have also contributed to our understanding of football in South 
Africa.  Peter Raath’s Soccer Through the Years: 1862-200252 is meticulously researched 
and provides a vital source of league tables and accounts of specific games even if it 
                                                          
46 Peter Alegi and Chris Bolsmann (ed.), South Africa and the Global Game: Football, Apartheid and Beyond 
(Oxford, Routledge, 2010). 
47 Oshebeng Alpheus Koonyaditse, The Politics of South African Football (Grant Park, African Perspectives, 
2010). 
48 Sylvain Cubizolles, “Finding a new identity for a township club – the case of the Mighty 5 Star in 
Stellenbosch”, The International Journal of the History of Sport, 28, 15 (2011), 2191- 2205. 
49 Peter Alegi, “A Biography of Darius Dhlomo: Transnational footballer in the era of Apartheid”, Soccer and 
Society, 11, 1 (2010), 46-62.  
50 Stephen Mokone, Kalamazoo! The Life and Times of a Soccer Player (Pretoria, De Jager-HAUM, 1986). 
51 Farouk Abrahams, Surviving African Football: Farouk Abrahams An Autobiography (Cape Town, Peter du 
Toit, 2003).  Also see Graeme Friedman, Madiba’s Boys: The Stories of Lucas Radebe and Mark Fish 
(Claremont, New Africa Books, 2001) and Peter Oborne, Basil D’Oliveira: Cricket and Conspiracy: The Untold 
Story (London, Little, Brown, 2005). 





attempts as far as possible to divorce football from the political situation in South Africa.  Joe 
Latakgomo’s Mzansi Magic53 provides some work on the rise of African football in South 
Africa and the culture surrounding it, and Jack Blades’ The Rainbow Game54 has a collection 
of articles which supply a stimulating if, by its own admission, random and incomplete history 
of South African soccer.  On the Western Cape, District Six Museum’s handbook to 
accompany its 2010 exhibit Fields of Play55 on memories of football and forced removals in 
Cape Town provides a good introduction to understanding the WPFB, football culture in 
Cape Town and the impact of the Group Areas Act on sport. 
Despite the growing historiography on South African sport, and football in particular, there 
remains a glaring absence – investigations into SACOS-administered sport and the issues 
surrounding it.  Despite SACOS’s role as the pre-eminent non-racial sports organisation for 
almost two decades, existing studies only provide limited insights into its workings, the 
meaning of non-racialism or the various identities prevalent within the group.     
Analysis of the organisation has moved on very little since the early 1980s and the 
conclusions drawn by Archer and Bouillon56 and Jarvie.57  Both locate SACOS in an overtly 
political sphere within the context of an increasingly pervasive anti-Apartheid movement.  
Jarvie begins his chapter on SACOS with the statement: 
The struggle through sport is only part of the struggle mounted by the 
oppositional forces such as AZAPO, SAN-ROC, BCM and ANC.58 
SACOS’s relationship to groups such as the ANC was ambiguous at best.  Their politics may 
have overlapped somewhat, but they disagreed on key issues and never substantially co-
                                                          
53 Joe Latakgomo, Mzansi Magic: Struggle, Betrayal and Glory: The Story of South African Soccer (Cape Town, 
Tafelberg, 2010). 
54 Jack Blades (ed.), The Rainbow Game: A Random History of South African Soccer (Lanseria, Bailey’s African 
History Archives, 1998). 
55 Various, Fields of Play: Football Memories and Forced Removals in Cape Town (Cape Town, District 6 
Museum, 2010).  
56 Archer and Bouillon, The South African Game. 
57 Jarvie, Class, Race. 





operated.59  To connect the two in the manner of the quote above is inaccurate and creates 
the impression that SACOS was principally a political organisation. 
This view of SACOS stems from an unquestioned reliance on the rhetoric and propaganda 
espoused by the SACOS National Executive.  Douglas Booth’s The South African Council 
on Sport and the Political Antinomies of the Sports Boycott60 is particularly guilty of this view.  
It suggests that SACOS by the late 1970s had come to a general agreement that it was 
‘impossible to separate politics from sport in South Africa’61 which led them to use sport as ‘a 
strategy against apartheid per se.’ 62   In order to combat the ‘politicisation’ of sport by 
Apartheid, SACOS called on non-racial sports organisations to become part of a wider 
liberation struggle to help bring down the ‘abnormal society’.  In doing so, SACOS 
categorised its sport as ‘abnormal’.  Booth assumes that this rhetoric was largely accepted 
within SACOS affiliates. 
If this assumption of politicisation is made, SACOS is precluded from existing global 
historiographical narratives on politics and sport.  Sugden and Bairner conclude their work 
on sport and sectarianism in Northern Ireland by asserting that: 
sport in Northern Ireland can best be understood as a two-way mirror 
which not only reflects transcending social and political conflict, but also, in 
certain important instances, helps to sustain the conflict.63 
Sugden and Bairner state that it is not possible for participants ‘to extricate themselves from 
the close linkage of sport and politics’, but that sport’s power is that it is ‘often terrain 
contested between competing elements of civil society and of the politically constituted 
state.’64  SACOS, if viewed as part of a societal radicalisation in the wake of the 1976 
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Soweto Uprisings and the influence of Black Consciousness movements,65 ceases to act as 
contested terrain.  It becomes only a reflection of the wider political conflict, a small cog in a 
larger machine without distinct agency. The ‘abnormal’ nature of SACOS precludes it from 
sport’s inherent ability to create and sustain conflict. 
Due in part to the underdeveloped historiography on South African sport, wherein most 
works are breaking new narrative ground, there is a strong tendency to locate studies within 
global trends without question.  For instance, Alegi’s Laduma! begins by declaring that it 
expands on the work of E.P. Thompson, Fred Cooper, Keletso Atkins and Phyllis Martin.66  
In focusing on the connection between identity formation, African urbanisation and football, it 
inserts South Africa into a global narrative.  By terming the FPL (the SASF professional 
league) ‘anti-racist’, Alegi essentially sidelines the group from this narrative.  Their 
‘abnormal’ history is dealt with in just two pages.67  By connecting them only with a ‘political’ 
ideology in anti-racism, the work treats the group as an adjunct to the true story.  Other 
studies have taken a similar path; South Africa and the Global Game barely mentions the 
non-racial SACOS-affiliated SASF.68 
Attempts to fit South African sports history into global narratives has led to skewed topic 
selection which ignores certain pervasive groups within the country’s social life in favour of 
those who fit prevailing narratives.  For example Sylvain Cubizolles’ work on the Mighty 5 
Star Football Club focuses on African football in Stellenbosch and the impact of economic 
migration on football and identities in the area.69  The club in question was part of the 
peripheral African Western Cape Soccer Association (WCSA).  The WPFB, by far the largest 
football organisation in Stellenbosch, has been largely ignored by current historiography.  
The topic choice seems to be predicated on the desire to fit Mighty 5 Star into a prevailing 
narrative, based on studies from Western Europe, which attributes the rise of organised 
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football clubs to the effects of widespread urbanisation at the turn of the twentieth century.70  
The effects of economic migration were less pronounced in the WPFB due to the age and 
established nature of many of the clubs and Coloured communities in the Western Cape. 
This tendency to dismiss SACOS sport as ‘abnormal’ has meant that even when studies 
have focused on local organisations that were or were to become affiliates of SACOS, 
analysis finishes before the organisation’s formation in 1973.  For example, John Nauright’s 
piece on Coloured rugby, religious divides and concepts of masculinity in Cape Town71 ends 
in 1970, three years before SACOS was formed.  The impact of supposed ‘politicisation’ and 
the Double Standards resolution which greatly affected Coloured rugby in the area are not 
dealt with.  Francois Cleophas and Floris van der Merwe’s two essays, one on the use of the 
colour bar by Black sports organisations in the Western Cape72 and one on the Western 
Province Senior Schools Sports Union,73 both barely deal with the influence of SACOS.  The 
latter’s focus finishes in 1973 and the former bases its investigation in the early 1960s.  
Despite all three essays’ focus on organisations that were members of SACOS in the 1970s 
and 1980s, Cleophas and van der Merwe’s work on the colour bar is the only one to mention 
the organisation by name.  The work focuses on the existence of a ‘colour bar’, and the 
agitations in the early 1960s against it, within the WPFB which barred ‘Muslims and Africans’ 
from the Coloured institution.  The rise of SACOS is cursorily linked to Bluebells, a 
traditionally Muslim club and chief agitator against the ‘colour bar’, but no exploration of the 
implications for understanding SACOS non-racialism is undertaken.  Despite raising the 
spectre of deep cleavages within Coloured sports organisations, none of the three essays 
analyses how these legacies affected SACOS. 
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If the group is analysed at all, it is done in political terms.  John Nauright essentially sidelines 
SACOS grassroots sport as unimportant with the assertion: 
Many of the problems that SACOS had in organizing non-racial sport, 
outside of Western Cape townships, stemmed from its inability to 
command resources and loyalties across a wide political spectrum and 
geographical space.74 
Nauright views SACOS sport from the perspective of the non-racial rhetoric that the SACOS 
National Executive espoused.  If taken from this viewpoint then Nauright’s arguments hold 
weight.  SACOS was never able to attract a large African membership and was deposed as 
the head of the non-racial sports movement by the pro-collaborationist National Sport 
Congress after the latter’s formation in 1988. 75   What remained of SACOS, unable to 
position itself as a critical part of the ‘negotiated political settlement’ at the end of Apartheid, 
was eventually destroyed by it.76  This view, however, almost entirely disregards the tens of 
thousands of sportsmen for whom SACOS-administered sports were not just a political ideal, 
but a weekly reality.  For this group, SACOS’s major achievement was not in legitimising the 
sports boycott, but in its provision of sport.77 
SACOS’s collapse in the early 1990s has added to the structural reasons for the dismissal of 
the organisation.  With the end of SACOS, many of the old provincial organisations, rooted in 
the Apartheid system and lacking the size of old African organisations or the financial 
prowess of some of the old White institutions, were forced to fold or amalgamate.78  In 
football, the only current79 South African Premier Division club to have taken part in the FPL 
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is Sundowns. 80   The invisibility of ex-FPL clubs in the current structure allows for a 
marginalisation of the SASF.  Alegi and Bolsmann’s From Apartheid to Unity touches on the 
FPL and sponsorship in comparing the league to the  integrated NPSL’s growing 
commercialisation, but the article also notes the effects of football unity.  The FPL, which 
folded in 1990 with the onset of unity, would therefore not fit the purpose.81   
The categorisation of SACOS as the anti-Apartheid movement’s ‘domestic sports wing’82 has 
also led to the problem that Booth terms the embracement of ‘emancipation as an ethical 
value’.83  He argues that social historians, including those of sport, through their content and 
form ‘reveal their general commitment to emancipation and the liberation of minority groups 
and women from oppression and subjugation.’84  Nowhere in this more prevalent, Booth 
suggests, than in South African historiography where in a manner that removes objectivity, 
historians are often reluctant to praise anything related to the state or its actions during the 
Apartheid period or to make any criticism of its opponents. 85   While the tendency is 
changing, it continues to affect the field. 
This is reflected in Christopher Merrett’s Sport, Space and Segregation.  Primarily focusing 
on the official record, its stated aim is: 
to track and illustrate aspects – political, economic, cultural and social – of 
the history of a small South African city through the lens of sport and 
recreation.86 
Merrett’s choice of material, however, quickly devolves the study (in the post-1948 chapters) 
into an attempt to show how ‘Sport and recreation in Pietermaritzburg (was) fashioned by … 
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apartheid’.87  Merrett treats Apartheid as totemic, as the force blocking ‘normal sport’ in a 
manner that reduces the agency and complexities of Apartheid’s opponents; SACOS is 
treated as part of a wider Unity movement which ignores the distinctiveness of the institution 
and its associates’.88  Merrett locates the state and anti-Apartheid groups in dichotomic 
positions around a portrayed ethical emancipation: the state ‘divided communities’ while its 
opponents attempted to integrate.89 
The embracing of ‘emancipation as an ethical value’ has attracted some less academic 
studies such as Cheryl Roberts’ No Normal Sport in an Abnormal Society90 which, while 
attempting to ‘honour’ the non-racial sports movement, 91  only serve to deepen the 
identification with ‘abnormal sport’.  Roberts writes: 
Our non-racial sports leaders were not about money or material gain and 
personal wealth accumulation.  They were about the struggle for a non-
racial, democratic South Africa and could have years ago sold out to multi-
national and apartheid sport and in the process further subjected the 
oppressed to inhumane conditions.92 
Whatever good intentions can be attributed to Roberts’ work, such a hagiographical style 
does little to expand our knowledge of the movement.  It skirts over the issues and divides 
within the organisation and its claim to non-racialism is accepted without scrutiny.     
All of these reasons, stemming primarily from SACOS’s categorisation as political, have led 
to the group and its affiliates being marginalised in the extant historiography.  The 2006 
compendium of essays Sport and Liberation in South Africa93 came out of a conference 
established to provide a ‘systematic study and analysis of the role sport played in the 
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liberation of South Africa.’94  SACOS, the largest pre-unity non-racial sports movement, 
however is featured predominantly in only three of the eleven essays printed in the 
collection.  Hamstrung by its stated goal, even the essays produced on SACOS fail to 
question its motivations.  Basil Brown’s essay on SACOS’s downfall assumes SACOS 
viewed itself as part of the liberation struggle.95  Hamilton  Peterson’s essay on school 
sport96  discusses an important and often underappreciated part of the non-racial sports 
movement, but focuses on the relationship of sport with education and takes the relationship 
between SACOS and the South African Senior Schools Sport Union (SASSU) as a given.  
Avis Smith’s The Invisible Factor97 details the role of women and gender politics on the 
movement.  While the role of women in the movement should not be ignored, the article only 
serves to detail that women were a part of the non-racial sports movement and does not 
analyse what their participation means to our understanding of the organisation.  The other 
articles in the volume focus primarily on either pre-Apartheid or post-Apartheid topics and 
essentially trace SACOS as the logical conclusion of growing anti-discrimination sentiment in 
the Black community.   
Despite the general view of SACOS as ‘abnormal’, several works have attempted to analyse 
the group as ‘normal’.  In isolation these studies however provide questionable conclusions.  
Grant Farred’s work on the propensity of clubs in the Cape Flats to mimic English clubs is 
particularly limited.98  There is some neat analysis of mimicry, its power and its limitations 
and by suggesting that WPFB clubs idolised White (albeit English) teams raises the question 
of SACOS’s racial politics.  However, the conclusions are undermined by an unexplained 
initial supposition.  It bases the analysis off an assertion that lower-class Cape Flats dwellers 
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were more likely to emulate the names and styles of English teams than those in the 
metropole.  There are many cases of this being inaccurate: Cape Flats FA had teams such 
as Young Lillies, Saxon United and Santos while middle-class Alliance, an organisation 
based at the Rosmead Sports Grounds in Claremont, had clubs such as Blackpool and 
Yorkshire AFC.  Even the Board-sponsored professional team, that largely comprised ex-
Alliance personnel, was called Cape Town Spurs.  The essay also ignores the fact that, due 
to forced and voluntary movement, most of the individuals who established clubs in the Cape 
Flats had previously been administrators in the metropole.  The article never adequately 
explains how the original supposition was arrived at and the rest of the analysis suffers 
greatly.  Even if this issue is sidestepped, the evidence that ‘mimicry’ went any further than 
the appropriation of names is dubious. 
Perhaps the best extant work on SACOS is Ashwin Desai et al.’s Blacks In Whites.99  While 
its analysis of SACOS structure is at times deficient and attempts to fit the narrative into a 
linear view of history, it provides an in-depth study of Black cricket in KwaZulu-Natal which 
does not embrace ‘emancipation as an ethical value’.  It locates the SACOS-affiliated South 
African Cricket Board (SACB) in its proper context without ignoring the divides and 
complexities within the movement.  It notes that these organisations had histories of 
practiced discrimination and goes into some analysis of how this meshed with the politics of 
non-racialism.  The problem with extrapolating the conclusions of Desai into wider 
conclusions for SACOS sport is that cricket was in a rather unique position.  In 1976 the 
White, Coloured, Indian and African associations united as one single entity: the South 
African Cricket Union (SACU).  The level of unity achieved in cricket was largely unparalleled 
in other sports.  The SACB was established in 1976 in protest against sporting unity while 
political, social and residential Apartheid remained.  This gave the organisation a unique 
political genesis which was unrivalled in other SACOS affiliates such as the SASF where 
sporting priorities were much more prominent. 
                                                          





In addition to the extant historiography, this work makes use of a number of 
contemporaneous sources.  Largely, the conclusions drawn are based on the WPFB’s 
minute books in the period 1968-c.1984.  These minute books provide invaluable information 
on the workings of the WPFB behind the public rhetoric.  Where the minute books have gaps 
or do not provide explanations, interviews (conducted by both the author and by the District 
6 Museum for its 2010 exhibit Fields of Play) and newspapers (primarily the Cape Argus, 
Cape Times and Cape Herald) have been used.  These sources have significant drawbacks 
and have been treated with caution.  Interviews, bound as they are within the politics of 
memory, are notoriously unreliable sources for facts100 and the inadequacy and bias of the 
Apartheid media will be dealt with at length in Chapter 6.  Despite limitations, it is felt that 
these sources if used in conjunction provide an extensive collection of sources from which 
conclusions can be extracted.  
 
The Structure and Aims of this Study – An Overview 
 
This work provides a history of SACOS that covers some of the gaps identified in the extant 
historiography.  In particular, it sets out to question the extent and manner of ‘politicisation’ 
within the group and to assess the organisation with regard to its sporting rather than 
political goals.  This has three major aims from a historiographical perspective. 
Firstly, the work is intended to act as an addendum to the current historiography on South 
African sport.  By describing and analysing how the SACOS system worked in amateur 
football, it hopes to add another layer to the works of Alegi,101 Nauright,102 Merrett103 et al.  
Merrett’s work in particular would benefit from a better understanding of the complexities of 
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the SACOS movement and how they intersected with the Apartheid local government.  The 
work currently only serves to portray the Apartheid state as totemic and by embracing 
‘emancipation as an ethical value’104 fails to add depth to the state’s interrelationship with 
wider society.  A more complete understanding of the operations of SACOS, the motivations 
behind its anti-Apartheid stance and its practical operations would allow for a more balanced 
and nuanced view.  At the very least, this study will provide a counter-point to the prevailing 
narrative of Alegi’s Laduma!,105 namely the appropriation of football by the African working-
class, and add the experiences of the Western Province and Coloureds to the current Rand-
centric focus. 
Secondly, the work will question current categorisations of the anti-Apartheid struggle.  Much 
of the current historiography on the 1970s focuses on an increasingly all-encompassing 
‘politicisation’ within Black society fuelled by the impact of Black Consciousness movements 
and the Soweto Uprisings of 1976.  The epic collaborative work From Protest to Challenge, 
which focuses on the ANC and PAC, is perhaps the pre-eminent work on the anti-Apartheid 
struggle.  The 5th volume on the period 1964-79 traces the resurgence of the anti-Apartheid 
struggle entirely through the rise of Black Consciousness and through the after-effects of the 
Soweto Uprisings.106  It is a meta-narrative that has subsumed much of the historiography 
done on 1970s South Africa and is prevalent when the supposed Coloured ‘politicisation’, in 
which the Double Standards resolution is often located, occurs in the 1970s.  Bill Nasson for 
instance locates the rise of Non-European Unity Movement influenced groups within the 
context of Black Consciousness, the shock of the Soweto Uprisings and the rising power of a 
new generation.107  SACOS, as an identified part of the anti-Apartheid movement, is often 
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cursorily linked to this context.108  This work will follow the logic set forth by Douglas Booth109 
and Timothy Gibbs110 in suggesting that the strategies and goals of organisations should not 
be categorised within one or other of the diametrically opposed pro- or anti-Apartheid 
positions.  The anti-Apartheid movement was much more complex and adherents displayed 
a wide range of motivations, many of which were not overtly political. 
Finally, from a more general perspective, a deeper understanding of SACOS is designed to 
be utilised to examine the efficacy of current conclusions on the inter-relationship between 
sport and politics.  In the case of SACOS, existing studies have generally treated sport as 
being subsumed by politics.  This work intends to scrutinise the veracity of this belief and in 
doing so provide evidence whether or not sport can ever be wholly captured by political 
considerations.   
Herein lies a problem: the historiographical goals stem from an attempt to question the 
extent and manner of ‘politicisation’ within the group and to assess the organisation in 
respect of its sporting rather than political goals.  This necessitates a certain division 
between sport and politics.  SACOS ideology, increasingly represented by the phrase ‘no 
normal sport in an abnormal society’, did not believe that this was possible in Apartheid 
South Africa.  It therefore drew no distinction between the two in decision making.  This 
study will initially suggest that there was a fundamental divide between the outlooks of the 
SACOS National Executive and grassroots level.  Many of the grassroots organisations long 
pre-dated SACOS’s formation in 1973 and drew legitimacy from ties and connections to their 
communities which were not based on anti-Apartheid concerns.  These ties had become 
divorced over time from initial (sometimes political) connotations and were chiefly associated 
with their respective sporting institutions.  The inter-play between these sporting connections 
and the apparently ‘politicised’, i.e. actively connected to the government acts put forth by 
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SACOS in the late 1970s, will be used to assess whether sport or politics held primacy within 
SACOS. 
For these purposes, the Western Province Football Board (WPFB), the organisation’s largest 
provincial sporting unit, has been selected as the basis of analysis.  The WPFB, established 
in 1924, was a long-standing institution in the Coloured communities of the Western Cape 
and had a myriad of ties and connections that long pre-dated SACOS’s formation in 1973.  
The impact of ‘politicisation’ will be represented by the Board’s relationship with the Double 
Standards resolution, perhaps the most influential and far-reaching of the legislative acts of 
SACOS which has been identified as a ‘tactic of political purification’.111  The WPFB and its 
response to the Double Standards resolution is used as a case study to reveal the workings 
of SACOS, its relationship with the non-collaborationist/anti-Apartheid movement and the 
inter-relationship between sport and politics. 
The selection of the WPFB, a predominantly Coloured organisation, as a case study causes 
the study to touch on the issue of Coloured identity.  While the position of Coloureds as a 
majority in the Western Cape (and the relative paucity of Indians) somewhat divided the 
experiences of the Board from other units in the SACOS-affiliated SASF,112 the organisation 
across the country primarily drew its strength from the Indian and Coloured populations.  
This work for the most part accepts the pre-eminent views on Coloured identity, summarised 
by Mohamed Adhikari’s Not White Enough, Not Black Enough.113  It will however not treat 
the works uncritically and by questioning the meaning of non-racialism within the Board will 
attempt to establish the veracity of Adhikari’s statement that assimilationist hopes (i.e. of co-
option into White society) ‘were remarkably resilient’.114  The WPFB was consistently hostile 
to White organisations and rebuffed all overtures.  This study hopes to raise Coloured 
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identity issues that are not evident within Adhikari’s focus on elites and political writings that 
miss the mass movements more evident in sport. 
In order to analyse the effect of the ‘political’ Double Standards resolution on the WPFB, the 
study will first have to establish the previously extant structure and culture of the Board 
before attempting to identify when, how and if the association and its members were 
fundamentally affected by the resolution’s implementation.  Instead of a narrow focus on 
political context, the WPFB will be treated as an institution undergoing fundamental change.  
The study will therefore draw on a framework drawn from organisational studies and social 
movement analysis. 
In particular, it will utilise the framework established by Davis et al. in Social Movements and 
Organization Theory.115  The study calls for an amalgamation of the fields of organisational 
studies and social movement analysis in order to provide ‘mutually beneficial cross-
fertilization’.116  Davis et al. argue that organisational studies scholars have tended to focus 
on ‘established organizational forms operating in specialized sectors or arenas’. 117  
Meanwhile, social movement analysis scholars have focused on the ‘study of emergent and 
challenging social movements targeting society-wide concerns’.118  The work suggests that 
this divided approach becomes inadequate when established organisations undergo 
fundamental change: 
The so-called established arenas – whether entire societies or sectors 
such as health care services – can undergo fundamental change, as 
prevailing conventions are questioned and entrenched interests 
challenged.  In such situations, attending to the structure and actions of 
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both established and emergent players is critical to understanding 
subsequent processes and outcomes.119 
In this situation, it is advised that scholars should make use of techniques from both fields 
when studying an established organisation undergoing fundamental change.  Their 
framework suggests six sections for a study: 
1) The starting point should be to identify the relevant period of interest and define 
the composition of the three classes of actors: Dominants, Challengers and 
Governance Units.  The Dominants are defined as ‘those individuals, groups 
and organizations around whose actions and interests the field tends to 
resolve.’120  The Challengers are those seeking to challenge the advantaged 
position of the Dominants and the Governance Units are the organisational 
units that exercise power and authority within the institution.  
2) The ‘wider social environment’ for any institution needs to be defined.  This 
should focus on identifying ‘external actors’ – anyone who, despite not being 
recognised as a participant in the field, in some manner influences the course 
of action. 
3) Institutions are characterised by certain ‘Institutional Logics’: values, norms and 
beliefs within the organisation.  These characteristics, based in the framework 
and goals of the institution, separate it from (but may reflect) wider society. 
4) Under normal circumstances, institutions tend towards stability and a status 
quo in the form of a hard-won ‘institutional settlement’.  Periods of ‘fundamental 
change’ are thereby predicated on ‘destabilising events or processes’ which 
push the organisation away from the status quo. 
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5) These ‘destabilising events’ set in motion a process of ‘reactive mobilisation’ 
within the institution.  Within this ‘reactive mobilisation’, a fundamental change 
is appropriated. 
6) The organisation then reforms an ‘institutional settlement’ via a shift in 
‘strategic alignment’.121 
This framework is particularly relevant to the WPFB.  It was an established organisation 
which through its affiliation to SACOS and the Double Standards resolution has been 
perceived to have undergone a ‘fundamental change’.  The framework suggested by Davis 
et al. is therefore well-suited to the purposes of this study and will largely be followed.  
Since the WPFB should not be seen only ‘as an institution prone to being ‘captured’ and 
used in the interests of one class or another’, 122  the first two chapters will focus on 
establishing the structure of the institution as well as the wider context of football in the 
1970s.  Chapter 1 outlines the structure of the WPFB, its extant culture and the three 
classes of actors within the institution: Dominants, Challengers and Governance Units.   This 
will allow the establishment of the WPFB’s ‘particular interests associated with … territorial 
sovereignty’123 which gave the institution a definable culture connected to, but separate from, 
wider Coloured and Apartheid society.  This peculiar culture will be used as the basis to 
establish the impact of the implementation of the Double Standards resolution.  In particular, 
the chapter will detail how, why and where the Coloured middle-classes established 
themselves as Dominants and the nature/efficacy of the ‘challenge’ to their position from 
lower-class, less-established and ‘politicised’ (Muslim) groups. 
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Chapter 2, establishes the ‘wider social environment’ of the WPFB.124  Since the Double 
Standards resolution was formulated due to the destabilisation of the wider South African 
football structure, understanding the workings and motives of the other football associations 
is deemed necessary.   It sets out the structure of these organisations in Cape Town and the 
position of the Board vis-à-vis non-Coloured communities.    
Chapter 3 attempts to cover the final three points made by Davis et al.  It identifies the shift 
in government policy towards the acceptance of non-racial sport and the collapse of the 
White professional league, the National Football League (NFL), as ‘destabilising events’.  
The period of ‘reactive mobilisation’ that led to the implementation of the Double Standards 
resolution is then described.  The end of the chapter is devoted to defining the new 
Institutional Settlement that was produced.  It will demonstrate that within the WPFB the 
Double Standards resolution was not primarily utilised as a political act.  Instead the WPFB, 
due to its distinct Institutional culture, used the resolution principally to further its sporting 
interests. 
The remaining chapters will suggest the WPFB did not view the resolution in political terms.  
Rather it was implemented largely to ensure the survival of WPFB football and the Board as 
an institution within the Apartheid context and had no specific political goal.   
Chapter 4 suggests that the destabilising effects, detailed in the previous chapter, led 
directly to the embracement of a new Institutional Logic within the WPFB: unity.  This unity 
however remained focused narrowly on the Coloured (male) community.  The relationship of 
the WPFB with its ‘external actors’ had destabilised, but the Board’s antagonistic attitude 
towards them had not fundamentally altered.  The WPFB used the Double Standards 
resolution to attempt to maintain the fundamentals of its previous societal position as pre-
eminent within the Coloured community.   
                                                          





Chapter 5, ‘Uncertainty’, treats Double Standards as representative of Coloureds’ marginal 
position within the Apartheid system. 125   In the wake of forced removals and the new 
government sports policy, the WPFB had become increasingly concerned by the uncertainty 
of future National Party policies, over which its members had very little control.  As 
government policy towards Coloureds became increasingly unclear, the WPFB viewed the 
Double Standards resolution as a means to increase the effects of its own agency.  Thus its 
extant position was protected. 
Chapter 6, ‘Confusion’, will suggest that the WPFB’s ability to implement the Double 
Standards resolution in a discriminate, asymmetric and largely apolitical manner was 
facilitated by the ‘abnormal’ nature of Apartheid society.  The first part will demonstrate, 
primarily through a study of Cape newspapers, that the media acted primarily with regards to 
its own priorities and outlooks.  Due both to their outlook, which focused on political rather 
than sporting considerations, and their personal priorities the media failed to provide an 
adequate ‘check’ on the power of the WPFB.  The Board was therefore able to implement 
the Double Standards resolution with impunity and without generally accepted standards.  
The second part of the chapter demonstrates the WPFB’s response to this relative freedom 
was to leave decision making to its provincial units who each used the resolution for its own 
purposes.  This, it is noted, has strong parallels to the implementation of the National Party’s 
new sports policy. 
A conclusion follows Chapter 6 that returns to the stated aims in the introduction and the 
possible impact of the study.   
This thesis attempts to demonstrate that the implementation of the Double Standards 
resolution was predicated on an attempt by the WPFB to keep itself alive, to keep its football 
alive within the Apartheid context.  The WPFB’s response to the resolution was primarily 
motivated by sporting, rather than political considerations.  The three stated 
                                                          





motivations/reasons for the Double Standards resolution – unity, confusion and uncertainty – 
are not designed to be exhaustive.  To describe the complete range of influences on any one 
person’s decision to implement the resolution would be unfeasible.  To attempt to do so for 
every member of the WPFB would be downright foolish.  This study is therefore designed 







Chapter 1 – The Structure and Culture of the WPFB pre-Double 
Standards. 
 
Rather than viewing … an institution (as) prone to being ‘captured’ and 
used in the interests of one class or another, we see it as having its own 
particular interests associated with territorial sovereignty.1 
 
The major differential marker between an institution and a ‘non-rational collective’ is that 
within an institution, while not entirely shorn of their personal autonomy, actors are 
influenced ‘toward a pattern of coordinated and effective behavior’.2  This means that they 
can never wholly be ‘captured’ by its surrounding context.  Each institution has its own set 
of values, norms and beliefs or Institutional Logics that steer the organisation and its 
members.3  These guiding principles, utilised in order to achieve a group’s goals, are the 
prism through which they view and interact with wider society.  It is therefore impossible to 
fully assess the impact of the implementation of the Double Standards resolution on the 
WPFB unless these Institutional Logics, the primary groups of institutional actors and the 
motivations and meanings behind them are defined. 
 
The Structure of the WPFB 
 
The ‘belief systems and associated practices that predominate in an organizational field’ 
reflect a general consensus on how to achieve an institution’s objectives within a set 
structure.4  The structure of the WPFB reflected the sport’s colonial origins amongst the 
Coloured community in Cape Town.  Football initially diffused into the Western Cape 
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through English-speaking officials and soldiers,5 but it quickly drew interest from the Black 
inhabitants of the province.  White practices were intently watched, imbibed and soon after 
mimicked.  By the start of the twentieth century, football in the Coloured areas of Cape 
Town had begun to be formalised with the establishment of organised clubs.  Their names 
often had explicit colonial links.  One of the first clubs to be set-up in Wynberg, the 
Yorkshire Football Club (1903), was so-dubbed after the Yorkshire Light Infantry Unit whom 
the club’s founders regularly watched play in their free time.6  Another early club, Young 
Men’s Own Bible Class FC (1917), was formed by a Baptist Sunday School teacher and 
held its first meeting at the Methodist Church on the corner of Chapel and Sydney Streets 
in District Six.7 
In 1904 the first organised soccer association for Coloureds, the Western Province Football 
Association (WPFA), was founded in Maitland.  It was quickly followed by the Stellenbosch 
and District Union in 1906.  Breakaways then occurred forming first the Cape Peninsular 
FA (out of the WPFA) and then, from a split in the latter, the Independant Soccer League 
(later renamed Alliance).8   These four units amalgamated in 1924 to initiate the Western 
Province Coloured Football Board, which was renamed the Western Province Football 
Board when the Western Province Indian Football Association (WPIFA) joined in the 
1940s.9   
The institution’s initial purpose and framework, as a super-structure for semi-autonomous 
local Coloured leagues, did not fundamentally alter until its closure in 1991.  In this 
administrative method, termed the ‘unit system’, teams did not affiliate to the Board directly; 
instead they affiliated to an association or unit, such as Cape District, Metropolitan or 
                                                          
5 For further discussion, See Lloyd Hill, “Football as Code: the social diffusion of ‘soccer’ in South Africa” in 
Alegi and Bolsmann (ed.), South Africa and the Global Game, 12-29. 
6 Various, Fields of Play,  59. 
7 Ibid., 53.  
8 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, Papers of the Western Province Association Football Board, MCH82-12-1-1, 
Written Document, c.1989.  The association is twice referred to as the Independant Soccer League.  It is 
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Northerns, under whose auspices they played league games.  On the eve of the Double 
Standards affair, the WPFB had become the largest Coloured sports organisation in the 
peninsula with 12 member units (whose names and major grounds are noted in Figures (i) 
and (ii)) comprising at least 14 366 members.10   Each of the units acted on a semi-
independent basis and generally only played each other in the Maggot Trophy.  The 
competition, named after WPFB founder Henry Maggot, shifted at various times between 
an inter-unit competition, wherein each unit picked its best players to represent its 
association, and an inter-club version, which pitted each unit league’s champions against 
each other.  The Maggot Trophy was always played in a league format.   After 1980 the 
Virginia Challenge Cup, an inter-unit cup competition was also introduced.11  Since Sunday 
play was largely outlawed and Fridays and Mondays were reserved for White and Coloured 
professional teams respectively, unit league matches generally took place on Saturdays.  
On an administrative level, the Board worked on a democratic basis wherein each unit 
delegate, along with members of the WPFB executive, received one vote.  
By 1977, the Metropolitan Union and the Northerns FA had both moved from their original 
locations.  The Metropolitan Union had originally played its matches at Green Point 
Common and drew its playing strength from Sea Point, the Bo-Kaap and District Six, but 
due to the impact of forced removals and the Common being declared a White area in 
1968, relocated to Bonteheuwel in the late 1960s.  Northerns suffered a similar fate; at 
around the same time, the unit moved from its base in Goodwood to Bishop Lavis.  The 
movement of Metropolitan and Northerns represented the first of many attempts by the 
WPFB to deal with the unrelenting destabilising effects of forced removals.  The continued 
mass migration of Coloureds to the Cape Flats continued to beset the WPFB deep into the 
1980s. 
                                                          
10 Football was the highest participation sport amongst Coloureds in the region (second was rugby with c. 8 
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1. Green Point Common – Metropolitan pre-1969, also used by Alliance, 
Cosmopolitan League and WPFA 
2. Royal Road Sports Complex – WPFA 
3. Rosmead Sports Ground – Alliance FA 
4. Shelley Street Sports Field – Cosmopolitan League and used by WPFA 
5. William Herbert Sports Ground – Cape and District FA 
6. Turfhall Sports Fields – Cape FA 
7. Goodwood – Northerns FA (pre- c.1970) 
8. Bellville – Central FA 
9. Grassy Park – South Peninsula FA 
10. Bonteheuwel – Metropolitan (post 1969) 
11. Bishop Lavis – Northerns (post c.1970) 
12. Heideveld Sports Forum – Cape Flats FA 
13. Ocean View – Ocean View FA 
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Central Union 1956 N/A Bellville 8 
South Peninsula Football 
Association 
1969 N/A Grassy Park 9 
Metropolitan Union 193112 N/A Bonteheuwel 10 
Northerns Football 
Association 
1951 N/A Bishop Lavis 11 





Ocean View Football 
Association  
1975 N/A Ocean View & 
Simon’s Town 
13 
Stellenbosch and District 
Union 
1924 Idas Valley Stellenbosch East 
Worcester Football 
Association 




Figure (ii): Main Fields pre-1977. 
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This structure was employed as part of the WPFB’s stated goal: 
To promote, foster and control professional football and amateur 
Association football in the Western Province.13 
While the constitution made no reference to race and the organisation was officially non-
racial, implicitly this meant Coloured football.  Individual Whites, Africans and Indians did 
become members of the organisation and the Western Province Indian Football 
Association was an intermittent associate.  However, for reasons detailed later, throughout 
its existence the WPFB’s membership remained predominantly Coloured and its Executive 
almost exclusively so.  The culture and Institutional Logics remained rooted within this 
community.  The Board is therefore treated in this study as a Coloured institution.   
Just as the WPFB remained a predominantly Coloured institution, it also continued to be 
male-dominated.  Apart from Sylvia Jeftha, who became the first female delegate to the 
WPFB’s national governance unit the SASF in 1976, 14  the Board minutes show no 
evidence of any female delegates.  The extant sources suggest that, apart from Cape 
District who established a women’s league in 1981, no units had female affiliates.15  The 
intrigues and preoccupations of the WPFB often reflected a male-orientated world view.  
For instance, the biggest issue in crowd problems at the William Herbert Sports Ground 
was described as ‘the language and behaviour of women spectators.’16  While it should be 
noted that the WPFB was a male-centric institution, the paucity of women’s organisations 
and the dearth of evidence surrounding Coloured women’s football makes it difficult to 
come to any conclusions other than the existence of a discrepancy.  With this in mind, while 
                                                          
13 The words ‘professional football and’ were only added to the constitution in 1971.  UWC, Mayibuye 
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14 “Bid to Topple Henkel a Failure”, Cape Herald, 17/4/76. 
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this study accepts a fundamental gender bias, it will not attempt or be able to draw 
conclusions on gender relations. 
There is little evidence that by the period in question Coloured males attached any peculiar 
significance to football.  While the names of early clubs, such as Yorkshire FC, provide 
evidence that the initial take-up of the sport by Coloureds was connected to attempts to 
assimilate into White working-class society, it is unclear whether this remained true by the 
1970s.  Whereas on the Rand the sport became increasingly connected to the African 
working-class,17 in the Western Cape it was not intimately connected to any racial group; 
the participation level between Whites, Coloureds, Africans and Indians was broadly 
similar.  Within the WPFB context, while connections to its English origins remained, not 
least through the appropriation of English club names,18 the sport was never discussed as 
a White game.  Evidence suggests that football was viewed as no more or less connected 
to Coloureds than any other racial group.  Within the Coloured community, the game cut 
across class and religious lines; the higher-class Stephanians (Alliance), the lower-class 
Norway Parks (WPFA), the Muslim Bluebells (Cape District) and the Christian St Athens 
(Cape FA) all enthusiastically took up the sport.   
The Coloured view of particular sports was divided from the implicit connotations evident in 
the White community.  Within White circles football was connected to the English-speaking 
working-class and cricket to a British, imperial elite.19  In the Coloured community the 
relationship between the two sports was more intimate.  Organisations such as the Cape 
District Board of Control20 made their fields available to cricket and football for six months a 
year respectively.  This led to a particularly high crossover of players and administrators 
between the two sports.  For instance Matt Seegers, Chairman of the WPFB until 1971, 
was also the Vice-President of the Western Province Cricket Board (WPCB).  While the 
                                                          
17 See Alegi, Laduma! 
18 See Farred, “Theatre of Dreams”. 
19 See Bruce K. Murray and Goolam Vahed (ed.), Empire & Cricket: The South African Experience, 1884-1914 
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culture of the WPFB did retain some representations of earlier assimilationist tendencies, 
by this period the sport of football had no distinct associations in the Coloured community.  
The peculiarities of the WPFB compared to other Coloured sports organisations must 
therefore be viewed as representative of institutional differences rather than the unique 
nature of the sport.   
 
The Governance Units of the WPFB 
 
The WPFB, as an institution, influenced its units and members ‘toward a pattern of 
coordinated and effective behavior’,21 but a concomitant process was influencing the Board 
in a similar manner.  The WPFB was part of a national ‘non-racial’ football and sports 
structure which controlled and affected the workings of the Board – see Figure (iii) for the 
national structure of the WPFB. 
The WPFB’s direct Governance Unit was the South African Soccer Federation (SASF).   
The structure of the Federation was similar to that of the WPFB.   Each provincial associate 
of the SASF provided delegates for Biennial meetings who decided policy on a democratic 
basis.   In terms of numbers, the WPFB was by far the largest affiliate of the SASF22 and it 
was treated as a source of shame whenever Western Province was unable to annex the 
annual SASF inter-provincial tournament.23 
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The Federation was founded in 1951 by an amalgamation of the South African African 
Football Association (SAAFA), South African Coloured Football Association (SACFA)24 and 
South African Indian Football Association (SAIFA).25  The genesis of the Federation had 
come from the WPFB itself; it was the brainchild of A.J. Albertyn, vice-President of SACFA 
and Chairman of the Board. 26    In the 1960s, as playing fields in Transvaal were 
increasingly re-allocated from the SASF, the majority of Africans left the organisation and 
joined the South African Bantu Football Association.27  From then on the SASF remained a 
predominantly Coloured and Indian organisation.    
The SASF often claimed to have been founded on the principle of non-racialism.  No 
evidence was found, however, of the Federation interfering to end the existence of clauses 
banning ‘Natives and Muslims’ within several units of the WPFB, including Cape District, 
Alliance and the WPFA.  The SASF only interfered in Board affairs when its authority as the 
leader of ‘non-racial’ football was at stake.  It was this perceived role that gave the SASF 
hope of achieving its long-term goal to join FIFA and represent South Africa in international 
competitions at the expense of the White Football Association of South Africa (FASA).28 
This goal meant that the SASF became involved in national politics to an extent its 
provincial units did not.  The WPFB was only committed to ‘promote, foster and control’ 
football in Western Province and had little interest in the machinations of FIFA politics.  
Right into the 1970s the Board steadfastly opposed what it viewed as the intrusion of 
‘politics’ into sport;  a 1975 Board meeting which censured the Federation Executive 
termed the root cause of the SASF-WPFB dispute to be ‘politics bedevilling our sport’.29  
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28 See Alegi, Laduma!,111-3. 
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The separate priorities of the two organisations spilled out during the Double Standards 
affair.   
The Board’s disinterest in the SASF’s position towards FIFA was reflective of the 
institution’s widespread antagonism towards professionalism.  Until 1971, the WPFB 
constitution only made reference to amateur football and there remained a strong divide 
between amateur and professional levels.30  An early professional team, Cape Ramblers, 
who played in the South African Soccer League (SASL) (1961-5), had its members 
ostracised by the WPFB.  This was despite the fact that Ramblers was largely made up of 
players from Aerials FC and the Alliance Union.31  The Board did establish its own team, 
Cape Town Spurs, for the SASF-administered Federation Professional League’s (FPL) 
inaugural 1969 season, but divides remained.  Despite winning the league seven times in 
the twelve seasons until its sale in 1982, there were strong and sustained calls for the 
Board to relinquish its control and financial support to Spurs almost every year.32  While 
Durban regularly provided seven or eight FPL clubs, the Western Cape for the majority of 
the period had just two: Spurs and the semi-autonomous Glenville.33  The WPFB, despite 
its ownership of Cape Town Spurs, retained a stronger commitment to the amateur than 
the professional code.    
The divide in priorities between the SASF and the WPFB was dwarfed by an even deeper 
gulf between the Board and the SASF’s governance unit: the South African Council on 
Sport (SACOS).  SACOS was established in 1973 with an initial purpose to provide a 
common front for all non-racial sportsmen.34  Situations in different sports varied, but the 
organisation drew its strength largely from the Coloured and Indian populations.  In 
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32 See UWC, Mayibuye Archives, Papers of the Western Province Association Football Board, MCH82, WPFB 
minute books, 1972, 16/11/72, 17/7/75, 1/10/78 etc.  
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SACOS’s early years, in the absence of an affiliated rugby or cricket union, football drove 
organisational policy; Norman Middleton, the long-time head of the SASF was SACOS 
president between 1973 and 1977.  In the years under Middleton, SACOS negotiated with 
other sporting bodies on the grounds ‘that sport transcended race and politics’.35  However 
in 1977, in the aftermath of the Soweto Uprisings, Black Consciousness and a growing 
non-collaborationist movement, the organisation turned towards a new Challenger, South 
African Cricket Board (SACB) President Hassan Howa.36  Howa, with his coining of the 
phrase ‘no normal sport in an abnormal society’,37 contended that it was ‘impossible to 
separate politics from sport in (Apartheid) South Africa’.38  It was under Howa’s leadership 
that SACOS implemented the Double Standards resolution. 
The Board was, through its affiliation to the SASF, bound by all decisions made by the 
SACOS Executive.  However, the WPFB’s antagonism towards politics affecting sport 
meant that the WPFB-SACOS relationship was often fractious.  This relationship was 
reflected in a growing antagonism towards the SACOS provincial arm, the Western 
Province Council on Sport (WPCOS or WEPCOS).  In 1975, a majority voted against Board 
affiliation to WPCOS39 and in 1978 ties were formally severed in a unanimous decision.40  
The WPFB only re-joined in 1982 after the implementation of the Double Standards 
resolution.  Even after the WPFB’s return, the relationship remained defined by mutual 
antagonism.   
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The Culture of the WPFB 
 
This structure of the WPFB led to a number of Institutional Logics within the Board that 
influenced and explained its later decision-making.  This was not however reflected in any 
distinguishable playing style.  Teams played in a multitude of ways which loosely reflected 
global trends.  Until the arrival of television to South Africa in 1976, the main connection 
most Coloureds had to world football was in newspapers and in short clips played before 
movies at local bioscopes.  Joe Schaffers noted their immense popularity and that: 
The Avalon Bioscope it had a thing called Movitone News and in 
Movitone  News there would be just a short section on soccer and then it 
used to feature the games for just a couple of minutes, but guys used to 
go to that … never mind what movie was playing and learn from that.  So 
that was how we learnt our soccer.41 
Other than this, global trends were filtered through the two professional White Capetonian 
clubs, Cape Town City and Hellenic.  The two clubs were able to call on foreign players and 
managers such as Frank Lord, Gordon Banks, Roger Hunt, Booby Moore and Geoff Hurst 
who disseminated British/European tactics.42  Irrespective of relations and attitudes towards 
South African Whites, English football remained regarded as the standard to aspire to and 
was greatly admired by many in the WPFB.  In 1977 all Board matches were postponed for 
a weekend so its members could watch the FA Cup Final.43 
Within the administrative sphere however there were several definable common values, 
norms and beliefs.  The first Institutional Logic was the use of English in official documents.  
Coloureds were bilingual; while many higher-class individuals spoke English, the majority of 
lower-class Coloureds spoke Afrikaans or a peculiar Coloured dialect termed ‘Kaapse’.  
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Despite this, Board meetings and indeed all official unit meetings, were administered 
exclusively in English.  This often led to confusion as, while administrators used English in 
the meeting minutes and other official documents, many of the participants would speak in 
Afrikaans.44    
Board administration also emphasised order and the constitution.  While most officials were 
less pernickety than long-time President of Alliance, Sydney Lotter, whom Ebrahim 
Abdullah termed ‘Mr. Constitution’,45 there was a general interest in law and order.  This 
was reflected in an obsession with the dress of delegates.  In 1969 one of the most 
debated issues was whether or not ‘safari suits’ were acceptable attire for Board 
meetings.46  The motion allowing them was passed, but was rescinded in 1975.47  This 
preoccupation of the administrators was often subverted by players who did not share their 
fixation.  For instance Farouk Abrahams notes that for his club in the Cape Flats FA, the 
constitution read that ties must be worn to meetings.  It did not however specify over what 
the ties must be worn and many players therefore turned up to meetings wearing ties over 
t-shirts.48   
The final common feature was a connection of football to a moral duty.   The sport was 
viewed not just as a game, but as a social responsibility that helped uplift the community.  
Joe Schaffers and Ebrahim Abdullah, in their interviews with the author, both explicitly 
placed football in direct opposition to gangs and criminal activity.49  A Cape Herald article 
on football in the Cape Flats summarised the perceived importance of football:  
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Before Cape Flats FA was founded, the township had several gangs of 
idle, frustrated youngsters. Gangs vanished as soon as we were able to 
provide the only social authority.50 
Whether or not football was effective in achieving these lofty goals, the link is so often 
mentioned in the press, official meetings and interviews that it can be concluded social 
uplift was an important motivation for many in undertaking football administration.  
Football’s connection to a moral undertaking added to the perceived importance of the 
sport within Coloured communities. 
All three of these ‘norms’ reflected a strong association between WPFB administration and 
the outlook and preoccupations of the Coloured middle-class.  This group represented the 
Dominant body of actors in the Board, in that their ‘actions and interests’ had an undue 
influence over the institution.51  The group’s attitudes were firmly rooted within the formation 
of a distinct Coloured identity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  The 
origins of Coloureds as a separate group are heavily disputed.52  However, there is a broad 
historiographical consensus that by the early-mid twentieth century the term Coloured was 
generally accepted by both those inside and outside the identified community.  This identity 
was heavily associated with an ‘intermediate status in the South African racial hierarchy’ 
and a ‘position of relative privilege’.53   Sociologist Zimitri Erasmus described Coloured 
identity as: 
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For me, growing up coloured meant knowing that I was not only not white, 
but less than white: not only not black but better than black (as we 
referred to African people).54 
‘Colouredness’, whether seen as a self-expression or as a term attributed to the group from 
outside, was defined by its relation to Africans and Whites.  Generally perceived to be of a 
mixed racial origin, the community initially became defined only by the combination of a 
number of loose associations, including skin colour, socio-economic position and cultural 
practices.55  These generally accepted identifiers, while vague, were used both from within 
and outside to define a distinctive identity. 
The term Coloured, while given a legal basis in the Population Registration Act of 1950, 
remained defined only as ‘a person who is not a white person or a native’. 56   The 
classification remained based on the vague standards of ‘appearance and general 
acceptance and repute’.57  This ambiguity led to the identifiers for ‘Colouredness’ being 
applied within the community for means of prestige and entry into a higher socio-economic 
position.  The middle-class became heavily associated not just with professional 
occupations e.g. teachers and lawyers, but with physical features and practices that made 
them ‘more White’: lighter skin, straight hair, the worship of Christianity, the use of English 
and the application of European cultural practices.  Lower-class Coloureds were generally 
identified with traits that made them less distinct from the African community: darker skin, 
curly hair and the use of ‘Kaapse’.     
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The Board’s culture and Institutional Logics were heavily associated with this middle-class 
identity.  The connection of football to social uplift and the obsession with order and 
constitution has many parallels to the Christian missionary culture within South Africa of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.58  This can be viewed as part of a wider 
attempt by the Coloured middle-classes to imbue their community with European notions of 
‘respectability’.  In doing so they initially sought to distinguish themselves from Africans and 
to attempt to ‘assimilate’ into White society. 59   While by the 1970s the Coloured 
classification had become increasingly defined and distinct which called into question the 
efficacy of this ideology, the Coloured middle-classes continued to be connected to this 
outlook.    
The Dominant position of the Coloured middle-classes within the WPFB was reproduced, 
strengthened and protected by a variety of methods.  Some of these were based in 
practical matters.  Official positions required time, money and access to transport that was 
beyond the material realities of many lower-class Coloureds.  Those in particular ‘middle-
class’ jobs were also preferred for certain administrative positions.  Understandably those 
with financial expertise were often selected for treasurer duties.  For instance Rashied 
Cloete was nominated to be Treasurer of Cape District due to his job at a firm of chartered 
accountants.60  On a cruder level, Joe Schaffers noted that often anyone with a car would 
be made captain of the team, on account of the fact that the rarity and importance of car 
ownership meant an owner would always be selected.61  Being captain of a team would 
generally lead to becoming a delegate to unit meetings and the possibility of entering unit 
officialdom.    
The association of the Coloured middle classes with Board administration was not however 
unchallenged.  These Challenger groups, while they had less immediate say in the affairs 
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and culture of the institution, nevertheless held an important role as an alternative to the 
Dominants.  These groups became particularly important during the Double Standards 
affair when they used the institutional destabilisation ‘for the realization of their interests’.62 
The first group of Challengers in the WPFB was ‘new money’ Coloureds.   While Coloureds 
still faced pervasive political and socio-economic discrimination in the 1970s, in economic 
terms the group made real if limited gains.  Goldin detailed the position of Coloureds in the 
period: 
Within the Coloured population the most noteworthy change was the 
growth in white-collar clerical and service employment and the declining 
relative share of Coloured employment in the lower manual and unskilled 
occupations.63 
The increase in the numbers of ‘white-collar’ Coloureds meant that more and more WPFB 
members could claim to have the ‘time, money and access to transport’ that had previously 
precluded them from official positions.  This allowed them to challenge the old Dominants 
within units.  The nature of the ‘challenge’ was traditional in that this group tended not to 
fundamentally question the system.  Owing in part to their new-found financial prowess, 
they usually became a delegate to unit meetings, before moving on to an administrative 
role within the unit. 
The second method of ‘challenge’ can be found at the unit level.  By the constitution of the 
WPFB all units were created equal, but in reality some were more equal than others.  Units 
varied in terms of size, financial prowess and standard of football.  On the eve of the 
Double Standards affair, the Dominant units can be identified as those regarded as higher 
class: Cape District, Stellenbosch and to a lesser extent Alliance dominated Board 
competitions.  Alliance, despite its long history as a Dominant, faded in power throughout 
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the period in question.  Due largely to the impact of forced removals, the association closed 
its doors in 1985.  All three units were strongly associated with the Coloured middle-class 
and financially were incredibly powerful.64  Cape District was generally viewed as the most 
powerful unit of all, due to its facilities at the William Herbert Sports Ground in Wynberg.65  
The ‘Mardi Gras’ celebrations were held at William Herbert every year and brought in 
significant windfalls of cash.  The Cape District Board of Control, the Cape District FA’s 
governing organisation, was not only able to use its money to buy the ground from the 
Council, but also significantly improve the facilities.  In 1967, at a time when few Coloured 
grounds even had changing rooms, Cape District was able to construct a multi-purpose 
sports hall and purchase the old floodlights that had been used at Hartleyvale.66  The 
ground was the premier Coloured football venue in the Western Cape until Council 
improvements to Athlone Stadium were completed in the early 1970s.   
The association of Alliance and Cape District with the Coloured middle class was for a long 
time enforced by what was known as ‘passing out parades’ wherein potential applicants 
would be checked for eligibility.  While in some units this meant little more than agreeing to 
the rules of the constitution, in Alliance and Cape District it meant checking on skin colour, 
religion and the straightness of hair.  Gamja Norton, an Indian Muslim, stated that at 
Alliance: 
apartheid was very forcibly in within the organisation as well … where 
they were looking at your hair.  And also basically they didn’t allow 
Muslims to be involved in the sport and I actually had to change my name 
to be registered as George.67 
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Norton also notes that Alliance President Sydney Lotter would use the infamous ‘pencil 
test’ well into the 1960s and that he would ‘humiliate’ prospective applicants.68  The links to 
Apartheid classifications can also be viewed in what Norton termed the use of ‘football 
names’, i.e. the ‘Christian’ name George.  The use of a different name to divorce oneself 
from old associations was often used by those who were looking to ‘pass for White’ in 
official registrations.  The similarities in the methods adopted by Alliance and those of the 
authorities were not lost on the players who termed Lotter ‘Ike the kommandant’.69    
There is no evidence that the WPFB Executive ruled against this kind of discrimination.  
Instead, discrimination was tacitly allowed by the Board who termed it a ‘domestic affair’ for 
units and teams.70  The practice of racial ‘passing out’ at unit level did recede in the 1970s 
with ‘passing out parades’ largely morphing into little more than the reading of the 
constitution, however the practice continued at club level.  Terrence Fredericks and Joe 
Schaffers noted that this was true at the Alliance-affiliated Ridgeville FC: 
TF: When I grew up, there was another soccer club, that soccer club, 
name was Ridgeville. 
JS: Ridgeville, yes.   
TF: You had to have a sharp nose. 
JS: And straight hair. 
TF: You had to have straight hair.71   
These clubs often used their privileged economic position to attract players from other 
clubs by offering to buy them togs or to waive their subsidy fees.72  These sort of practices 
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ensured that units such as Alliance and Cape District were still identified as ‘elitist’ into the 
mid-1980s.73  Discrimination within the Board continued to exist, but it was swept under the 
carpet.  The Board system of not interfering in non-footballing matters was maintained 
during the Double Standards affair. 
The Challengers to the Dominant ‘middle class’ units can be recognised as new, less 
established and/or perceived lower class units.  The WPFA, based at the Royal Road 
sports complex in Maitland, despite being the oldest unit of the Board was regarded as 
lower class and was often excluded from the highest level of Board competition in the 
1960s.  Fanie Stuurman noted that the association was looked down upon because while 
other associations’ administrators were teachers and lawyers, in Maitland ‘there weren’t 
people like that’.74  Both Stuurman and Fransman suggest that this discrimination barred 
WPFA players from being selected for professional or WPFB teams.75  In a similar fashion, 
members of the Cape FA, based at Turfhall, were colloquially referred to as ‘bosbessies’ or 
bushberries.76  The Maggot Trophy throughout the 1960s ran on an inter-unit system which 
had two divisions with no promotion or relegation.  The first division had units such as 
Alliance, Cape District and Stellenbosch while the second involved the WPFA, Central, 
Cape FA and Metropolitan.  Anger at the division of units came to a head in 1969 when 
Central, WPFA and Metropolitan refused to play in protest. 77   While class concerns 
underlined the dispute, sporting concerns were also apparent.  Barney Leendertz, the 
chairman of Bellville-based Central, noted that his only demand was for a ‘system of play 
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which does not discriminate against players’.78  The system was replaced with one division 
in 1970.  
The impact of forced removals led to the emergence of another group of Challengers, the 
new units established in the rapidly growing towns on the Cape Flats.  By 1979, in order to 
facilitate residential segregation approximately 150 000 people had been forcibly removed 
under the Group Areas Act, 1950; the vast majority of these were Coloureds and the vast 
majority of those moved to the Flats.79  While initially this movement was catered for by the 
movement of Northerns and Metropolitan, the two units worst affected by forced removals, 
by 1972 the WPFB was aware that it needed ‘to cater for’ the new unions that were being 
formed.80  In 1973 the Cape Flats FA, based in Heideveld, became the first organisation of 
this type to become a full member of the Board.  The association had inauspicious 
beginnings; the unit was served an edict in 1973 reminding it that all players must play with 
football boots on.81  However, behind a rapidly growing membership, Cape Flats swiftly 
grew in stature and in 1976 the association’s biggest club, Everton, annexed the Maggot 
Trophy.82  Following the Cape Flats FA’s success, a host of other associations, among 
them the Mitchells Plain FA and Hanover Park, linked up with the WPFB in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.   
Neither of these clusters of Challengers fundamentally questioned the system or outlook of 
the Board.  Challenges stemmed predominantly from particular groups attempting to 
establish themselves in official positions or within the existing Board structure.  The Double 
Standards resolution, however, predominantly came out of a third Challenger faction – a 
group that analysed events by their relationships outside of narrow institutional confines, in 
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politics.  This faction, heavily associated with the Muslim community, was formed out of 
events in the early 1960s.   
Coloureds, viewed by the Apartheid state as ‘a residual statutory population category’,83 
were heavily divided.  The 1950 Population Registration Act divided the Coloured 
community into seven sub-categories: Cape Coloured, Cape Malay, Griqua, Indian, 
Chinese, ‘other Asiatic’, and ‘other Coloured’.84  The second group, Cape Malays, were 
generally identified as descendants of Indonesian slaves brought over to the Cape in the 
seventeenth century.85  Malays, an officially separate group, were predominantly Muslim86 
and had different customs, dress and food to Cape Coloureds.  These divides led to a 
particularly pervasive rift within the Coloured community.  Several units including Cape 
District and Alliance 87  had clauses within their constitution that excluded ‘Natives and 
Muslims’.88  This meant that until the late 1950s Muslims largely played in their own unit, 
the Western Province Moslem Board.  This situation was not peculiar to football; rugby and 
cricket were divided along similar lines.89 
The rift had racial, religious and class connotations. Muslims were stereotyped as poor, 
‘Kaapse’-speaking and as having darker skin.  This led to a general perception that they 
were lower-class.  Dougy Herbert asserted: 
I think even the Moslem African thing was more class than racial.90 
Herbert based his belief on his experiences with Battswood (Cape District) in the late 
1950s.   The club, despite the laws of the unit, had several Muslim players (who used 
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‘football names’).  All of these players were however ‘upper (class), that was English 
speaking’.91  The exclusion of Muslims was not only a reflection of religious divides, but of 
the association of middle-class culture with the Dominant units and their administrators.   
The clauses within the constitutions of Alliance and Cape District initially seem to have 
been enacted at the behest of the Western Province Moslem Board itself.92  However, by 
the 1950s they had become highly controversial.  While officialdom of the Moslem Board 
remained Muslim, the unit had changed its name to the Cosmopolitan Union in 1950 and 
clubs such as Bluebells had many non-Muslim members.93  Throughout the 1950s the 
Cosmopolitan Union consistently called on other units to open their ‘doors to all players, 
regardless of race.’94 
The situation was brought to a head when the Cosmopolitan Union collapsed due to 
financial difficulties in the late 1950s.95  Seeking somewhere to continue playing their sport, 
Bluebells, a predominantly Muslim club drawing its strength from the area around Batts 
Road in lower Wynberg, applied to join its local unit, Cape District.  Despite the unit ditching 
the clause in its constitution that barred Muslims and Natives for the 1960/1 season,96 
Bluebells’ application was rejected.  That was when Steve Dublin (a long-time proponent of 
non-racialism) stepped in; his club Duncan Rovers, centred in Duncan Road in upper 
Wynberg, was ‘going to go defunct’.97  He approached Cloete and offered to merge the two 
clubs under the name Duncan Rovers, but with the colours of Bluebells.  In the words of 
Rashied Cloete, ‘Mr Herbert98 was shocked ... the Bluebells kit that was a shock for the 
Establishment’.99  By 1971, when the club officially adopted the Bluebells name, several 
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other ‘Muslim’ clubs had joined the unit and exerted growing influence within Cape District 
that resulted in Steve Dublin becoming Chairman of the unit in the mid-1970s.     
In Alliance the path for another Muslim club, Blackpool, was – at least according to Ebrahim 
Abdullah – paved by Basil D’Oliveira: 
E.A.: he (D’Oliveira) then said because he was a … icon of this particular 
association, he then told them if you people do not accept the Blackpool 
football club in this association, then I will join the Blackpool and I will 
resign and I will join the Blackpool club.  And this made them change their 
whole view of this whole thing and because of that they accepted 
Blackpool.100  
Blackpool and Bluebells paved the way for a host of Muslim clubs to join the two units.  
These clubs thereafter took up Challenger roles both within units and in the WPFB more 
generally.  The nature of them as Challengers was very different to the cases mentioned 
earlier.  While the other groups utilised traditional Board structures, this faction became 
increasingly attached to politics.  While their previous experiences had been motivated at 
least in part by sporting considerations, Bluebells’ perceived history of political struggle 
attracted political activists to the club.101  Among these was Abie Adams, the future SACOS 
president.102  This faction and their stance came to embody ‘politicised’ decision-making 
within the Double Standards affair.  Their support or otherwise (and underlying motivations) 
is utilised later to ascertain the level of ‘politicisation’ within the Board.  
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The WPFB’s existing Institutional Settlement, the ‘agreement negotiated primarily by the 
efforts of field dominants (and their internal and external allies) to preserve a status quo 
that generally serves their interests’,103 was based around the Coloured middle-classes.  
There is little evidence that non-racialism played any day-to-day role in Board affairs.  By 
the early 1980s, after the implementation of the Double Standards resolution, the WPFB 
officially had a strong non-racial policy (even if this was not always followed at grassroots 
level) and official documents often stressed the WPFB’s long history with the ideology.  For 
instance the 1978 Secretarial Report noted that the SASF’s 1951 ‘Non-Racial Platform … 
gave birth to SACOS.’104  This has led some historians to argue that the WPFB and non-
racialism were intimately connected.  Joe Latakgomo stated: 
The development of soccer in the Western Cape…is rooted in the 
principled quest for non-racial soccer.105 
The experiences of Muslims and the continued association of Dominant WPFB culture with 
a light-skinned middle class should be enough to repudiate this statement. 
Even in the 1970s, there are still many cases of official discrimination within the Board.  
Indeed Stuurman and Fransman describe a multitude of ways in which they were 
discriminated against: 
A.F.: we were the poor ones and you, you didn’t have long hair; they 
would discriminate on that.  You will not get into the Board team because 
you… 
F.S.: your colour is not right and haven’t got the right hair…. 
A.F.: yes it was obvious, you are not English speaking, so you cannot 
represent. 
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F.S.: your your mother, your father isn’t a teacher…. 
A.F.: you cannot play with them.  Hoekom hulle is ‘n bietjie te swart [They 
are a bit too black].106 
Fransman and Stuurman go on in their interview to accuse Wallace ‘Wally’ Henkel 
(Chairman of the WPFB, 1971-81), Matt Seegers (Chairman up to 1971 and later SASF 
President), Vincent Baartjes (Secretary of the WPFB, 1974-1985, Chairman, 1985-1990) 
and William Herbert (long-time head of Cape District) of being ‘racists’.107  They claim that 
discrimination at Cape District did not improve until the ‘early eighties’.108    
The Board never tried to implement non-racialism as an Institutional Logic or a value within 
the institution.  Instead it tacitly allowed discrimination to continue to exist at club and unit 
level and the WPFB’s administration retained its association with the middle-classes.  The 
values, norms and beliefs of the institution were founded off the structure of the Board itself 
and the wider culture of the communities it served.  The success or otherwise of the 
organisation in achieving its goal ‘To promote, foster and control professional football and 
amateur Association football in the Western Province’ depended on an asymmetric, flexible 
system wherein the Executive largely stayed out of ‘domestic’ (unit and club) affairs.109  The 
WPFB’s implementation of the Double Standards resolution was undertaken in this context.  
The reaction, manner and methodology of the Board’s response all reflected the WPFB’s 
extant connections to the middle-class Coloured community and the unique structure of the 
institution.  The WPFB however did not exist in a vacuum.  This extant state of affairs was 
destabilised by events sparked by a shift in the outlook of the other football organisations in 
the Western Cape.  This destabilisation led directly to the Double Standards resolution’s 
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implementation.  To analyse the motives behind the WPFB take-up of the act, these groups 






Chapter 2 – The Football Structure in the Western Cape 
 
Organizational fields are not generally benign and cooperative 
arrangements held in place by a sense of duty or honor, although the 
rhetoric and ideology of their proponents might lead one to think so.  
Instead, they are set up to benefit their most powerful members … The 
most important determinants of that power are the size of the firms and the 
ability of actors in them to prevent other organizations from entering their 
fields.1  
 
The WPFB’s implementation of the Double Standards resolution was predicated on an 
attempt ‘to prevent other organizations from entering their fields’.  In the wake of failed 
integration talks, the Board turned to the resolution in order to protect its extant spheres of 
influence from the other football associations active in the Western Cape.  Due to the 
stratified nature of the Apartheid-era Western Cape, while each of these External Units was 
de jure non-racial by the mid-1970s, they remained heavily associated with particular racial 
classifications: the WPFA (Hartleyvale) with Whites, the Western Cape Soccer Association 
(WCSA) with Africans, and the Western Province Indian Football Association (WPIFA) with 
Indians.2   
Before the integration talks of the mid-late 1970s, each association had largely restricted 
itself to its own ‘racial’ field of influence.  The WPFB’s main concern had been ‘rebel’ 
organisations (those without a national Governance Unit)3 who established themselves as 
rival Coloured football associations.4  These small and generally underfunded ‘splinter units’, 
while remaining of some concern to the WPFB, in terms of perceived threat faded into the 
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background once the larger and more established  ex-‘racial’ organisations shifted to a more 
outward-looking stance in the late 1970s.  The growing influence of the White WPFA 
(Hartleyvale) in particular created great anxiety within WPFB circles.  The Double Standards 
affair was based around these concerns and therefore these football associations, their aims 
and outlooks must be understood.   
 
The WPFB’s External Actors: the WPFA (Hartleyvale), the WCSA and the WPIFA   
   
The WPFB’s External Actors were each institutions in their own right and therefore had their 
own values, beliefs and norms, or Institutional Logics, that defined their organisations and 
informed their decision making.  This position meant that while the WPFA (Hartleyvale), 
WCSA and the WPFB all had the ultimate goal of controlling amateur (and professional) 
football in the Western Province, each utilised separate means and methods. 
The African WCSA and the White WPFA (Hartleyvale) acted as rival associations to the 
Board, but the relationship between the WPFB and WPIFA was more complex.  While 
Africans and Whites were clearly defined and identified as distinct groups, the position of 
Indians vis-à-vis Coloureds was more ambiguous.  The official designation of Coloureds as 
‘a person who is not a white person or a native’ occasionally allowed Indians to be 
subsumed within the wider Coloured classification;5 until 1961 when a Department of Indian 
Affairs was established, the Department of Coloured Affairs was responsible for the control 
and administration of both groups.6  The small number of Indians in the Western Cape 
combined with certain cultural links to Cape Malays made Indian identity less distinct than 
elsewhere.  Many were descendants of Muslim Gujarati traders and sometimes identified 
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with Cape Malays in pan-Islamic terms.7  These links helped lead to a particularly high 
number of controversial race classification cases in Cape Town.8 
The complex inter-relationship between Indians and Coloureds meant that the Western 
Province Indian Football Association’s (WPIFA) connection to the WPFB was very different 
to the WCSA or the WPFA (Hartleyvale).  The WPIFA, unlike its White or African 
counterparts, was a periodic associate of the WPFB and dual affiliation between the 
organisations was common.  The Indian association played its games at Rylands on 
Sundays, while the Board played its amateur games on Saturdays.  This allowed them to 
use WPFB players.  This dual affiliation, while officially illegal, was often overlooked and was 
practised by Coloureds and Indians.  For instance the Daniels brothers, Arthur and Keith, 
were well-known players in the Alliance League and for Aces United at Rylands. 9   In 
affiliating Coloureds, the WPIFA often used ‘football names’ similarly to how WPFB units 
affiliated Muslims.10  The Board’s units generally turned a blind eye to this practice; the 
WPFB Executive had to release a statement in 1977 to reiterate that juniors could not have 
dual affiliation.11  For the players, the WPIFA was an enticing proposition.  The backing of 
the strong Indian business community gave the Association financial strength and prize 
money beyond most competitions of the Board.12  Meanwhile the relatively small size of the 
Indian population in Cape Town and the fact that most players’ primary association remained 
the WPFB meant the Board never perceived the WPIFA as a threat.  WPIFA officialdom, 
regardless of the mixed racial make-up of the players, remained almost entirely in Indian 
hands.13  The WPIFA was at various times unaffiliated to any national body14 and at others 
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affiliated to the South African Indian Football Association (SAIFA) until it joined the WPFB as 
a unit in 1982.15   
In the mid-late 1970s the WPIFA changed its name to the FAWP.16   While the name 
change’s exact date could not be found, it is likely that it was in the immediate aftermath of 
the passing of the Double Standards resolution by SACOS in 1977.  Shoukat Mia locates its 
stimulus in the fact that juniors ‘could never get into the schools team’;17 after the passing of 
the resolution, the Western Province Senior Schools Sports Union (WPSSSU) as a SACOS 
affiliate did not accept members who also played non-SACOS administered sport.  The 
motivation for the name change is unclear.  Jasper Raymond locates it in politics: 
we concluded that something had to be done to get rid of the old regime 
because they were totally entrenched in the roots of the apartheid era.18 
The claim is questionable.  The name change was little more than cosmetic; the WPIFA had 
always had integrated teams.19  Indeed, it seems that the restrictions on the WPIFA from the 
Double Standards resolution also had an influence.  The resolution meant that previously 
accepted dual affiliations were cracked down upon and players were suspended.20  This fact 
combined with Mia’s testimony suggests that for many the motivation behind the name 
change and the consequent attempts to join the WPFB was the drain of players ensuing 
from the Double Standards resolution.  As shall be demonstrated with the WPFB’s 
implementation of the resolution, it was as much an attempt to ensure the institution’s 
survival and guarantee the continuation of its football as a political undertaking.  
                                                          
15 Full membership only in 1984. 
16 It should be noted that the WPFB had removed ethnic markers from its name almost thirty years earlier. 
17 Interview with Second Focus Group, Shoukat Mia, 24/10/07. 
18 Interview with Rygate Site Visit, Jasper Raymond, 30/1/08. 
19 Ted Doman, “Who is Bluffing Who”, Cape Herald, 12/8/72. 
20 For examples of players suspended for dual affiliation with WPIFA/FAWP, see UWC, Mayibuye Archives, 








Figure (iv): Simplified Football Structure in the Western Province.21  
                                                          
21 The WPIFA/FAWP’s national structure is not included here since it was less consistent than the other groups.  
At various times the group was affiliated to the South African Indian Football Association (SAIFA) and to no 





















































In contrast to the relationship with the WPIFA/FAWP, official relations with the ‘rival’ WCSA 
and WPFA (Hartleyvale) associations were almost non-existent.  The Western Cape Soccer 
Association (WCSA), based in Langa, was affiliated to the South African National Football 
Association (SANFA) and like the Board worked on a unit system.  Despite strong teams 
such as Bafana and Spes Bona, the NPSL (the SANFA professional league) never had a 
team from the WCSA.22  In 1972 the NPSL did establish a Zambuk or promotion league in 
Cape Town however, despite promises to the contrary, none of the ‘promoted’ teams ever 
entered the NPSL first or second divisions.  George Thabe, the long-time President of 
SANFA, blamed this situation on the lack of a suitable stadium and the high cost of travel to 
and from the Western Cape.23  A Cape Town team may have cost the league as much as 
R126 000 annually.24  The relationship between the WCSA and SANFA was fraught and Joe 
Mthimka, the founding President of WCSA unit the Gugulethu FA, described the WCSA as 
‘just ... a sibling association’ to SANFA.25   
Until 1985 when the two organisations’ parent bodies, the SASF and SANFA, entered talks, 
relations between the WPFB and the WCSA were rare and highly limited.  Then Secretary 
and later President of the WPFB, Vincent Baartjes, blames this largely on African 
antagonism towards Coloureds.  He described a rare meeting between the organisations in 
1975: 
when we first tried to get unity and that was when people like Mr Wally 
(Henkel), them were around.  You know we went out to Langa and it was 
pitch dark.  And the meeting we were in was pitch dark and there was 
candles and things… 
                                                          
22 Apart from in 1962 and 1963, when the league was still in conception as a rival to the South African Soccer 
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23 Raath, Soccer Through, 114.  
24 Diza Mahlebo, “Shock for Cape Town Soccer”, Cape Argus, 1/2/73. 





And we were accused at the time particularly you know you Coloured 
people this and you Coloured people that.  And I remember (Thami Mkhizi) 
actually making the observation to his own members. 
He says…we talk about uh about the Coloureds, but I want you to 
remember something that while we are in chains of iron, they are in chains 
of gold, but both of them were in chains.26 
The reliability or otherwise of this story is debatable.  Baartjes’ legacy has been built on his 
reputation as ‘the pioneer of football unity in South Africa.’27  In the interview he notes with 
pride that when the WPFB and WCSA united, they ‘were the first in the country’.28  His 
location of the failure to unify earlier in the socio-economic position of Africans and their 
antagonism towards Coloureds could be viewed as an attempt to preserve this legacy.   
Rather than Africans being anti-integration, it is more likely that these ‘chains of iron’, poor 
facilities and a chaotic administrative system, led to the WCSA being perceived as more of a 
potential hindrance than an asset to the WPFB.  The Board’s middle-class outlook prized 
order and the constitution, and the administration generally felt that its own lack of facilities 
meant it should have fewer units not more. 29   The socio-economic and political 
circumstances for Africans in the Western Cape made effective organisation of African 
football in the Western Cape difficult.  In 1955 the Secretary of Native Affairs, Dr. Max 
Eiselen, introduced the Coloured Labour Preference Policy.  Eiselen described the policy’s 
goal as ‘the ultimate elimination of natives from this region (Western Cape)’.30  In practice 
the scheme drew a line behind which employers had to demonstrate that Coloured labour 
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28 Ibid. 
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could not be obtained before being allowed to employ African labour.31  Strict influx controls 
were also placed on Africans.  Only those who were born and whose parents were born 
behind the ‘imaginary Berlin Wall’ were classified as being from the Western Cape.32  If no 
proof could be found, then Africans had to apply for an eleven month pass to live and work in 
the region.  After this, individuals had to ‘return’ to their homelands and apply for a new 
pass.33  The policy meant that most Africans in the Western Cape were officially classed as 
temporary residents.   
This status meant that even compared to the inadequate Coloured amenities, the 
recreational facilities provided for Africans were of a deplorable standard.  Langa Stadium, 
the largest ground in the African townships, was described as an ‘uneven, gravel pitch’.34  
When the WCSA appealed to the City Council to improve the field, it was levelled with 
charcoal taken from the cooling towers of the Athlone Power Station.  This made the pitch 
akin to a tarred road35 – and this field was generally regarded as the best in Langa.   The 
standard of facilities inhibited the improvement of African soccer.  When Orlando Pirates 
played a Western Cape African XI in 1974, Pirates won 9-0.  The press attributed the 
thrashing to the ‘alien’ conditions that the Western Cape players faced due to the ‘lush, cut 
turf’ at Hartleyvale.36  
These ‘chains of iron’ made administration difficult.  The WCSA simply did not have the 
resources, finances or facilities to administer its football to the same level as the WPFB.   Mr. 
Mpatidos blamed the lack of relations between the WCSA and the WPFB on: 
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I must be honest they were bit far from us in the sense that in organising 
because one, they had resources, we didn’t have resources, they had 
fields.37   
The classification of Africans as ‘temporary’ residents led to a very high turnover of 
individuals which added to and exacerbated these organisational difficulties.  As unity talks 
arrived in the late 1980s, most African clubs and units still lacked a proper constitution.38  To 
the WPFB hierarchy, obsessed with order and the constitution, this was a major barrier to 
unity. 
This situation seems to have led many Coloureds in the WPFB to look down upon their 
African counterparts.  Mr. Mpatidos noted: 
some of them (WPFB) had attitude.  I must be honest, they had attitude 
towards us (WCSA) and towards our people (Africans) … that frustrate me, 
a lot.39 
This ‘frustration’ created a context of mutual antagonism between the two groups.  Many 
Board members and officials viewed the WCSA as an inferior organisation lacking in the 
facilities or administration required to join the Board.  This in turn created a sense in the 
WCSA of a racial division and a stronger connection to the survival of their organisation.  
African footballers and administrators (such as Mr. Mpatidos) increasingly believed that their 
peculiar circumstances required a separate organisation catered to their particular needs.      
Due to what Adhikari describes as Coloureds’ ‘intermediate status in the South African racial 
hierarchy’,40 the WCSA’s view of the WPFB was largely paralleled by the WPFB’s of the 
White WPFA (Hartleyvale).  The White organisation played on a centralised basis with direct 
affiliation from clubs, i.e. there was no unit system.  It was affiliated to the Football 
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Association of South Africa (FASA).  As well as its amateur leagues which took place at 
Hartleyvale on a Saturday, there were two professional teams who played in the FASA-
administered National Football League (NFL): the WPFA (Hartleyvale)-owned Cape Town 
City and the autonomous ethnic Greek club Hellenic.  Both teams played on Friday nights – 
City at Hartleyvale and Hellenic at Green Point Stadium.  The organisation, ‘against a lot of 
people’s wishes’,41  became officially non-racial in November 1971; however until 1976 no 
self-identifying Coloured seems to have played in the league. The motivation for the change 
was probably similar to the South African Football Association’s (SAFA) name-change to 
FASA and deletion of its own racially exclusionary clause in 1956, i.e. ‘to create the 
perception of substantive change while keeping an all-white status.’ 42   Seemingly, the 
organisation had no strong internal impetus for change.  
The White association, due to its ownership of the 28 000-seater Hartleyvale Stadium and 
connections to the Cape Town City Council, was generally perceived to have the best 
facilities in the Peninsula.  When its ground’s floodlights were ‘worn out’ in the early 1970s, 
the WPFA (Hartleyvale) was able to secure a loan from the White-owned insurance 
company SANLAM for £35 000 to purchase new ones; the ‘worn out’ lights were sold for a 
considerable fee to the Cape District-owned William Herbert Sports Ground.43  The general 
perception was that access to these facilities meant that the WPFA (Hartleyvale) had the 
highest standard of amateur football in the region. 
The association’s centralised system meant that its priorities and outlook differed from the 
WPFB’s.  All teams affiliated directly and played in a promotion/relegation system termed the 
Cape Western League.  This meant that attention and facility provision focused on the Cape 
Western League first division and the bigger clubs within it.  While within the Board different 
units drew different levels of interest, the localised and fluctuating unit structure meant that a 
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high standard of facilities was demanded in more locations.  Board Unit leagues were 
generally given a similar level of prestige to the inter-unit Maggot Trophy with many players 
choosing to play in their leagues over the competition.44  These structural differences meant 
that the WPFA (Hartleyvale) was far more centred around several large clubs, e.g. Camps 
Bay and Salesians, while the WPFB had to take into account a myriad of different voices.  
This difference in institutional outlook continued to act as a barrier to integration right up until 
the onset of football unity in 1991. 
  
The WPFB’s relationship with ‘other racial groups’ 
 
While the WPFB, WPFA (Hartleyvale), the WCSA and (to a lesser extent) the WPIFA largely 
represented their respective population groups, as all four groups became ‘non-racial’ each 
association attracted members from outside their original communities.  The Double 
Standards resolution as demonstrated later was rooted in Board consternation over the 
prospect of losing its hold over the Coloured community.  While no evidence could be found 
of Coloureds taking part in either the WPFA (Hartleyvale) or the WCSA pre-1976, there were 
a few cases of non-Coloureds taking part in WPFB competitions.  Their experiences can be 
said to be illustrative of the extant barriers to integration before the Double Standards affair.   
In the late 1960s an African unit, the Langa-based Western Province United (WPU),45 did 
briefly affiliate to the Board.  By 1970 however the WPU lost its full membership and soon 
after left the Board entirely.46  This decision followed the unit having forfeited at least six 
Maggot Trophy games in 1968 and having withdrawn from Board competitions in 1969 due 
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to cost.47  The poor administration, facilities and lack of financial resources in African areas 
seemingly meant that the WPU could not remain a member of the WPFB without significant 
assistance.  The Board consistently refused to provide this help. 48   Official relations 
thereafter ceased between any local African body and the Board until 1979. 
Apart from isolated individual members, relations with Africans were reduced to occasional 
friendlies with non-Cape African teams e.g. Moroka Swallows versus Spurs in 1974. 49  
Friendlies in Western Cape African townships also continued; interviews suggest WPFA, 
Alliance and WPIFA teams all played in Langa at various times, however these were 
relatively rare.50  While individual Africans did occasionally play in Board competitions, the 
situation was a rarity due to segregation and apartheid laws.  Africans, who were generally 
removed earlier from areas such as District Six, were confined largely to the townships of 
Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga.  The barrier created by distance was extenuated by the 
existence of onerous pass laws on Africans.  Travelling outside or even between townships 
required a ‘dompas’ which made playing football in a Coloured area an arduous task.  
Whatever attitude the Board had to integration with Africans, the legal realities made it 
incredibly difficult.  Despite shifts in government sports policy in the late 1970s, these 
realities changed very little.  The socio-economic, legal and political divides between the two 
population groups continued to act as a barrier to integration which increased ‘sporting’ 
support for the Double Standards resolution. 
While there were limited relations with African bodies, relations with White footballing bodies 
were almost non-existent.  No evidence was found that any White players played in WPFB 
teams pre the late 1970s.  While the WPFA (Hartleyvale) became officially non-racial in 
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1971, the Association seems not to have accepted anyone identifying as Coloured until 
1977.51   Mixed sport was never officially illegal, but the Reservation of Separate Amenities 
Act, 1953, along with a host of other restrictive measures made the practice difficult.52  Mixed 
sport required separate entrances and toilets which were beyond the means of most 
amateur clubs, even White ones.  Even then, the traditional post-match drink was prohibited, 
due to the Liquor Act, 1928.53  
Coloureds however were not generally antagonistic towards White football.  The two White 
professional National Football League (NFL) clubs, Hellenic and Cape Town City, had a 
fanatical Coloured following.  City’s home ground Hartleyvale was segregated under the 
permit system with the Railway Stand and half of the Hoskins Stand reserved for Coloureds.  
These stands were almost always packed for Friday night NFL games.54  A Cape Herald 
article from 1969 decried the situation wherein Coloureds supported White teams at the 
expense of Coloured football clubs: 
Thousands flock to regular Friday evening games elsewhere and possibly 
some could be persuaded to support the football of their own … If they 
have any conscience they should realise that they have a duty to their own 
people.55 
Until the implementation of the Double Standards resolution, the Board did not have an 
official policy on attending NFL games although its general position was hostile.  Regardless, 
many of those who attended were Board members.56 
While most of the football-loving Coloured community supported one or other of the Cape 
NFL teams, by the 1970s some of the more politicised clubs barred their players from 
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attending due to their opposition to the permit system.  The largely Muslim, Alliance-affiliated 
Blackpool club never allowed its members to attend.57  When long-time member Ebrahim 
Abdullah did attend one game at Hartleyvale, to see his English team Tottenham Hotspur, 
he had to sneak into the ground and ‘told nobody’ about his transgression for fear of 
reprisals.58  In general however clubs, seeing White football as separate rather than as a 
WPFB rival, condoned the practice.  The divide between clubs such as Blackpool who 
viewed the matter in wider political terms and clubs who were focused on their own sporting 
concerns became increasingly important with the onset of SACOS and the Double 
Standards resolution.   
The almost total segregation of South African football was ended by a change in government 
policy.  Piet Koornhof, the Sports Minister, announced the new policy of ‘multi-national’ sport 
in 1971.  The policy supported teams of different ‘races’ competing against each other at a 
national level and allowed for touring foreign sides to be racially mixed.59  In 1976 this policy 
was extended to club level.  Thereafter racially mixed teams in leagues such as the National 
Professional Soccer League (NPSL) were tacitly if not officially supported.  The concept of 
‘multi-national’ games fitted with general National Party policy and interests.  It was 
essentially an extension of the ‘homelands’ policy wherein the government attempted to 
establish independent nations for the various ‘tribes’ within the African classification.  On a 
sporting level, it also provided a ‘policy that could be sold overseas’ in the wake of the 
growing international sporting boycott of the country; 60  in 1970 the International Cricket 
Council (ICC) had declared a moratorium on all tours to South Africa and they had been 
expelled by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). 
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From a practical point of view the policy was disastrous.  In 1975, a Chevrolet-sponsored 
Champion of Champions event, pitting the winners of the NFL against the winners of the 
African NPSL was established.61  In the first final Hellenic faced Kaizer Chiefs and the White 
side won the first leg in Cape Town 4-0.  The second leg, played at the Rand Stadium in 
Johannesburg, turned into a near riot.  Chiefs won the game 2-1, although as bottles rained 
down, it was suggested that the result was down to Hellenic’s ‘tactfulness and diplomacy’ 
rather than footballing inferiority.62  In the aftermath of the disturbances, the Argus declared 
the ‘multi-national’ experiment a failure and called for integrated sport as the ‘final solution’.63 
Perhaps the ‘multi-national’ sports policy’s greatest impact was providing an impetus for 
sportsmen and women to question the laws around non-racial sport.  Many came to the 
conclusion that it was not technically illegal and in 1973 in Pietermaritzburg, the Aurora 
Cricket Club fielded a mixed team in the White Maritzburg Cricket Union (MCU).64  This 
context led the first strongly White-associated club, the University of Cape Town (UCT), to 
apply for WPFB affiliation (through the Alliance League) in October 1974.  For UCT the 
decision was almost certainly political rather than sporting in nature.  The move was 
preceded by a University-wide referendum held in August 1974 that ruled that every sports 
club must ‘furnish evidence to the Sports Union that applications have been submitted to the 
provincial associations for all students to be eligible to play in external leagues’.65  The 
referendum was criticised by the sports clubs for being student-wide rather than confined to 
the clubs themselves.  While UCT affiliated a team to Alliance, it continued to have a team in 
the WPFA (Hartleyvale) administered Cape Western League.  For reasons that are unclear, 
few White students chose to leave the WPFA (Hartleyvale) for the WPFB.  It can be stated 
with reasonable confidence that this was not the result of an ideological aversion to mixed 
teams; in 1975 just 2 of 70 players voted against a motion to leave the WPFA (Hartleyvale) if 
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they did not accept a Black member.66   The issues faced by UCT in Alliance and the 
response of the WPFB administration to them provide perhaps the best example of Board 
attitudes to White integration pre-Double Standards resolution.   
While SASF President Norman Middleton ‘welcomed the decision’ of UCT,67 the Board’s 
initial reaction was coy.  Chairman Wally Henkel stated that: 
We should take the bull by the horns.  The executive has been guided by 
the constitution of the South African Soccer Federation and we thus have 
an obligation to all players.68 
The word ‘obligation’ summarises Henkel’s attitude.  He immediately places the 
responsibility for the affiliation outside of the WPFB and into the hands of the SASF.   
Consternation felt at UCT’s affiliation was widespread and the 1974 Secretarial Report noted 
that UCT was ‘viewed in many areas with distrust and suspicion which is justifiable and is 
not at all surprising’.69  This trepidation seems largely to have been the result of UCT’s dual 
affiliation to the WPFA (Hartleyvale) and Alliance and more political issues.  Cape Town 
United, a former FPL side which played in the NPSL in 1975, wrote a letter to the WPFB 
condemning its acceptance of UCT due to wider discriminatory practices at the University.70  
The consternation quickly heightened to outright antagonism when UCT began playing in 
Alliance.  On 12th April 1975, UCT was beaten by Harvey Rangers in its first game in the 
Coloured association.  The game however was not played at Alliance’s home-ground 
Rosmead but rather at UCT-owned pitches in Pinelands.71  Unsurprisingly, regular Alliance 
supporters were outraged.72  UCT claimed the relocation was due to needing a permit to 
                                                          
66 “UCT club threatens to withdraw”, Cape Times, 11/9/75. 
67 “UCT Applies to Join Alliance”, Cape Herald, 26/10/74. 
68 Ibid. 
69 UWC, Mayibuye Archives, Papers of the Western Province Association Football Board, MCH82-15-2-2, WPFB 
minute books, Secretarial Report 1974. 
70 Ibid., 20/3/75. 
71 “UCT bow in with Alliance”, Cape Herald, 12/4/75. 





play at Rosmead,73  but the Board disputed this claim.  In similar scenes to those noted by 
Merrett in his study of the Aurora Cricket Club,74 the local council decided to wash its hands 
of the affair and refused to clarify its position.  The desire of UCT to play at the Alliance 
ground, with or without permits, was heavily questioned within Alliance.  Even within the 
WPFB, Rosmead was notorious for being a quagmire particularly in the rain.  Coenie 
Stuurman described Rosmead as having a ‘black slush’ which stank. 75   The pitch at 
Pinelands was of a much higher quality.  On his first game at Pinelands, Castle Celtic player 
Cyril Kounis stated gleefully that ‘Our passes went where they were supposed to have gone 
thanks to the conditions of the pitch.’76   
In addition to this sporting concern, the makeup of the UCT team also drew criticism.   
Blackpool member, Ebrahim Abdullah, located the origin of his opposition to UCT in the fact 
that the Whites they had held meetings with were not in the team.  He stated that the team 
had almost no Whites at all. 77   Seemingly the administration of the UCT club, having 
complied with the referendum’s requirements to provide a team in a league where Black 
players could participate, had along with the vast majority of White players remained in the 
Cape Western League.  This meant that the UCT team were mostly Black and were not 
students at all, but workers at the University.78  Due to these concerns Blackpool refused to 
take the field against UCT at Pinelands.79   Blackpool, a predominantly Muslim club, was 
identified in Chapter 1 as part of a distinctively politicised ‘Challenger’ faction.  The 
experiences of the UCT affair represented the first major incident prompted by this group 
who became a vocal and influential minority during the Double Standards affair.  The 
WPFB’s inability to effectively countenance their tactic of refusing to play or their utilisation of 
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Board structures in non-traditional manners enabled the group to utilise power despite 
limited numbers. 
By the end of 1975, three Alliance clubs had refused to play at Pinelands and had defaulted.  
The Alliance Union however decided to stand behind the university team.  The three 
defaulter clubs – Blackpool, Clarewood and Castle Celtic – were suspended by the union 
while UCT was given permission to carry on playing home and away matches at Pinelands 
despite a Board directive forbidding it.80  The directive was explicit in stating that UCT must 
play at Rosmead ‘even if there was a confrontation with the authorities’ over permits.81   
At the WPFB AGM in 1976 the issue of Alliance and UCT came to a head.  Chris Stevens, 
Chairman of the Cape Flats FA, led the opposition to UCT: 
In the interest of the Unity in Black Football, consideration be given to 
terminating the membership of U.C.T. AFC in its ‘present form unless … 
U.C.T. AFC affiliates to the Alliance F.A. “only and in to”.82 
The phrase ‘Unity in Black Football’ requires a little more discussion here.  This referred 
exclusively to Coloured football.  At this time the WPFB had no predominantly non-Coloured 
units and their actions represent very little interest in the Black Consciousness movement.  
No recorded attempt to co-opt any non-Coloured members were made at this time.  The 
phrase ‘Unity in Black Football’ should therefore be read as referring only to the unity of the 
WPFB and Coloureds.  The quote from Stevens also suggests that the anger towards UCT 
was not primarily of a political or racial nature.  His primary concern is WPFB unity.  The 
marriage of convenience between this viewpoint and the more politicised groups such as 
Blackpool was a hallmark of future events.     
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The meeting continued to be marked by a vociferous criticism of UCT and Alliance whom 
Vincent Baartjes accused of ‘playing the House of Lords to see who’s King of the Castle’.83  
The AGM backed the three clubs who had been suspended by Alliance and called on the 
unit to re-instate all three and for Alliance to sever all connections to the UCT club unless it 
quit the WPFA (Hartleyvale) and affiliated only to the Board.84  Alliance was suspended until 
such time as it complied with these directives.   
By the end of 1976 the issue had died a quiet death.  UCT had left Alliance and the unit was 
deemed to have complied with the directives of the AGM and was re-instated.  However, the 
experiences and failure of the UCT affiliation were to provide the backdrop and local context 
for the destabilising events that soon followed.  The new government sports policy and 
concurrent unity talks between the SASF, FASA and SANFA destabilised SACOS and led to 
the formation of the Double Standards resolution.  The Board’s response was much the 
same as in the UCT affair; certain clubs took up a political stance, units divided and the 
Board primarily sought to re-establish stability and unity.  As in the UCT affair, potential 
White (and African) integration was sacrificed in order to protect the existing members of the 
Board and their football.  Politics was utilised to serve the WPFB’s immediate sporting 
interests. 
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Chapter 3 – The Implementation of the Double Standards 
Resolution 
  
Under ordinary circumstances, we believe that fields tend toward stability… 
Given this presumption, we think most periods of significant field 
contention/change begin with destabilizing events or processes that often 
have their origins outside the narrow confines of the field.1 
 
The middle-class WPFB Dominants’ ‘hard-fought and fragile’ Institutional Settlement was 
ended by the Doubles Standards affair.2  The situation detailed in the previous two chapters 
was destabilised and the WPFB seemingly transformed from an organisation that opposed 
what it saw as ‘politics bedevilling our sport’3 into one that used sport as ‘a strategy against 
apartheid per se’.4  After the Board’s implementation of the Double Standards resolution in 
1980, publicly the institution claimed that there was no division on the issue.  It proclaimed 
that ‘defectors’, those who played sport in non-SACOS affiliates, would not be given ‘any 
leeway’ and called for strong punishments.5  Despite Board rhetoric, this situation never 
materialised.  At the grassroots level the resolution was often flouted with Executive 
connivance.  The Board and the SACOS Executive, due to differing goals and Institutional 
Logics, viewed the act in very different terms.  While SACOS analysed the situation in 
political terms, the WPFB viewed events from a sporting perspective. 
The ‘destabilizing events’ that affected the WPFB originated outside the SACOS sports 
structure, within shifts in government sports policy and attempts by White groups to 
integrate.    Douglas Booth notes: 
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In the belief that sport transcended race and politics, SACOS pursued 
negotiations with white sports officials to integrate and democratise South 
African sports.  Failed negotiations, state harassment of SACOS leaders 
and a thorough analysis of the relationship between apartheid and sport, 
convinced SACOS that black sports people would continue to experience 
discrimination while apartheid existed.6 
In so many words, Booth notes that unity attempts by White sports bodies and their failure 
destabilised SACOS and caused a shift in its outlook.  Booth asserts that this led directly to 
the formation of the Double Standards resolution.7  The impact on the Board of the Double 
Standards resolution was filtered through this prism.  In order to understand how the WPFB 
viewed the resolution one must therefore begin with the unity talks initiated by FASA in 1976. 
 
The Integration talks of 1976 and 1977 
 
In September 1976, the government extended its ‘multi-national’ policy to club level.  In the 
wake of the Soweto Uprisings in June and the expulsion of the White football association 
from FIFA just one month later, the move was part of a wider attempt by Pretoria to improve 
its international standing and combat the growing international sporting boycott of the 
country.8    While never fully endorsing racially mixed sport, tacitly the National Party gave its 
blessing for sporting organisations to unify. 
At the same time, the FASA-administered professional league, the NFL, was in the throes of 
a financial crisis.  After a peak in the mid-late 1960s, league attendance levels had been 
consistently on the wane.  Cape Town City’s average attendance fell by almost four 
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thousand in the 1972 season alone.9  The situation was even worse in the Transvaal where 
some clubs failed to ‘pull in 1000 people’.10  Sponsorship levels also declined as private 
firms increasingly focused on marketing ‘their products to millions of township consumers’, 
rather than the more established White markets.11  By 1977, NFL clubs across the country 
were experiencing severe financial difficulties.  1976 champions Cape Town City withdrew 
from the League Cup competition due to the burdensome cost and four-time winners Durban 
City were described as on the verge of collapse.12   
Buoyed by the new sports policy, seeking a return to FIFA and worried by the imminent 
collapse of its professional league, general consensus within FASA called for unity talks with 
SANFA and the SASF.  The means to achieve ‘unity’ were however heavily disputed.  
General Manager of the NFL, Viv Granger, argued that the Federation had won the “soccer 
war” ‘and was the only South African unit that held any power in world soccer’.13  Therefore 
he reasoned that FASA should disband and join the SASF.  Meanwhile others, including 
many in the African SANFA, opposed the idea of joining the Federation citing the possibility 
of an umbrella organisation which placed all three bodies on an equal footing.14   
Despite a non-racial soccer structure being the stated goal of the SASF, the association was 
initially slow to join talks.  This drew strong criticism from some affiliates including the WPFB 
who, despite the sour experiences of the UCT affair, favoured integration.  Board delegate to 
the SASF, Mrs. Sylvia Jeftha,15 accused the Federation of being a ‘gutless fraud … doing 
nothing for soccer’.16  She went on to question why they were not ready for talks after 25 
years to prepare and accused the association of having ‘betrayed’ the WPFB. 17   A 
concurrent Board meeting backed Jeftha’s stance and Chairman Wally Henkel declared that 
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the Board ‘would inform Federation about their dissatisfaction’. 18   The initial reaction 
suggests that the Board and the Coloured community had no fundamental political aversion 
to integration.  It was only when the practicalities of unity become apparent that popular 
opposition began.      
Talks began, but the SASF withdrew within a month stating that it wanted non-racial soccer, 
but with ‘no strings attached’.19  From then on the SASF refused unity talks unless other 
organisations were prepared to join the Federation. 20   Within Coloured circles the 
association was roundly criticised for the collapse of talks.  Reporter Lennie Kleintjies 
summed up the response succinctly: 
Is it really a stand on principle or is it more than certain Federation officials 
and other members see themselves losing their exalted positions if soccer 
administration falls under one head?21 
The fear of SASF officials losing their positions in a new football super-structure reflects the 
first practical drawback to unity.  Consternation was not unfounded.  Integration created the 
potential for the marginalisation of the minority Coloured and Indian groups.  The African 
SANFA had the numbers22 and the White FASA, despite the financial difficulties engulfing 
the NFL, had the money through the backing of powerful sponsors such as South African 
Breweries (SAB).  The SASF was said to have the politics, but this was essentially forfeited 
by integration.  Marginalisation was not only an issue for administrators who feared losing 
their ‘exalted positions’.  While in the Western Cape Coloureds were protected somewhat by 
their majority status, clubs and players were left vulnerable in any agreement.   Although the 
Board was critical of SASF members prizing their own positions over the ‘best course’ for 
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soccer, when integration at the Western Cape level was mooted, the WPFB reacted 
similarly. 
Despite the SASF’s withdrawal, SANFA and FASA pressed ahead with integration along 
with the marginal South African Coloured Football Association (SACFA) and South African 
Indian Football Association (SAIFA). The Football Council of South Africa (FCSA) was 
formed in November, with SANFA chief George Thabe as its inaugural President.23  In 1977 
the FCSA launched the Mainstay League Cup involving White and African professional 
teams.24  The competition, overshadowed by crowd trouble, was roundly declared a disaster.  
After violence in Pretoria during a game between Hellenic and Pretoria Callies, Hellenic’s 
English manager Johnny ‘Budgie’ Byrne stated: 
I’ve had enough … I’m not prepared to put people’s lives in danger.25 
While crowd violence had previously existed in all codes of South African professional 
football,26 in the wake of the heightening of racial tensions post-Soweto Uprisings, the media 
attributed the blame to the accentuation of racial difference by ‘multi-nationalism’.27  The 
Cape Times declared:  
When natural team rivalry is bolstered by a racial difference and excitable 
spectators see a game as a conflict between white and black, you have all 
the ingredients of a race riot.28 
Regardless of the strength of the connection between racially mixed games and crowd 
violence, it quickly became a trope in the White press.  When the WPFB-owned professional 
team Cape Town Spurs first played the White WPFA (Hartleyvale)-owned professional side 
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Cape Town City in 1977, the White Cape Argus ran stories of ‘a gun-wielding man’, ‘flying 
bottles’ and ‘tramples’.29  The Coloured Cape Herald’s depiction of the violence only noted 
‘Stones were thrown’.30  The reasoning attributed to the violence by the two papers was 
starkly different.  The Herald blamed a lack of security arrangements,31 while the Argus 
questioned:   
Can black and white play side by side in the present political climate when 
there is so little social contact between races?32 
This trope created another barrier to integration.  Whites, fearful of violence, increasingly 
sought to unify primarily with elements they perceived to be ‘respectable’.  In the Western 
Cape, this meant that integration attempts focused on the Coloured middle-classes who also 
held sway within the WPFB administration. 
With the perceived failure of ‘multi-nationalism’ and the Mainstay League Cup, the NFL 
pressed ahead with qualified moves towards non-racialism.  Despite a gentleman’s 
agreement with SANFA for FASA teams not to field any non-White players, Arcadia 
Shepherds selected the Black Vincent Julius in March 1977.33  Julius, despite clear talent,34 
found the adjustment to the NFL difficult and amidst accusations of racial abuse from fellow 
players,35 attempted to return to the FPL by the end of May.36  Regardless of personal 
tribulations, Julius opened the floodgates for Black players to enter the NFL.  The FPL soon 
followed suit in co-opting other races; in the 1977 season Richard Gomes became the first 
White to take part in the FPL when he moved to Berea from Durban City.37  In the Western 
Cape, ex-Cape Town Spurs stars Bernard Hartze and Neville Londt signed for Hellenic38 and 
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ex-Cape Town City and Hellenic striker, Sergio Dos Santos, became the first White player to 
pull on a Spurs shirt.39 
Integration was not confined to the professional level.  The WPFA (Hartleyvale), six years 
after becoming officially non-racial, finally opened its doors to Coloured players in 1977.  
Several Coloured footballers enthusiastically joined and a ‘rebel’ team, Hertha Berlin of 
Manenberg,40 even applied unsuccessfully.  Despite the shifts in government policy, many of 
the laws that had made integrated sport difficult remained; Raymond Jamierie and other 
Coloured teammates at Camps Bay FC were reported as needing ‘to ask their White 
teammates to buy drinks for them.’41  Regardless, a steady trickle of Board players passed 
over to the WPFA (Hartleyvale) and Silvertown United, of the Metropolitan Union, crossed 
the divide in May. 42    The WPFB’s pre-eminent role in the Coloured community and 
potentially its survival were placed under threat.  
The relationship that the WPFB and the SASF had held with the other football associations 
had been shattered; the situation had destabilised.  This was replicated across SACOS.  In 
cricket these attempts led to the creation of a unified body – the South African Cricket Union 
(SACU) formed out of the SACOS-affiliated South African Cricket Board of Control 
(SACBOC), the White South African Cricket Association and the South African African 
Cricket Board.  This led to ex-SACBOC President Hassan Howa forming a new non-racial 
anti-integration cricket union, the South African Cricket Board (SACB), in November 1977.43  
The SACB quickly became a powerful anti-integrationist voice within SACOS.  This origin 
divided the outlook of the SACB from the established SASF.  The cricket association was 
founded around an anti-integration stance and ex-SACBOC administrators who favoured 
unity mostly passed over to the SACU.  While individual pro-integration SASF 
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administrators, such as the former FPL Public Relations Officer Abdul Bhamjee, passed over 
to the integrated White/African FCSA, the SASF retained the vast majority of its 
administrators regardless of political stance.  Consensus on the ‘unity issue’ was never 
reached in the SASF to the same extent as the SACB. 
In February 1977, several months before the SACU was founded, Hassan Howa was 
elected President of SACOS, a move that along with the creation of the SACB transformed 
the organisation towards a more radical focus.  SACOS’s former President, SASF chief 
Normal Middleton, was a supporter of unity talks and qualified collaboration with the 
government, albeit on an anti-Apartheid basis.  Middleton’s stance towards the government 
was embodied by his concurrent position as Deputy Leader of the Coloured Labour Party.  
The Labour Party was established in 1965 on a platform of using the Coloured Persons 
Representative Council (CRC) as a ‘temporary institution’ through which to gain full 
citizenship for Coloureds.  The CRC was part-appointed by the government and part-elected 
by Coloureds, but had severely limited powers.  It was never popular and the Capetonian 
turnout for the first election in 1969 was just 16.4%; turnout for later elections was even 
worse.44  Despite flirtations with Black Consciousness ideologies, the use of the CRC meant 
that the Labour Party was always connected to a distinctive Coloured identity.45  In elections 
however, the party ran on an explicit anti-Apartheid stance and regularly boycotted CRC 
events where there was involvement from National Party figures.46  Middleton summarised 
his position as: 
I am not on the CRC out of choice but because it’s the only available 
medium for voicing effective opposition.47  
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He went on to argue that although he ‘disapproved’ of the CRC, he could not ‘do nothing’.48   
He was willing to work within the system to fight for the best situation possible for his 
(Coloured) community.  He took the same view on sport.  The Apartheid system was a 
reality and while he argued against the unfair distribution of resources, he looked upon 
SASF events in immediate and sporting terms. 
Howa meanwhile by early 1977 stated categorically that he would not accept mixed cricket 
at club level unless the situation was replicated at school level. 49   It was generally 
understood that calls for the mixing of sport at school level were an implicit call to end 
Apartheid, as it was virtually impossible for mixed50 school sport and Apartheid to co-exist.  
Howa, believing that Black sport would always be in a disadvantaged position while 
Apartheid existed, subsumed the sporting cause to a higher political goal.  The Middleton-
Howa divide (represented at associate level by a SACB-SASF divide) defined the politics of 
SACOS in the ensuing years, even after Middleton lost his position as SASF President in 
1981.  Their ideological rift and their different perspectives on the purpose of SACOS was 
replicated across the organisation including within the WPFB. 
Howa’s 1977 presidential campaign platform was based on what came to be known as the 
Double Standards resolution.  It was initially intended as a tool with which to instil ‘internal 
discipline’.51   The resolution as first passed in April 1977 declared: 
No person, whether he is a player, an administrator or a spectator, 
committed to the Non-Racial principle in sport, shall participate or be 
associated with any code of sport which practice, perpetuate or condone 
racism or multi-nationalism.52 
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The resolution barred SACOS members from having simultaneous membership of any non-
SACOS affiliated sports organisation.  The ideological basis was the oft-quoted phrase that 
there could be ‘no normal sport in an abnormal society’.  Howa, who coined the phrase, 
stated that it came out of his realisation that Apartheid and sport could not be separated: 
I admit now that I should not have fought [against apartheid] from a cricket 
angle.  I should have fought from a completely humanitarian angle. I 
should have carried the fight right down the line.  People come to me and 
say what you fought for has arrived, why aren't you satisfied.  I can't be 
satisfied if I was fighting for the wrong thing.  My standards were wrong.  
Probably I've become mature.  Probably I've become aware of politics.53 
The slogan argued that residential segregation, the racial distribution of facilities, the permit 
system and other Apartheid policies ensured that ‘normal sport’ could not exist in the extant 
system.  For this reason it was ‘impossible to separate politics from sport in South Africa’ 
and Howa rejected integrated sport due to it being used to legitimise the government.54  The 
Double Standards resolution, particularly after its widening to outlaw ‘racial’ bodies including 
the CRC, was designed to respond to the ‘abnormal society’ by politicising Coloured sport 
with an anti-government stance.  As SACOS ruled sport was already politicised by the 
government, normal sport became a secondary concern to the organisation, something only 
achievable once Apartheid had been dismantled.  To Howa and his adherents in the short-
medium term, politics became more important than sport. 
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The Mahoney Incident 
 
The fallout from the Double Standards resolution and Howa’s stance struck the Board even 
before it was officially passed.  It was no coincidence that this ‘politicised’ resolution was first 
supported by Bluebells, a club identified as part of the distinctively ‘politicised’ Muslim 
associated Challenger faction in Chapter 1.  Due to its perceived history of political struggle 
and its role in breaking the Cape District ban on Muslims, the club had consistently attracted 
political activists and had a fairly unique outlook within the WPFB. 55   Captain Rashied 
Cloete’s uncle, Abie Adams, was the Vice-President of SACOS and support for the Council 
at Bluebells was very strong.56   
On 24 February 1977, Bluebells refused to take the field for a Coca-Cola Summer 
Tournament game with Glenville because they objected to the appointed referee, Jock 
Mahoney.  Mahoney in 1976 had become the first Coloured cricketer to represent the White 
Western Province team and played cricket in the recently formed, integrated WPCU.  He had 
however remained a player and referee in the WPFB.  Captain Rashied Cloete entered the 
Bluebells dressing room and rallied his team against Mahoney: 
I said guys, this is the position, Jock Mahoney feels we’re not good enough 
to play cricket with him, but now he wants to referee our game. 
The Team said “dan gaan ons nie speel nie” (then we won’t play), we don’t 
want him as a referee, unless they replace the referee, we’re not going to 
play.57   
Bluebells refused to take the field and called upon Cape District to revoke Mahoney’s 
membership.  The incident is widely regarded to have instigated the implementation of the 
Double Standards resolution, but it also represented the rise of the ‘politicised’ faction within 
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the Board.  Throughout the period this group, though it consistently rose in stature, remained 
small in numbers.  The WPFB though was unable to effectively hedge off their opposition; 
the Challengers had the support of SACOS, and the institution had no effective means to 
counter their methods.   
Bluebells’ stance was not only representative of the rise of an undefined political faction 
within the Board.  It can also be identified as the first time that two new values/Institutional 
Logics that defined future Board decision making were seen.  The first was ‘unity’.  The 
phrase ‘we’re not good enough to play cricket with him’ implies a connection to the legacies 
of the poorly defined nature of Coloured identity and religious divides.  The movement of 
certain highly talented sportsmen into ‘White’ sport and society had clear parallels to those 
who attempted ‘to pass for White’ in the early years of Apartheid.  Part of the motivation 
behind the earlier separation of Muslims from Christian football units was that their darker 
skin and non-European customs did not fit the administration’s assimilationist, middle-class 
outlook.  Therefore, as a whole, Muslims were highly antagonistic to those who tried ‘to pass 
for White’. 58   The phrase ‘we’re not good enough’ has clear allusions to this practice.  
Bluebells, in opposition to integration that it believed would split ‘respectable’ middle-class 
Christian Coloureds from their darker skinned Muslim counterparts, was pushed to support 
the tenets and ideology behind the Double Standards resolution. 
There is also evidence that Bluebells’ stance was rooted in ‘confusion’.  Bluebells’ official 
statement on the incident declared the decision was made ‘in accordance with the SA 
Federation Policy’. 59   In February 1977 SACOS was yet to officially sanction Double 
Standards and the SASF only ratified the dogma in November 1978.  Indeed, the President 
of the SASF, Norman Middleton unequivocally backed Mahoney arguing it was a cricketing 
issue and the player himself was not to blame.60  It is fitting that the incident that originated 
the Double Standards resolution inside the WPFB took place with such muddled beliefs.  
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Confusion around the meaning, underlying ideology and effects became a hallmark of the 
resolution’s implementation.   
The fallout was swift.  While Glenville manager Fred Eagles attacked Bluebells stating “It is a 
sad state of affairs if they bring politics into sport”,61 Cape District as an institution decided to 
‘almost unanimously’ back Bluebells and expelled Mahoney.62  This reflected a growing 
Muslim and political influence in the unit which had seen Steve Dublin, the ex-Duncan 
Rovers Chief who had been influential in breaking the ‘Muslim clause’ in the 1960s, become 
President.  It was not only though a reflection of ‘politicisation’.  As Alliance had learned in 
the UCT affair, the suspension of clubs had consequences.  Of the three clubs suspended 
by Alliance during the incident, not one returned to the unit once reinstated; Blackpool went 
to the Cape Flats FA and Clarewood and Castle Celtic passed over to Cape District.  
Bluebells had allies, not least within the strong Muslim faction within the unit.  If Bluebells 
had been suspended, the unit ran the risk of a mass walkout which would have thrown the 
administration into turmoil and risked the very future of the institution. 
Opponents who objected to both the methods and stance of Bluebells existed; for instance 
Woodside’s chairman, Bennie Abrahams, asked why Mahoney was not acceptable, but 
Glenville (whom Bluebells were due to play against) were.  Glenville had played against 
White Cape Town City earlier in the year. 63   Regardless of this position, Woodside’s 
delegate to Cape District voted with Bluebells.  Despite Cape District’s rapidly radicalising 
stance and its later withdrawal from the WPFB for two years, there is no evidence any club 
left the unit in opposition.  The clubs that objected had no wish to leave Cape District or to 
force a confrontation with the ‘politicised’ group.  The Cape District League was regarded as 
the strongest in the Board.  Any schism risked the unit’s soccer; a risk the clubs seemed 
unwilling to take.  Within Cape District, clubs such as Woodside and Bluebells came from 
essentially opposite viewpoints, but both decided to support the Double Standards resolution 
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as Bluebells had applied it.  Bluebells saw Mahoney’s cricket defection as the thin end of a 
wedge, an early move in a mass exodus that would threaten the Coloured community, the 
WPFB as an institution and their football.  Increasingly they and others agreed that the end 
of Apartheid was the only means to destroy this threat.  Woodside meanwhile viewed the 
incident in more immediate sporting terms; they had no issue with Mahoney’s actions – they 
were a cricketing matter.  They only sought to retain unity and the future of their soccer.      
Cape District’s decision, for political and sporting reasons, was to back Bluebells and refer 
the matter to the WPFB.  However a special Board meeting called to discuss the issue 
ended with no clear mandate.  Instead, with the exception of Central and the Cape FA, the 
units gave no clear decision and referred the decision to the SASF.64  The Federation 
could/would not make a ruling either.65  No-one – the units, the WPFB executive or the 
SASF – seemed happy with the situation.66  The ‘political’ faction was however becoming 
increasingly influential not just within Cape District, but across WPFB units.  The WPFB 
Executive and most units attempted to avoid a confrontation and possible schism by refusing 
to act. 
The WPFB stumbled on in an uncertain, ill-defined and contradictory manner.  It accepted 
the validity of the Cape District resolution on non-racial sport, essentially its own version of 
the Double Standards resolution, on the grounds it did not contradict Federation or Board 
policy.67  However it remained coy on dealing with defectors.  The Cape Herald reported that 
Danny Marais was well-known to have played in the WPFA (Hartleyvale) with Bayview 
United, but returned to Magnolia (WPFA) without Board clearance.  Despite this reported 
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knowledge, the WPFB took no action on Marais, stating it had no official report of his 
defection.68  The Board also continued a non-political stance by refusing to take part in a 
sporting blackout called by the Soweto Students’ Representative Council to commemorate 
the anniversary of the Soweto Uprisings; the FPL, SANFA and the SACOS-affiliated South 
African Rugby Union (SARU) all participated in the blackout.69   
Despite the Board’s attempts to take a middle ground, relations with Cape District 
increasingly polarised.  Steve Dublin termed Norman Middleton a ‘racialist’ due to his CRC 
links70 and condemned Secretary Vincent Baartjes for not knowing “what a principle is”.71  
While Cape District remained in the Board for the time being, the situation became 
increasingly untenable.  An eventual clash and need for the Board ‘to take a side’ was 
termed ‘inevitable’.72 
Jock Mahoney meanwhile was left without a sporting home.  He returned to Cape District 
briefly in late May after his lawyers intervened,73 but was made increasingly unwelcome.  In 
cricket, he left Pinelands and re-joined the WPCB through the University of the Western 
Cape (UWC) team, citing the fact that if he had carried on playing in the WPCU he would not 
have been able to coach his son at his school.74  His return did not last long; by the end of 
1977 his membership of the WPCB was terminated.  Unwilling to go back to the WPCU 
asking “How could I go on playing in heaven when schoolchildren on the Cape Flats play in 
hell?”,75 Mahoney was left as a ‘man without a country’.76  His own ability to continue his 
sport was barely thought about. 
The Mahoney Incident left a lasting impression on the WPFB.  Cape District, with SACOS 
support, took up an oppositional role to the WPFB and SASF who refused to implement the 
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Double Standards resolution.  The actions prompted by Bluebells’ refusal to take the field 
created a pattern that was generally followed.  Clubs, units and the WPFB Executive sought 
to retain unity, while debates over what exactly the Double Standards resolution intended 
rumbled on in a confused manner.  The WPFB, in general more concerned with immediate 
sporting matters, lacked the will or the impetus to either wholeheartedly back the political 
faction or outright oppose them. 
 
The Failure of Integration in the Western Cape 
 
At the same time as the Mahoney Incident rocked the WPFB, national events caused the 
White FASA and its associates to again make overtures to the SASF.  Their moves were 
predicated on moves by the professional NFL clubs.  In August 1977, four-time NFL winners 
Durban City announced their intention to join the Federation.  The club owner, Norman 
Elliott, explained his decision with the statement, “I have wrestled with my conscience long 
enough … I can no longer continue to play multi-national sport”.77  Most reports at the time 
doubted the sincerity of Elliott’s professed politics and regarded the move as financially 
motivated, a calculated effort to bring back the club’s dwindling Indian support.78  Cape Town 
City, R127 000 in debt and with its large Coloured fan base, soon indicated its willingness to 
follow suit.79  Most of the remaining teams from coastal regions, where the SASF had a 
strong presence and NFL teams received a large percentage of their crowds from Coloureds 
and Indians, soon agreed to enter talks to join the FPL.  In October it was reported that the 
NFL and FASA would be joining the SASF.80  The Federation struck a triumphalist tone with 
Middleton claiming the move ‘was the final recognition that race should have no place in 
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soccer’.81  A few days later FASA voted unanimously to disband and join the Federation by 
29 October.  
Despite strong words and assurances, the agreement broke down almost immediately.  As 
two Rand NFL clubs, Highlands Park and Arcadia Shepherds, began to make overtures to 
the SANFA-administered NPSL, 82  FASA affiliates rescinded their previous decision and 
called for a merger. 83   The SASF had consistently rejected this proposition since the 
breakdown of the first unity talks in 1977.84  Returning to narratives seen in the UCT affair, 
Middleton questioned FASA’s integrity and sincerity.85  The WPFB, in a special meeting, 
unanimously decided to reject future talks with FASA since it ‘had failed to prove its bona-
fides by not disbanding’. 86   Quite how serious the prospect was of FASA joining the 
Federation is questionable; Eric Dalton, then Vice-President of the White WPFA 
(Hartleyvale), claimed he did not know of any unity talks pre-mid-1980s.87  Either Middleton 
was correct in questioning FASA’s ‘integrity’ or the situation was so confused and uncertain 
that few can accurately remember or even knew what was happening.  
FASA’s failure to disband effectively ended the prospect of Coloured-White amateur unity 
but at the professional level NFL teams continued to affiliate to the FPL.  While the four 
Transvaal teams (Arcadia Shepherds, Germiston Callies, Lusitano and Wits) withdrew and 
joined the NPSL, the rest of the NFL teams all applied to join the FPL.88  Despite no full 
Board meeting to sanction the event, in January the WPFB organised a Castle Lager Bowl 
competition between the four Cape Town professional teams, Hellenic, Cape Town City, 
Cape Town Spurs and Glenville.  Wally Henkel lionised the new tournament: 
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the competition heralded a new era in soccer.  The entire soccer 
community has been waiting long enough for this competition in which all 
the soccer teams in the Peninsula will vie with each other.89 
The series took place with ‘no seating restrictions’90 and was a sporting success.  While 
Hellenic took home the spoils, the Coloured clubs by no means disgraced themselves; 
Glenville beat Cape Town City and Spurs were only defeated in the final on penalties.91 
Despite the tournament’s success, a Board meeting from the end of February reveals that 
the failure of amateur unity had made WPFB members increasingly hostile towards the 
prospect of unity.  The Board, as noted in Chapter 1, had always been dispassionate about 
professional soccer and viewed it as a secondary concern to the amateur code.  Led by 
Cape District and Central the Executive was officially censured by the meeting for not 
consulting a full Board meeting before the tournament took place.92  Correspondence from 
District accused the Board Executive of ‘selling out on amateur football’.93  It is clear that to 
the vast majority of delegates professional unity was at best a peripheral concern.  The 
same could be said for fans.  While amateur unit leagues were well attended, the crowds at 
the Coloured professional teams Cape Town Spurs and Glenville had steadily fallen to 
minute levels by 1980; only 500 people attended one Spurs match while Glenville’s 
attendances were even worse.94 
For sporting reasons, amateur football unity was always less likely than at the professional 
level; the disparity in facilities and playing standard was much wider.  The Coloured 
professional teams played at Athlone Stadium where the facilities were comparable to 
Hartleyvale; those encountered by the amateur Cape Flats FA on the ‘grass triangles’ 
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around the N2 and the White amateur association were not.95  Amateur unity would also 
have led to WPFA (Hartleyvale) clubs being forced into the unitary system of the Board.  
While the standard of soccer at the highest level may have been similar, within unit leagues 
standards were much lower than in the centralised Hartleyvale system. 
Despite obvious anger the Board as a collective still rejected radical solutions.  A resolution, 
tabled by Johann Groepe of Cape Flats and Errol Burgess of Central, to withdraw from the 
SASF and sell Cape Town Spurs in protest at continued negotiations with FASA, was 
rejected.96  This move would have threatened not only its professional football (through the 
sale of Spurs), but also its amateur football as it would have been reduced to the status of a 
‘rebel’ organisation.97  To those who viewed events primarily from a sporting perspective this 
was indefensible.  Instead, by a vote of 15-5, a resolution was passed that called on the 
WPFA (Hartleyvale) to provide written assurance it would join the Board within one month or 
otherwise Cape Town Spurs would be withdrawn from the (integrated) FPL.98   
Following these events, Cape District decided to withdraw from the WPFB, stating that the 
‘Unit is not satisfied with the developments both Nationally and Provincially’.99  Steve Dublin 
explained: 
normal football could never be played in this country.  Time will prove us 
correct.  We do not want to get into the sewerage politics of this country.100 
Cape Flats soon followed District in walking out although it returned within the month.  The 
reversal of the decision was supported by Chris Stevens, the unit’s founding President, 
arguing that: 
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I have always considered Cape Flats not only as a home for soccer – but 
an amenity for the residents of Heideveld and Manenberg.  In the interest 
of soccer I think it was a sound move by the union.101 
Cape Flats’ quick reversal of the decision to leave the WPFB in support of the Double 
Standards resolution serves as a stark reminder that units were intensely divided on how 
they viewed the resolution.  Flats had initially opted to follow Dublin’s political stance, 
essentially a rephrasing of ‘no normal sport in an abnormal society’.  Stevens however 
represents a sporting focus.  As noted in Chapter 1, one of the Board’s Institutional Logics 
was the attribution of a moral duty to its undertakings and the sport of football in general.  
Football in many communities was viewed as too important to lose.  Within units there were 
deep divides over the Double Standards resolution and to take a strong stance, one way or 
another, risked the organisation’s future.102     
On a professional level, the former NFL teams soon solved the debate over their continued 
affiliation to the FPL.  Cape Town City left the league in April citing a refusal to move its 
juniors and reserves from the WPFA (Hartleyvale) and went over to the NPSL.103  A steady 
stream of White clubs followed and by the end of the year all of the former NFL clubs had left 
the Federation.104  With their withdrawal, the opposition to the Double Standards resolution 
took another hit.  The main alternative to the resolution, integration, had become a moot 
point.  The White clubs could or would not at professional or amateur level join the 
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Federation.   Coloured opponents of the resolution were beginning to risk following the fate 
of Jock Mahoney and becoming a group ‘without a country’.105 
  
The Noose Tightens 
 
As the prospects for integration evaporated, SACOS tightened the noose on the SASF’s 
refusal to implement the Double Standards resolution.  In March 1978, the Federation was 
suspended for six months ‘for accommodating white clubs and players’.106  While official 
policy remained that SASF players could take part in other SACOS-administered codes, the 
radicalised, Howa-controlled WPCB decided to reject SASF members in some instances; the 
Dynamos (FPL) player Mansoor Abdullah was told that he could not take part in the WPCB 
due to his SASF affiliation.107  The position of the thousands of WPFB players who also 
played WPCB cricket in the summer suddenly became uncertain.  WPFB members, even 
those who opposed the Double Standards resolution ideologically as an intrusion of politics 
into sport, were faced with the possibility of being forced into a choice between accepting the 
resolution and giving up their other sports.  From a sporting perspective, the resolution was 
given an extra impetus. 
Despite the collapse of integration prospects at amateur and professional level and the 
pronouncement by the SACB of SASF members as Double Standards transgressors, the 
SASF remained unwilling to implement the resolution.  In the 1978 SASF Presidential 
elections Paul David, a strong proponent of Double Standards, was defeated 31-10 by 
Norman Middleton.108  Middleton’s primarily sporting approach was still preferred over David 
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who viewed the SASF as primarily part of the anti-Apartheid movement and used phrases 
such as ‘talking the language of the liberation struggle’.109 
On 4 November 1978, SACOS formally expelled the Federation for failing to implement the 
Double Standards resolution.110  Amidst warnings of SASF members having membership in 
other sports bodies revoked and rumours of the genesis of a rival SACOS-backed football 
association, the SASF finally accepted the resolution and ruled its affiliates must do the 
same.  Despite the acceptance by its Governance Unit and all of the factors pushing towards 
the Double Standards resolution’s implementation, the WPFB still refused.  In a close vote of 
11-10111 the resolution was rejected and the WPFB left the Federation.112  Several weeks 
later, the Board took the flawed decision to return to the SASF, but not to implement Double 
Standards.113  Chairman Wally Henkel explained their position:  
soccer players were interested only in playing soccer- not in the political 
fighting behind the scenes 
Other codes are trying to use soccer to achieve their own political ends 
and the attempt to force soccer to apply the double standards resolution is 
one way of doing it.114 
The statements by Henkel suggest that despite the political stance of Cape District, the 
group that believed in the primacy of sport still held sway within the Board.  He describes his 
stance as rooted in soccer and not in politics.  Quite apart from the perspective of SACOS 
that sport and politics were inexorably intertwined under Apartheid, the resolution was 
viewed only as a product of political manoeuvring at SACOS; Ronald Harrison, a Cape Flats 
delegate, termed SACOS “to be centred around a personality clash for prestige and 
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definitely not serving sport”.115  Even worse, in some quarters the resolution was viewed only 
as an authoritarian attempt to control; Les Mondo of the Northerns union compared the 
resolution to the “methods … of Communist Russia.” 116 
The Board was left in limbo.  As its position in the football structure was irreversibly 
transformed, the Board attempted to take a middle ground.  The WPFB chose to stay in the 
SASF (and therefore SACOS), but reject the Double Standards resolution.117  While the 
Board remained static, the situation increasingly polarised.  Defections to the White WPFA 
(Hartleyvale) persisted and concurrently support for Cape District continued to grow; Central 
left the Board in February citing its failure to implement the resolution.118  The new challenge 
for the WPFB did to an extent cut across old class divides.  Cape District was generally 
perceived to be a middle-class, traditional Dominant while Central, based in Bellville, was 
thought of as a lower-class, traditional Challenger.  The varied nature of this challenge made 
it much more difficult to effectively oppose. 
While the rumoured rival SACOS-administered football association never materialised,119 
several ‘rebel’ unions looked to fill the void that the WPFB not implementing the Double 
Standards resolution had created.  In 1978, the Peninsula Soccer Union, a league of 15 
teams which took place on Sundays,120 attempted to establish itself as a rival to the Board 
by applying directly to WPCOS.121  The Union claimed that its motivation was that “Our idea 
of non-racialism seems to be different to that of Mr. Norman Middleton.”122  The rapidly 
growing Mitchells Plain FA (who joined the WPFB in 1982) briefly also attempted to launch a 
rival organisation.  The Cape Herald reported in 1979 that it had ‘called on soccer unions 
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who support the Sacos double standards resolution to form a body in opposition to the 
Western Province Football Board.’123  Throughout the time that Cape District and Central 
remained outside the auspices of the Board, both units had strong links to Mitchells Plain FA 
and other ‘rebel’ organisations and acted as a boon to their aspirations of creating a rival 
board.  It should be noted that the proclaimed political motivation of these organisations, 
particularly Mitchells Plain FA, was heavily questioned at the time.124  
The prospect of a rival organisation was something the WPFB took very seriously.   It 
provided a sporting and institutional survival impetus to implement the Double Standards 
resolution.  The Board, the role of its administrators and its football were placed in peril.  In 
1979, in an unprecedented move designed to avoid the creation of a rival organisation, the 
Board overnight increased in size by 50% by accepting six new units: the Atlantis FA, 
Retreat and District, Hanover Park FA, Manenberg FA, Cloetesville FA and the Inter-
denominational FA.125   The WPFB did not finish there; feelers were put out to groups in 
Langa and Gugulethu126 and by 1984 five more units, including the Mitchells Plain FA, the 
FAWP and the Gugulethu FA, had joined the Board.  Many of these organisations would 
previously have been rejected due to the Board’s interest in order and the constitution.  For 
instance, the Cloetesville FA was based in a township on the outskirts of Stellenbosch and 
was tiny in comparison to the existing Board units.  In 1979 it had only 166 members and 
was smaller than the Metropolitan club Sea Point Swifts.127    
As the WPFB attempted to forge a path that would retain the unified institution after the 
climax of the affair, the Double Standards resolution continued to evolve.  In September 
1979 the initial resolution was amended to outlaw the participation in any government body 
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which ‘designed and/or promote(d) the separateness of people’.128  This included Local 
Management Committees (LMCs), any government run sports organisation and, critically for 
Norman Middleton, the CRC.  The function of the resolution adapted from instilling internal 
discipline to a tactic of ‘political purification’. 129   While the ideology behind the Double 
Standards resolution had always been rooted in anti-Apartheid sentiment, the resolution now 
expressly called for all members to act in a non-collaborationist manner.  In SACOS, the 
amendment perhaps reflects the apex of ‘politicised’ decision making. 
The amendment was accompanied by a strongly worded SACOS statement to the SASF 
stating that ‘Racialists (including President Norman Middleton) must get out’.130  The SASF 
refused the demand and was expelled again in February 1980.131  Finally the SASF, faced 
again with the prospect of organisational ostracism from SACOS, decided to implement the 
Double Standards resolution on a much more stringent basis and ruled that ‘all members 
must sever ties with CRC, LMC, LAC within 30 days’.132  The WPFB was told to either 
implement the policy or leave the Federation for good.  Faced with the prospect of its 
members being barred from other SACOS organisations, the potential for a rival SASF-
backed Coloured football association in the Western Cape, the continued refusal of Central 
and Cape District to re-join the WPFB and the seeming lack of a viable alternative, Chairman 
Wally Henkel, a long-time opponent of the resolution, called on the Board to accept.  His 
plea was heeded and the resolution was passed with a 24-3 majority with the only delegates 
voting against hailing from the Metropolitan Union and the newly affiliated Retreat FA.133  
Sporting imperatives had finally coincided with political ones.   Institutional survival had 
become predicated on implementing the Double Standards resolution (at least publicly). 
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The (part-)Implementation of the Double Standards Resolution 
  
The Board quickly attempted to restore its control within the context of implementing the 
Double Standards resolution.  Cape District returned to the WPFB in September and Central 
followed soon after.134  The Board began doling out suspensions to defectors and agreed to 
honour suspensions on policy from other codes of sport. 135  Companies who offered 
sponsorship were vetted for political affiliations; an offer from Johnson’s Sportswear in 1981 
was rejected due to the company falling foul of Double Standards and encouraging clubs to 
join the WPFA (Hartleyvale).136   The controversial Industrial Leagues, previously WPFB 
associates, were outlawed.137  The Industrial Leagues, run by White businesses some with 
explicit links to the government, had been a contentious issue for several years.  While as a 
rival soccer organisation they had always been disapproved of, they had not previously been 
opposed since refusing to play might have affected employment prospects.     
Despite these moves, it seems that the resolution was never fully appropriated and was 
often only implemented in part.  This is illustrated by the experiences of Joe Schaffers.  
Schaffers went over to play cricket for Landsdowne in the WPCU in the early 1980s despite 
also playing in Alliance with Aerials.  He explained his decision: 
I had never ever played on turf and I also thought this boycott thing and 
stuff, it’s head banging, we’re not getting anywhere here.  Because both 
sides are refusing to get this understanding of each other and what it was.  
And of course any so-called White sides decide they would be opening up 
their doors and some of the so-called Coloured cricketers would come 
across.  And I went across not because I simply wanted to play, I thought 
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to myself.  Look we always say that given the chance we can show them 
how good we are or maybe how bad we are ummm … let me go across 
and see what we can do, what I can do, to get ... to get my own 
satisfaction.138 
By the terms of the Double Standards resolution Schaffers, due to his WPCU membership, 
should not have been allowed to be a member of the Alliance FA.  Alliance President 
Sydney Lotter however refused to discipline Schaffers: 
It was brought to his attention that I am playing on the White side and I’m 
still playing soccer there.  And Lotter stood up and said in the Union 
meeting that while I am not playing soccer on the White side, it’s 
completely divorced from the sport of soccer; and it’s cricket.  So I will be, 
will not be kicked out, I will not be ostracised and I will play for Alliance 
league.139 
While some new administrators, such as Abie Adams who became the first Muslim 
Chairman of the WPFB in the mid-1980s, with a highly politicised outlook had risen through 
the ranks of the WPFB, the vast majority of administrators remained holdovers from the 
previous era.  Unlike the newly formed WPCB, the administration of the WPFB and its units 
was still strongly connected to the earlier Institutional Settlement and the old methods of 
dominance.  They were still divided on the issue of integration.  Lotter himself had been a 
leading adherent of UCT during its affiliation.  The Double Standards resolution was always 
limited by SACOS’s inability, unlike a state, to ‘police and punish ‘transgression’’.140  The 
enactment of suspensions relied upon the co-operation of individual grassroots 
administrators who often had separate sporting concerns.   
                                                          
138, Interview with Joe Schaffers, 11/2/15. 
139 Ibid.  





In cases where suspensions were not applied, the only remaining punishment was 
‘ostracism’ from the community.   Newspapers of the period often discussed defectors being 
ostracised and becoming detached from their community.141  This method however relied 
upon public support.  While Schaffers noted that some guys ‘didn’t want to talk to you’, he 
stated that to him it ‘was water off a duck’s back’.142  Schaffers’ experiences of ‘ostracism’ 
were at most a small inconvenience.  It was limited to a small number of people and does 
not seem to have deterred his actions. 
Drawn by the greener pastures and better facilities of the White WPFA (Hartleyvale) and 
with punishments often not materialising, there remained a constant trickle of players out of 
the WPFB.  The situation in late 1983 was summarised by an article in the Cape Herald: 
For, even though the non-racial sport bosses of Federation and the 
Western Province Football Board are dishing out lengthy suspensions to 
players who return when they find the grass is not so green on the other 
side, defections go on.143 
The article notes that as many as eight footballers who had taken part in the SACOS festival 
in the previous October were now playing in the NPSL.144   
It was not only individuals who passed over to the ‘other side’.  In 1982, after Cape Town 
Spurs was sold by the WPFB to Ronnie Martin, Spurs and Glenville left the FPL to join the 
NPSL.  Some players such as Danny Agulhas opted to remain in the Federation,145 but the 
vast majority of the Spurs administration and around half of the players moved with the 
club.146  Even Glenville, which was not accepted into the NPSL first division and went into 
the African WCSB, was able to continue with minimal losses of personnel.  On an amateur 
level, major clubs such as Stephanians (Alliance, 1982) and Jamestown United (Cape FA, 
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1982) defected and joined the WPFA (Hartleyvale).  This was despite stark warnings in the 
Cape Herald that the moves ‘would almost certainly kill the junior section’ since few 
schoolchildren would sacrifice their school sport to continue with the two clubs.147   
If taken from the viewpoint of the ‘political’ SACOS, the Double Standards resolution had 
proven ineffective in the WPFB.  It had neither instilled ‘internal discipline’ nor had it 
achieved ‘political purification’.148  Within the WPFB it was often viewed as having been 
forced on the institution from outside.  Wally Henkel stated that it was: 
never the board’s intention to implement the double standards policy until 
they had fully investigated the matter and that the board would find itself 
saddled with problems once it was implemented.149 
This suggests that the WPFB’s attitude can be explained by continued antagonism towards 
the resolution while wishing to remain within the SASF.   
The stance of the WPFB, due to its predominantly sporting outlook, was very different 
however.  While the WPFB by no means implemented the policy fully, it was still largely 
followed.  After its implementation in 1980 the WPFB never called for its repeal.  It was not 
that this stance was impossible in the context; the SASF affiliate Orange Free State Union 
left the Federation in 1981 on the grounds that it needed to utilise LMCs for its survival.150  
The WPFB went further than just acceptance.  In April 1981 the Board, by a vote of 19-9, 
agreed to release a statement against Norman Middleton’s continued role as SASF 
President (he was removed from the position a month later and replaced by former WPFB 
Chairman Matt Seegers).151  Despite clear and concerted opposition, the WPFB increasingly 
allowed itself to be defined by the resolution.  While there were cases of defectors escaping 
punishment, others received harsh punishments.  In 1981 Vincent Baartjes stated that 
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defectors would not receive ‘any leeway’. 152   Life suspensions for defection were not 
uncommon; Ocean View suspended Henry Brown, Cliffe Carelse and John Laguma for life 
after they were found to have played in the Cape Western League (WPFA (Hartleyvale)).153  
The decision to outlaw the Industrial Leagues was reported to have forced thousands to quit 
the Leagues.154    
In the light of the experiences already noted earlier in the chapter, these actions seem to be 
inconsistent and lack coherent logic.  The WPFB, however, whilst it had agreed to implement 
the Double Standards resolution it had not done so for the same reasons as SACOS.  
Predominantly, the institution still viewed the resolution as part of its goal: 
To promote, foster and control professional football and amateur 
Association football in the Western Province.155    
It did not utilise the resolution as a ‘strategy against apartheid per se’.156  Instead they 
implemented it with sporting goals in mind.  These can be examined through the WPFB’s 
actions in three major controversies that surrounded the Double Standards resolution’s 
implementation. 
The first major fallout from the resolution was when Metropolitan withdrew from the Board.   
President Bert Erickson and several other administrators were members of the non-SACOS 
affiliated WPCU club Avendale and refused to sever their ties with their cricket team.  
Despite Erickson offering his resignation, the unit declared its support for him and 
Metropolitan unanimously decided to withdraw from the Board.157  The issue only abated a 
year later when Erickson refused to stand for re-election.158  The only dissenting voice in the 
withdrawal seems to have been Sea Point Swifts who left the Union to join the WPFA.  
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Perhaps the most striking feature of the episode is the complete lack of politics.  Erickson 
states unambiguously that he had no political motivation and that his decision was 
predicated on his close association to Avendale (as a founder member).159  The unanimous 
support given to Erickson by the Union seems to have been in a similar vein to Lotter’s 
support of Schaffers noted earlier i.e. that cricket had nothing to do with football.  Even Sea 
Point Swifts’ stance was seemingly apolitical; a Swifts official stated the reason for leaving 
was: 
Because of Metropolitan’s stupidity, our club has lost nine of last year’s first 
team squad, and a number of our most promising juniors.160 
Swifts, who had moved to Bonteheuwel from Tramway Road in Sea Point due to forced 
removals, had not in the past been strong proponents of politics.  In 1980 the club was 
reported to have taken part in the FASA-organised Bellville tournament.161  It seems that the 
goal of stability was the key motivation to all actors in this instance.  Erickson wanted to 
carry on playing his sport (cricket), the Metropolitan Union wanted to retain Erickson, its 
President for the past 18 years, as leader and the Swifts club wanted to ensure the survival 
of the club and its junior section.  
A similar process can be identified in the controversy surrounding the Chairman of the 
Atlantis FA, Sydney Louw, and his position as head of the Atlantis LMC.162  LMCs were of 
great importance in ‘new’ towns such as Atlantis since facilities were still being provided and 
they were a powerful means of pressurising the government to provide them.  The town 
which had been built in the late 1970s, had 25 000 residents by 1980, but just 15 
policemen.163  Louw refused to quit the LMC stating that “I have done a lot for Atlantis”.164  
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Instead, he chose to quit his position as chairman of the Atlantis FA.  The response of the 
FA though was to immediately attempt to make Louw a life member.165  While this request 
was rejected, neither Atlantis nor the WPFB Executive cut ties with ex-Alliance member 
Louw; in 1982 he was noted to be taking official photographs for the Board itself. 166  
Seemingly Louw unofficially continued within the Board.   
That politics remained at best a secondary motivator within the Board is summarised by an 
incident involving Cape District, the champions of the Double Standards resolution within the 
WPFB.  Yorkshire AFC (one of the oldest Board clubs) was instructed by WPCOS to rescind 
the membership of Herschelle Gibbs, the future South African Test cricketer, since he 
attended the private White St Joseph’s Marist College.  The club, in a unanimous 
decision,167 refused this directive stating “If the boy goes, we go”.168  Cape District, despite 
its earlier ‘politicisation’, ruled with Yorkshire on the grounds that ‘the child could not be 
responsible for the actions of his father’.169  The stand-off that ensued was only resolved by 
Gibbs agreeing to leave Yorkshire FC and the WPFB of his own volition.  While there could 
be said to be a political motivation behind the stance of Yorkshire and Cape District (the 
private White schools clause was a controversial amendment), the stance reveals a 
difference in how SACOS and grassroots actors viewed the resolution.  For SACOS the 
clauses outlawing private White schools and the clause on ‘racial’ bodies were part of a 
‘strategy against apartheid’, part of a grand plan to remove the ‘abnormal society’ and allow 
for ‘normal sport’.170  For Yorkshire and Cape District, however, the resolution is taken on a 
much smaller scale.  Essentially, they refused to risk the future of their junior sections for 
transgressions not committed by the players themselves. 
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The implementation of the Double Standards resolution had not fundamentally changed the 
outlook of the WPFB or its adherents.  When Cape District left the WPFB in 1978, two main 
perspectives were identified on the resolution: Steve Dublin’s focus on politics and Chris 
Stevens’ on football and the survival of the Cape Flats FA as an institution.  The impact of 
SACOS and the SASF’s imposition of the Double Standards resolution on the WPFB had 
been to shift the latter outlook.  This view remained predominant within the Board; due to the 
stance of the SASF (and SACOS) and the collapse of integration talks members had been 
convinced that the resolution was the best thing for their sport.  It was utilised as a means to 
ensure the survival of the institution of the WPFB, to ensure the survival of its football.  In 
this outlook sport was, at least within the WPFB context, more important than politics.   
If looked at in this manner, then the decision-making of the WPFB becomes much clearer.  
The Double Standards resolution had not changed the stated goal of the WPFB: to promote, 
foster and control professional football and amateur Association football in the Western 
Province.171  As the remaining three chapters demonstrate, all of the actions of the WPFB 
can be explained by the institution searching for the stability that allowed it to continue 
striving for this goal.  In this quest, the Double Standards resolution was used as a weapon 
rather than as a goal in itself.  While SACOS viewed sport as a tool in the wider liberation 
struggle, the WPFB largely viewed politics (inherent in the resolution) as a tool in its wider 
sporting struggle. 
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Chapter 4 – Unity  
 
Shepsle describes political institutions as “ex ante agreements about a 
structure of cooperation” that “economize on transaction costs, reduce 
opportunism and other forms of agency ‘slippage,’ and thereby enhance 
the prospects of gains through cooperation”.  Political institutions thus 
create stability in political life.1 
  
The manner and methods of the part-implementation of the Double Standards resolution by 
the WPFB were informed by three sporting goals that emerged as Institutional Logics and 
drove Board policy.  These goals were primarily designed to reinstate stability, critical to the 
success of any institution.  The first of these values was unity.  While the term unity was, 
within the wider 1970s football context, mainly applied to the talks between the various 
national soccer organisations, i.e. SASF, FASA and SANFA, in the WPFB ‘unity’ was used 
with reference only to the Coloured community.  The footballing context of the WPFB and its 
destabilisation, as the White and African organisations became practically as well as legally 
non-racial, continued to require the Board to think in these terms.  In all negotiations, the 
WPFB protected its extant units even at the cost of the co-option of non-Coloured 
members/clubs.  The Double Standards resolution in the WPFB, despite its anti-Apartheid 
roots, was primarily applied with this goal in mind.  The resolution, far from being a tool to 
further the goal of playing football ‘with no reference to one’s colour’,2 was used to further 
Coloured solidarity and a sense of community. 
The Double Standards resolution became connected to this goal because of the institutional 
system of the WPFB.  This framework had no means to deal with the threat represented by 
the political faction.  Cape District and Central, by suspending their Board membership until 
the resolution was implemented, essentially held unity hostage.  In general, WPFB 
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associates who opposed the resolution were not willing to risk their football by leaving the 
Board in protest.  Even Metropolitan who did resign returned after only a year.  The 
implementation of the resolution became viewed as necessary to preserve unity. 
The reason the resolution was however applied in such an asymmetric manner was that the 
Board continued to be threatened by the destabilisation of the football structure.  Before the 
late 1970s the WPFB had never faced a concerted threat to its hegemony within the 
Coloured community.  ‘Rebel’ organisations, the traditional rivals to the Board, were 
generally small in size, and incorporated players who practiced dual affiliation i.e. were also 
affiliated to a Board team and often sought to join the WPFB itself.  The WPFA (Hartleyvale) 
and (to a lesser extent) the WCSA represented more powerful opponents.  They were 
established organisations with access to their own, separate facilities. 
Whenever the Board’s position in the Coloured community was questioned, it called upon 
the narrative of unity.  The UCT affair, identified as the first occasion that a White associated 
team affiliated to the WPFB, can also be identified as the first use of the unity trope.  When 
the club joined the WPFB, Chairman Wally Henkel’s statement read: 
The executive has been guided by the constitution of the South African 
Soccer Federation and we thus have an obligation to all players.3 
In reality the WPFB, by ruling that the UCT club must play at Rosmead regardless of a 
‘confrontation with the authorities’4 and backing the three defector clubs, essentially decided 
to champion the cause of some players over others.  UCT, rightly or wrongly, felt that 
permits would have been required to play at Rosmead5  and sought to play at its own 
Pinelands ground to avoid official reprimand.  The three dissenter clubs, Blackpool, 
Clarewood and Castle Celtic, stated no practical reasons why they could not have played at 
the UCT fields.  Regardless the WPFB backed the dissenter clubs unequivocally.  Vincent 
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Baartjes described his support for the severance of ties with the UCT club as based on the 
fact that the ‘Unity of our soccer (was) … at stake’.6  The Board decided that the potential 
rewards of co-opting the ‘White’ UCT club were not worth the possible schism of existing 
Board structures. 
The interest in unity remained throughout the period.  A 1983 WPFB statement on the 
continued stream of defectors to the WPFA (Hartleyvale) described the situation’s greatest 
drawback as ‘this whole affair is sowing disunity’.7  The Board stuck dogmatically to a policy 
that called for collective responsibility and public togetherness regardless of political 
ideologies.  The Board’s reaction to this statement by Wally Henkel, reported in the Cape 
Herald, is particularly telling: 
… never the board’s intention to implement the double standards policy 
until they had fully investigated the matter and that the board would find 
itself saddled with problems once it was implemented.8  
Henkel’s politics do not seem to have been an issue at the meeting; the minutes show no 
denial of the issues raised.  Instead the Board’s official proclamation read that the Executive 
‘was perturbed that the statement could give the impression there was division on the 
issue’.9   Unity was prized over politics.  The politics of the resolution were utilised to achieve 
immediate sporting concerns.   
The WPFB’s stated aim was ‘to promote, further and control amateur Association Football in 
the Western Province.’10   Since the 1950s, the Board’s constitution held no reference to 
race and publicly the Board stressed a non-racial stance.  Despite this, the WPFB in its 
actions in the late 1970s prioritised its continued pre-eminence within the Coloured 
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community over integration.  As part of the FASA agreement to disband by 29 October 1977, 
its provincial units including the WPFA (Hartleyvale) were required to affiliate to their local 
SASF unit.  When FASA failed to ‘prove its bona-fides by not disbanding’ on this date,11 
Board relations with the WPFA (Hartleyvale) quickly turned sour.  At the 1978 AGM to 
discuss the situation, the WPFB Executive was censured for continued negotiations.12  The 
meeting went on to re-iterate earlier calls for the WPFA (Hartleyvale) to provide written 
assurance that it would ‘join our Board’ i.e. disband and join units on an individual club 
basis. 13   It was noted earlier that for the White association this was an unattractive 
proposition.  The WPFB units had worse facilities, a lower standard of football and playing at 
grounds classified as Coloured by the City Council may have required permits.   
The reasoning behind this stance was noted to be that any other situation was ‘not 
conducive to well ordered amateur soccer’.14  Implicitly the statement refers only to Coloured 
football.  At no point in any WPFB meeting in the period was the position of White players 
taken into account.  The Board acted in its own interests which, due to the makeup of its 
membership, remained Coloured interests.  In doing so, it provided the WPFA (Hartleyvale) 
with an unattractive proposition that ended any hope of integration.  Just a year and a half 
earlier the WPFB had agreed to ‘inform Federation about their dissatisfaction’ because they 
had refused to enter unity talks.15   
Despite the onset of the Black Consciousness movement which suggested that Coloureds 
were not distinct from Africans (or Indians), the WPFB’s concept of unity still largely 
disassociated themselves from Africans.16  After the Board decided to expand in 1978, the 
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WPFB did decide to put out feelers to groups in Langa and Gugulethu17 which resulted in the 
Gugulethu FA joining in 1982.  Despite earlier links to Cape District, Central and the 
Mitchells Plain FA, the Gugulethu FA lacked the required finances or administration to be an 
effective part of the Board.  In 1983, just one year after being accepted into the WPFB, the 
organisation collapsed.18  There seems to have been little concerted attempt to retain the 
Gugulethu FA.  It was known when the group joined that it had severe financial constraints 
and could not even afford goalposts.19  Despite this, when a Gugulethu FA team failed to 
appear for a match at Stellenbosch in 1982, in the Board minutes there was no call to help 
their ‘underprivileged brothers.’20  In fact Barney Leendertz, the Stellenbosch FA delegate, 
stated that ‘the failure by Guguletu F.A. must not be tolerated, as it can damage the non-
racial cause.’21  The effect of losing the WPFB’s only African unit seems not to have been 
questioned.  Its membership was allowed to lapse in order to protect the Coloured members 
of the Board.  The Gugulethu FA’s collapse and the WPFB’s response closely parallels the 
Langa-based WPU in 1970. 
The WPIFA (now re-named the FAWP) did join the WPFB in 1983, however despite the two 
associations’ long-standing relationship, the WPFB seems to have been reticent.  When the 
FAWP first applied for membership in 1982, negotiations collapsed.  The main reasons for 
this failure were reported to be the predominantly Muslim FAWP’s ‘religious objections to 
liquor sponsorship and an objection to playing during the Fast of Ramadan’.22  The WPFB 
refused to allow the FAWP permission to not display adverts for Maggot Trophy sponsors, 
the Virginia Wine Company, or to suspend its league during Ramadan despite previous 
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allowances for individual teams.23  No evidence was found that the WPFB adapted its stance 
in 1983.   
Despite the WPFB’s stated non-racial goal, their conception of unity remained located within 
the Coloured community.  It is unlikely that this can be traced to any political aversion to 
integration.  The WPFB historically had been a strong proponent of racial unity.24  Rather it 
should be viewed as a product of the realities of the Apartheid system and their inter-
relationship with the institutional field of football.  Patric Tariq Mellet has stated: 
Under Apartheid, identity was heralded into a singular kraal and this was 
either an ethnic group or one of the four race-silos into which we all had to 
fit.25   
Mellet argues that ‘identity is not singular but plural’ and that while identity was portrayed as 
only being about race, it was not.26  It is a salient point when analysing the WPFB.  The 
entire process could be argued to have come out of a Muslim-Christian divide.  The UCT 
incident, the Mahoney Affair and the widespread antagonism towards going to ‘White’ 
grounds all had their origins within Muslim teams.  The legacies of the anti-Muslim clauses 
are critical to understanding the entire process.  It could be argued the entire affair was a 
later reflection of the religious tensions seen in John Nauright’s article Masculinity, Muscular 
Islam.27   
The Christian-Muslim schism itself was reflective of deeper class issues which had not 
disappeared either.  The Everton (Cape Flats) - Battswood (District) Virginia Challenge Cup 
Final in 1983 was reported to be ‘more than just a confrontation on the field’.28  It was a clash 
between the working-class (Everton) and the middle-classes (Battswood).  The divide was 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 See Lennie Kleintjies, “Soccer Body gets a Lashing”, Cape Herald, 17/8/76. 
25 Patric Tereq Mellet, Lenses on Cape Identities: Exploring Roots in South Africa (South Africa, DIBANISA, 
2010), 5. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Nauright, “Masculinty, Muscular Islam”. 





clearly illustrated as the stands descended into violence.  Everton fans were noted to have 
been shouting “Gooi die ratepayers … hulle praat mos Engels” (Throw out the ratepayers … 
they speak English). 29  
Many middle-class Christian Coloureds may have associated culturally more strongly with 
British Whites or even Afrikaners than their Muslim or lower class counterparts. 30   The 
Theron Commission, the 1976 report set up to look into the problems of Coloureds, stated 
‘that they (Coloureds) were not culturally different or distinguishable from the white 
population’.31   Others, seeking ‘a refuge from the alienating contradictions and confusions 
that plague common-sense assumptions about race’ in South Africa, embraced Black 
Consciousness ideology and identified strongly with Africans and Indians.32    
While individual Coloureds identified in a myriad of ways, the WPFB as an institution was 
forced to face the legal realities of its situation within a ‘race-silo’.  Teams and units were 
reflective of their local community; often connected to just one family.  Joe Schaffers 
described the situation in Alliance: 
And I said the clubs used to be family clubs, family used to be in the 
centre.  The Meyers and Pedro Meyer and Stephanians, the Schaffers 
were in Bloemhof Flats and of course Smith was Corinthians.  And of 
course your cartel up there (Ridgeville), old man Fredericks and his clan.33   
The WPFB did not have a structure in place to allow individual African or White teams, 
based in segregated areas, to join.  Its structure required a unit.  After the collapse of 
integration talks with the WPFA (Hartleyvale), a White unit was never mooted and if the case 
of the Gugulethu FA can be taken as representative then African units lacked the required 
administrative level and finances to travel such large distances. 
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It was not that the WPFB actively decided that it wanted to remain a Coloured institution 
because it agreed with Apartheid.  As with all institutions it ‘tend(ed) towards stability’.  Due 
to earlier laws and discrimination, the WPFB had been built around Coloured interests and 
outlooks.  Its connections, ties and membership remained rooted in this group.  Whites and 
Africans were divided by residential segregation and restrictive laws.  Despite the change in 
government sports policy, amateur-level sports administration across ‘racial’ divides 
remained difficult.     
The situation had been very different for Muslims when they challenged the established 
Dominant ideology of the WPFB in the early 1960s and forced their way into Alliance and 
Cape District.  They fought extant discrimination and clauses within the constitutions of units, 
but certain barriers were lower.  Bluebells were based in Batts Road, Lower Wynberg (less 
than 1 km from the William Herbert Sports Ground) and had no legal, in terms of the state, 
hurdles to cross.  The situation was different when the WPFB and the WPFA (Hartleyvale) 
attempted to integrate.  Beyond residential segregation, there was the thorny issue of 
permits.  A WPFA delegate to the WPFB noted that his unit’s main issue with NFL clubs 
joining the FPL was whether or not permits were needed.34  The co-option of African teams 
by the Board had similar problems.  An Atlantis team that played in Gugulethu was raided for 
permits when it returned to the house of one of the Gugulethu players.  The Cape Herald 
reported that the team believed that it had been followed by police ever since it left the 
Gugulethu fields.35  Just as in the UCT case, the City Council and the Police refused to 
clarify their position on the permit question and seemingly the law was applied randomly. 
The residential segregation and the permit laws meant that, despite all four major football 
associations having officially jettisoned their racial ties, everything was still viewed in this 
manner.  The WPFB’s connection first and foremost to the Coloured community allowed for 
the Double Standards resolution to be implemented despite the appropriation of its politics 
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being incomplete.  The resolution, in the short-term, served to reinforce separation.  In its 
original form, and this is worth repeating here, it stated that: 
No person, whether he is a player, an administrator or a spectator, 
committed to the Non-Racial principle in sport, shall participate or be 
associated with any code of sport which practice, perpetuate or condone 
racism or multi-nationalism.36 
This outlawed SACOS members from being connected to any non-SACOS code of sport.  
For Coloureds (and Indians) whose main sports organisations were mostly affiliates of 
SACOS, this was a matter of not ‘passing over to the other side’.  For Africans and Whites, 
however, their extant sports associations were mostly classified as ‘racial’.  Following the 
Double Standards resolution was a more complex task that involved leaving many of their 
existing community ties behind.  Even then SACOS could not provide all sports in African 
and White areas.37  The resolution relied inherently on community subscription.  As seen 
with the Joe Schaffers defection, punishments needed the support of local administrators 
and (for ostracism) the public at large.  This communal buy-in was incomplete in Coloured 
areas, never mind White/African areas where SACOS was less prevalent. The resolution, 
while formulated on a non-racial basis, practically and immediately created more walls 
between racial classifications.   
The WPFB had by the 1970s become an integral part of the Western Cape Coloured 
community and provided administrators an elevated status within the community.  The clubs, 
units and the Board itself had become important symbols.  Joe Schaffers described his 
participation in the Aerials in such collectivist terms: 
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This sport is about team sport, it wasn’t about the individual.  And that for 
us in those days that was important.  There were no stars.  We played as a 
team.  And as you know those days we played for the love of the game.38 
Football’s ability to create common attachments has been echoed by many historians 
including Peter Alegi who view football as creating ‘bonds of solidarity that inspired collective 
action’. 39   In the Coloured Western Cape communities, these bonds had increasingly 
embedded themselves within the communal identity.  They had become too important to 
lose. 
For Coloured administrators, sport was perhaps imbued with even greater importance than 
in other communities.  There were very few institutions in the later twentieth century that 
provided an opportunity for Coloured control.  The group spoke European languages and the 
majority were members of the Dutch Reformed Church.  The popular perception of 
Coloureds is summed up by du Pre’s description of Africans’ view of Coloureds: 
They ... (look) upon them as “mixed-breeds” with no nationhood, no identity, 
no land, no culture.40 
Africans, while on the other side of the ‘relative privilege’ experienced by Coloureds in the 
Apartheid system, still had some connections to a distinct, extant culture.  Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi41 rose to the position of Prime Minister of the KwaZulu Bantustan and head of the 
Inkatha Freedom Party owing in part to his inherited position as chief of the large Zulu 
Buthelezi tribe.  While by the 1970s the growth of organisations influenced by the Non-
European Unity Movement (NEUM) provided a Coloured political movement, their appeal 
never reached beyond a minority.  Since being removed from the common voters’ roll in the 
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Cape in 1951,42 Coloured marginality led to their identity being marked by a general ‘political 
apathy’.43   
The Coloured middle-classes, in particular, became committed to the WPFB because it 
provided a rare path to control.  Coloureds were barred from the highest echelons of 
government and the Dutch Reformed Church.  The relatively few political positions 
Coloureds could hold, e.g. in the CRC, came with severe restrictions and an implicit 
acceptance of subservience to Whites.  By the late 1970s these positions were as much 
ridiculed as they were prized.  Paul David, in his 1978 SASF election campaign, accused 
Norman Middleton ‘of speaking from the racist CRC platform’ and that the ‘youth regarded 
him as a sellout’.44  Whether or not David’s words were accurate (Middleton did win the 
election comfortably) the quotes suggest that his CRC role was a hindrance as much as a 
boon to his prestige.  The WPFB provided an oasis of control to these individuals.  The 
WPFB could justifiably state that it did not take orders from any other racial group or from 
any body it had not chosen to affiliate to.  The Board had no ties to the government.  It had 
control of its own destiny; this provided administrators with a route towards prestige in their 
community.    Middle-class Coloureds, the Dominant group in Board administration, then 
imbued the WPFB with further importance.  The WPFA (Hartleyvale) plans to attract this 
group, due to their perceived ‘respectability’, were therefore retarded.   
This prestige was predicated on Coloured unity.  The WPFB was an institution that could 
claim to represent the entire Coloured community; Christians, Muslims, the middle-classes 
and the working-classes were all enthusiastic members.  The ability to cut across class, 
religious and area divides was made possible by the nature of football as a sport that anyone 
can play.  It requires almost no equipment and has fewer rules and structure than games 
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such as rugby or cricket.45  In the Western Cape, it was a sport that could be picked up by 
everyone.  Joe Schaffers46, Ebrahim Abdullah47, Ahmed Fransman and Fanie Stuurman48 all 
describe how they learnt their sport playing on the street, often playing with bottles in the 
absence of real footballs.  Tennis and cricket, which require a higher level of equipment and 
investment, had more barriers to participation.  This status gave football an unrivalled 
connection to the Coloured community.  The Mitchells Plain FA, founded in the late 1970s, 
resisted overtures by the Board until 1982.  The Association’s eventual link-up was 
explained as: 
Even though Mitchells Plain has by far the best soccer facilities in the 
Peninsula, players living in the area are already travelling out of the area 
on Saturday afternoons to play on units belonging to the Western Province 
Football Board.49 
The ties to the Board proved stronger than the pull of better facilities.  
The WPFB, to its adherents, had a critical role.  It was an institution they controlled, that they 
connected with and they did so across area, religious and class divides.  The middle-class 
Dominants were highly defensive of their positions.  This was not a wholly selfish stance.  
The WPFB was connected with a moral duty.  It was viewed ‘not only as a home for soccer– 
but an amenity for the residents’.50  To the Board administrators it was viewed as critical, for 
their own personal prestige and for the Coloured community at large, that the institution 
survived. 
Practically, this required the maintenance of Coloured unity under the WPFB banner.  The 
Board’s pre-eminence was built on numbers.  SACOS, due to its connection to the Coloured 
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and Indian populations, was often accused of representing minority tendencies.51  While this 
was true on a macro level, in the Western Cape Coloureds formed a majority.52  The WPFB 
therefore had a majority not minority outlook.  In 1975 the WPFB held a meeting on the issue 
of whether or not Cape Town Spurs should be sold.  Wally Henkel stated: 
If Spurs are sold, I must get out … it will also prove that 20 000 people 
can’t handle a professional club.53 
The Double Standards resolution originated in a similar context; its architect Hassan Howa 
was WPCB chief.  The WPCB, while divided politically from the WPFB, held the same 
majority outlook.  The Double Standards resolution was actually tailored more to the needs 
of the majority than the minority.  While the national government had reduced its restrictions 
on non-racial sport in 1971 and 1977, local councils continued to discriminate.  Many were 
not willing to provide the facilities required to the anti-Apartheid SASF and severely restricted 
their playing fields.54  In Pretoria Blacks were banned from the Caledonian Stadium in 198055 
and in Durban non-racial soccer was suspended for two years at King’s Park (New 
Kingsmead).56   
The WPFB’s majority position located them in a separate context.  Relations with the Cape 
Town City Council were often fraught and the Council was constantly accused of doing 
nothing for the Board.57  The WPFB even alleged that they sought to tax the association out 
of existence in 1981, when rates for Council-owned fields were raised from R5 a year per 
registered club to R3 a match; the projected cost to the Hanover Park FA amounted to R1 
560.58  However, the majority status of Coloureds in Cape Town (particularly important for 
the WPFB when it united with organisations such as the WPCB under the SACOS/WPCOS 
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banner) meant it was politically inadvisable and unsustainable not to provide facilities.59  For 
instance, between 1965 and 1972, after ruling Green Point Common a White facility, the 
Council upgraded Athlone Stadium, providing ‘an eight foot high fence around the stadium, 
gates and a ticket office, a covered stand to accommodate 5000 spectators, commentary 
boxes and changing rooms’.60  This served to make Athlone Stadium the ‘premier venue for 
black football in the city’ through the 1970s and 1980s.61  The disparity with the situation in 
Durban, the Transvaal and the ash-laden WCSA pitch at Langa is stark.  The WPFB owed 
this relatively privileged position not to government co-operation or finances, but to sheer 
weight of numbers.  The Double Standards resolution protected this status, it protected 
WPFB football. 
The unitary system of the WPFB also required unity to administer football effectively.  The 
system encompassed semi-autonomous bodies that largely acted independently.  The 
actions taken by Cape District following the Mahoney affair were facilitated by the unit being 
able to continue its league at the William Herbert Sports Ground.  In a centralised system 
there would have been no structure to enable the withdrawal of a large number of clubs.  
Leaving the Board would have meant teams had no competition to play in – a very different 
prospect to what happened with Cape District who essentially withdrew from the inter-unit 
Maggot Trophy.  It would have been anathema from a sporting perspective.  The unit system 
was a historical legacy and representative of a socio-economic necessity; the Board could 
not have played on a centralised basis due to financial and transport restrictions.  Even the 
Maggot Trophy, the inter-unit competition of the Board, caused problems.  As late as 1983, 
Cloetesville regularly failed to turn up for scheduled matches due to financial and 
administrative problems.62  The system facilitated conflict by creating not just a means for 
protest, but by creating another level of power bases outside of Executive control.  Steve 
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Dublin, the President of Cape District, explained the unit’s withdrawal as due to ‘interference 
in our domestic affairs’.63  In this context, unity became a rallying cry of the Board out of 
necessity; as a weapon to combat the conflict caused by the highly flawed and contentious 
unit system.  
The integration attempts of the late 1970s heightened these issues.  The WPFB’s base had 
been built on achieving Coloured unity and opposing schisms within it.  Wally Henkel 
questioned the purpose of the Board in the 1973 AGM: 
Do we consider and accept this board as the ultimate authority of soccer in 
the Western Cape, or do we use it as a convenience and platform for 
verbal tirades and opportunity to seek public recognition for egotistic ideals 
which do not subscribe to, nor assist, our common cause.64 
However the WPFA (Hartleyvale) and, to a lesser extent, the WCSA had begun by the late 
1970s to actively seek out Coloured clubs.  They represented a concerted and established 
threat the WPFB had not previously faced.  By 1982 Stephanians (Alliance) had passed over 
to the WPFA (Hartleyvale) and Glenville had moved to the WCSA.  The WPFB, after years 
of relative stability, was thrust into a precarious position with a strong and established rival.  
The WPFB’s biggest concern became stemming the tide of Coloured footballers and clubs to 
the other two associations and retaining Coloured unity.   
The first responsive policy of the WPFB was to reject the Double Standards resolution since 
it created disunity through suspensions, ostracism, etc.  Even before the Double Standards 
resolution was implemented it was reported that Metropolitan Chairman Bert Erickson and 
Atlantis Delegate Sydney Louw would have to be removed from the organisation. 65  
Meanwhile the Board attempted to retain Coloured unity by co-opting units in the new 
communities created due to the forced and voluntary movement of Coloureds to the Cape 
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Flats.  Between 1957 and 1985, the Group Areas Act led to 150 000 people in the Cape 
Peninsula being forcibly removed.66  Many more moved voluntarily to new towns such as 
Mitchells Plain and Atlantis.  In his 1977 Secretarial Report Vincent Baartjes launched the 
new policy by asserting: 
Some consideration must be given to the many little Bodies still not 
affiliated to our Board.  The Group Areas Act will continue shifting huge 
sections of our players and provision must be made.67 
The Board quickly moved to ‘consolidate (its) position at home’.68  At the beginning of 1979, 
six new units were accepted:69  the Atlantis FA, Retreat and District, Hanover Park FA, 
Manenberg FA, Cloetesville FA and the Inter-denominational FA.  In the coming years, the 
Board continued to grow with the affiliations of Mitchells Plain FA (1982), Paarl (1983), 
Lentegeur (1983), Gugulethu (1982) and the FAWP (1984).  The old Institutional Logic or 
value of order and the constitution was sacrificed to ensure unity.  Administrative problems 
dogged the new units for the next few years.  The Hanover Park FA was suspended in 1982 
due to a myriad of administrative failures which included not attending WPFB meetings, not 
paying accounts and ignoring Board summonses.70 
There is little evidence that the new units held any distinctive political stance.  The Mitchells 
Plain and Gugulethu FAs had strong links to Double Standards before they joined the Board, 
represented by a tournament that they took part in with Double Standards dissenters Central 
and Cape District.71  However, Mitchells Plain did not join the Board until several years after 
Double Standards was implemented and there were strong suggestions that the association 
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was more interested in control than politics. 72   There was always a complex interplay 
between the move to the Cape Flats and attitudes towards the government.  Sean Field’s 
work Oral History, Community and Displacement does a good job of noting that the 
movement out towards the Cape Flats should not be seen as exclusively negative.73  Many 
of the facilities in the ‘townships’ were far better than those available previously.  For many 
the move, be it forced or voluntary, allowed them access to proper housing and electricity for 
the first time in their lives.  The sporting facilities were often a marked improvement.  
Ebrahim Abdullah, a former Alliance League player with Blackpool who moved to Mitchells 
Plain in 1977, noted that he had never used a dressing room before his move.74  While 
Abdullah himself was supportive of Double Standards, it is important to note that the 
removals were multi-faceted and that there were a multitude of reactions.  It is therefore not 
surprising that there is no obvious correlation between political stance and geography of the 
unit.   
The very existence of these units does though reflect a shift in Board politics to a greater 
interest in unity.  Many of the units were not in terms of administration or size strictly ready to 
join the Board; Atlantis and Cloetesville were no bigger than the Metropolitan club Sea Point 
Swifts. 75   The WPFB’s insistence on them joining at this stage demonstrates the 
consternation the Board felt about Coloured unity.  This fear often contrasted with actual 
reality.  Ebrahim Abdullah, in an interview with the author, never suggests that there was any 
possibility that Mitchells Plain would not link up with the Board.  Indeed he notes that the 
Mitchells Plain FA was the brainchild of Chris Stevens from the Cape Flats FA.76  At the time 
Mitchell Plain’s reluctance to link up with the Board was attributed by Association officials 
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only to not yet being ‘administratively sound’.77  Abdullah notes that all of the Mitchells Plain 
officials, including he himself at Alliance, were former Board officials and there seems to 
have been little thought of not becoming part of the Board.78  Units such as Mitchells Plain 
were still connected to the same Coloured middle-class that controlled units in the 
metropole.  Despite this apparent reality, the Board displayed great consternation at the 
apparent unwillingness of Mitchells Plain to join.  Vincent Baartjes warned: 
Mitchells Plain, one suspects, fancies themselves to becoming the grand 
Colouredstan, and further approaches are not expected.  That they will 
become a force should not be underestimated and the situation must be 
watched.79 
It is clear that the Board felt increasingly uneasy about the presence of unaffiliated units 
while the outward-looking WPFA (Hartleyvale) and the WCSA existed. 
The efficacy of the WPFB refusing the Double Standards resolution and co-opting new units 
into the WPFB in order to retain Coloured unity was diminished by the stance of the SASF 
and SACOS.  The WPFB’s position in regard to SACOS while it refused to implement the 
resolution was unclear.  The WPCB issued threats that WPFB members would be barred 
from their organisation but, apart from a few isolated incidents, this never came to fruition.  
The situation was only clarified when the SASF called for the WPFB to implement the policy 
or leave in March 1980.  If the Board did not implement the policy within thirty days, the 
SASF stated that its membership would be revoked and it would be classified as a ‘racial’ 
body.80  With this re-classification, WPFB members would no longer be able to play in other 
SACOS-administered sports.  While some associates would undoubtedly have chosen 
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football and the WPFB, many others would have chosen cricket, tennis, rugby, hockey, etc.  
The WPFB’s quest for Coloured unity would have been in tatters.   
SACOS and the WPFB predominantly viewed events very differently: SACOS in political 
terms and the WPFB from a sporting perspective.  The problem for the WPFB and the SASF 
more generally was that once the Double Standards resolution had been implemented, the 
Council became a very difficult organisation to leave.  The WPFB which as the largest 
member of the SASF had been involved in the establishment of SACOS, could not have 
foreseen its adaptation to a political entity.  SACOS’s initial 1973 goals, according to 
Roberts, were ‘international affiliation for non-racial structures’, the ‘mobilisation and 
consolidation of sports organisations under the banner of SACOS and successful attainment 
of sponsorship for non-racial sports development’.81  While within these motives there exist 
certain anti-Apartheid connotations, there was no sense that SACOS would become ‘an 
important node of the anti-apartheid movement’.82  Even the Double Standards resolution 
itself was initially intended only as a tool for instilling internal discipline.83  It was only with the 
amendment of the resolution to encompass outlawing membership of ‘racial’ political and 
social organisations that SACOS transformed into an overtly political confederation.   
This situation forced the WPFB into a corner wherein they had ‘no alternative but to 
implement and carry out the instruction of SASF’.84  Not to do so would have threatened the 
existence of the institution and its football.  The WPFB first and foremost implemented the 
resolution for sporting reasons.  It continued to view the resolution in these terms.  It 
therefore was always part-implemented from the perspective of retaining unity, viewed as 
critical to the WPFB’s survival.   As long as a Double Standards contravention did not involve 
leaving the WPFB or catch the attention of the press, it was tacitly allowed.  Joe Schaffers’ 
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experiences with the Alliance union and its President Sydney Lotter can be explained as 
such.  Schaffers was not leaving the WPFB, he was only going to play cricket on the other 
side.  Lotter’s stance was described by Schaffers as: 
I am not playing soccer on the White side, it’s completely divorced from the 
sport of soccer; and it’s cricket.85 
While the practice of ‘looking the other way’ on such dalliances was noted to be common,86 
the WPFB minutes contain no reference to any administrator being punished for allowing this 
practice.   
Punishments were almost exclusively doled out by the WPFB only when the defection 
involved football and/or when the press were involved.  Even then, sentences were often 
lenient.  Mitchells Plain FA Executive member Ampies Daries was called before the WPFB 
Executive for participating in organising the Farnese Tournament, a football competition that 
involved non-Board players, but he was suspended for just three weeks.87   The suspension 
was set for the next three weeks, which meant that Daries missed just three weeks during 
November, the middle of the WPFB’s off-season.  When harsh punishments were handed 
out, it was generally because the offender had gone over to the WPFA (Hartleyvale), which 
remained a threat to the Board’s hegemony.  Ocean View suspended Henry Brown, Cliffe 
Carelse and John Laguma for life after they were found to have played in the Cape Western 
League (WPFA (Hartleyvale)).88  John Adams of the Atlantis FA was also banned for life 
after crossing the divide to play for Bayview.89 
The Double Standards resolution was used less as a tactic of ‘political purification’ than for 
‘instilling internal discipline’.90  It was administered in order to attain the WPFB goal of 
Coloured footballing unity.  The Board itself largely washed its hands of suspensions unless 
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its hand was forced or it involved a Coloured player/team crossing the divide to the WPFA 
(Hartleyvale) or WCSA.  In order to ensure the return of Cape District and Central, however, 
the WPFB essentially allowed its units to apply the resolution how they wished.  Some were 
very strict; the Cape Flats FA by 1977 already had a list of all defectors and applied life bans 
unilaterally.91  Others such as Alliance were lenient.  The asymmetric implementation of the 
Double Standards resolution allowed the WPFB to retain unity and ensure its short-term 
survival.  The policy however was not only utilised for this purpose.  It had a longer term goal 
in mind: the reduction of ‘uncertainty’ created by the ill-defined government policy towards 
Coloureds and the marginality of Coloureds within the Apartheid system. 
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Chapter 5 – Uncertainty 
 
The essential preconditions for an insurgent collective identity include … 
social spaces within which members of an oppressed group can develop 
an independent sense of worth in contrast to their received definitions as 
second-class or inferior citizens.1 
 
The WPFB was a ‘free space’, a ‘sphere of cultural autonomy’ in which the administrators 
and the wider Coloured community could exercise control.  While Coloured unity became 
viewed as critical to institutional survival, it was not the only goal that was re-emphasised 
due to the destabilisation of the football structure in the 1970s.  The destabilisation had not 
come from within the WPFB itself; rather it was a product of shifts in government policy and 
a change in the outlook of the White national association, FASA.  This experience 
crystallised the notion, already made apparent by the impact of forced removals, that while 
officials and players had discovered an oasis of control within the confines of the football 
association, this oasis remained subject to storms from outside.   
The future impact of these storms was unclear.  Government policy at various times made 
attempts both to integrate and further separate Coloureds from White society.  With their 
institution and football survival left at the whim of a state which they had little or no say in, 
the WPFB was in a quagmire of uncertainty.  Buttressing the ‘free space’ of the WPFB soon 
became an Institutional Logic or goal of the Board.  The means to achieve this involved the 
Double Standards resolution.  By utilising its ‘dogmatism’2 and its opposition to government 
policy the WPFB was able to create a ‘new kind of solidarity’,3 gain the support of the 
increasingly influential ‘politicised’ faction and shield itself from future governmental policy 
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shifts.  The Board was able to protect its oasis and continue to play football within the 
Apartheid system.   
By the early 1970s the National Party government had removed almost all of the avenues 
Coloureds had to affect government policy.  In the Cape the group were removed from the 
common voters’ roll in 1951.4  The government’s alternative to representation in the National 
Parliament was the establishment of the Coloured Person’s Representative Council (CRC) in 
1964.  The Council, however, had extremely limited powers and was widely regarded as a 
‘political fraud’.5  Roy du Pré described the position of Coloureds: 
During the 20th century, they (Coloureds) were stripped of their political 
rights, formed into a nation against their will, deprived of their privileges in 
violation of the constitution and legislated into oblivion simply because they 
were ‘different’.6 
While most Coloureds were less damning of their position, it is generally accepted that their 
identity was marked by ‘marginality’ due to their ‘intermediate position’ within the South 
African racial hierarchy.7 
As a result of governmental policy shifts the WPFB, despite its majority status within Cape 
Town, was reminded of its intermediate role.  The WPFA (Hartleyvale) through its superior 
facilities and backing of sponsors was able to attract clubs from the WPFB;8 teams such as 
Silvertown United and Hertha Berlin soon ‘passed over’ to the White association.  No 
examples could be found of a White club (after UCT) affiliating to the WPFB.  On a 
professional level, while Cape Town City and Hellenic attracted Coloured stars such as 
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Trevor Manuel and Bernard ‘Dancing Shoes’ Hartze, Cape Town Spurs’ only noted White 
player was Sergio dos Santos who was unable to get a game for Hellenic or City.9  While the 
African WCSA in terms of facilities and sponsorship was in an even worse position than the 
WPFB and some amateur clubs such as White Spurs of Gugulethu did pass over to the 
Board,10 the sheer numbers of SANFA made them powerful within the professional arena.  
By 1982 the SANFA-administered professional league, the NPSL, had gained the majority of 
support from White businesses and was able to boast a turnover of nearly R3,2 million.11   In 
the same year, the NPSL was able to coax over both Cape Town FPL teams, Glenville and 
Cape Town Spurs. 
Coloured players generally found little success in White teams.  A Cape Herald article on 
Neville Londt at Hellenic suggested that the White players refused to pass to him and stated 
he could not be a success ‘if his team-mates (do not) realise that he is in their team.’12  
Londt, having gone over to Hellenic in the 1977 season, returned to Spurs by September 
1978.13    Regardless of the many players who discovered that ‘the grass is not so green on 
the other side’, the lure of superior facilities, higher pay and a perceived higher playing 
standard in the WPFA (Hartleyvale) ensured that defections continued.14 
These defections created uncertainty and threatened the unspoken bonds of community 
within the Board and its units.  Cape Town Spurs, the long-time professional arm of the 
WPFB, forsook the Board and the SASF in search of additional sponsorship.  While Spurs 
and Glenville’s places in the FPL were taken by Santos (ex-Cape Flats) and Glendene (ex-
Cape District), the previous communal connections had been broken.  While the Spurs-
Glenville derby was a major event regularly attracting 20 000 supporters, a 3 500 attendance 
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at a Glendene-Santos match was regarded as surprisingly high.15  The flight of Stephanians 
from the Alliance league to the WPFA (Hartleyvale) took a particularly onerous toll on the 
WPFB’s connections to the Claremont community.  Stephanians had been formed in 1924 
as the community rallied around to honour a young boy, Stephen Hilario, who had recently 
drowned at the old pier in Cape Town.16  They had become a vital part of the area, with table 
tennis and netball teams as well as the original football club, and had been part of the 
Alliance League since 1945.17  The old ties that for so many years had informed Coloured 
football were under threat.  The continued existence of the WPFB, its units and its clubs had 
become uncertain.  The WPFB began to enact a siege mentality, a feeling that its very 
existence was under attack. 
This feeling was heightened by another connected government policy: forced removals.  
Forced removals, which moved thousands to the Cape Flats, drew into question community 
ties which in turn questioned extant connections to the Board and its units.  Stephanians’ 
move was described as: 
Stephanians have felt the effects of the Group Areas Act more than most.  
Indeed, the club showed great resolution in keeping together after the Act 
had spread their members around all parts of the Peninsula.18 
The club’s players and administrators were already being forced to travel from across ‘the 
Peninsula’ to play in Alliance at the Rosmead Sports Ground.  It was not such an 
undertaking to travel to play at Hartleyvale.  Even if clubs such as Sea Point Swifts decided 
to remain in the WPFB (by moving to the Metropolitan Union in Bonteheuwel from their 
original location in Tramway Road, Sea Point), forced removals spread their players across 
the Peninsula and their connections to their unit and original community were weakened.  In 
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1981 Swifts, as part of the Bert Erickson dispute, left the Metropolitan Union to join the 
WPFA.19 
If a club did not move or moved to a different area than a player/administrator, 20  then 
members were left with a decision; to travel the large distances to their clubs’ base (Mitchells 
Plain is 30km from Green Point Common, Atlantis more than 62km) with its inherent cost or 
to join a new club.  For many who changed clubs, their new teams never held the same 
connections as their old ones.  Ebrahim Abdullah, still in an interview in 2015 almost thirty 
years after leaving the club, described Blackpool as ‘we’.21  His connections to Parkhurst 
AFC, his team since moving to Mitchells Plain in the late 1970s, were far less stressed in the 
interview.  Joe Schaffers, removed from District Six in the late 1970s, describes himself as 
‘having always been an Aerials man’ and notes with vigour the cultural, class and familial 
ties of other Alliance clubs such as Ridgeville and Corinthians.22  Alliance, along with its rich 
web of institutional relationships and connections, closed its doors in 1985 due to the impact 
of forced removals and Aerials moved to the Mitchells Plain Football Association.23  Cut off 
from its original Bloemhof Flats context, the club disbanded within a few years. 
Joe Schaffers described the impact of forced removals on the WPFB:   
but of course the Apartheid system was … when we were shifted out of the 
Bloemhof Flats and that applied to many other clubs.  Cricket clubs, soccer 
clubs.  Cos everything community based was destroyed, your schools, 
your churches, your sports clubs, all gone and it could never really get itself 
together again.  And a lot of the big name clubs also fell by the wayside 
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cos they couldn’t get members and if they had members, they were playing 
where they were living and where they could play.24 
While others including Ebrahim Abdullah were more positive on the associations and clubs 
that emerged from forced and voluntary removals, they represented a major shock to the 
Board.  The WPFB and its system had always been based in community.  The collapse of 
Alliance, a founder member, was a stark reminder that these communities and their 
institutions could be destroyed at the whim of the Apartheid state.  The very fabric of the 
Board was under threat.   
The imposition of Coloured unity was part of an attempt to restore stability in this context.  
The problem for the WPFB was that it still remained susceptible to another ‘shock’ from 
outside.  The impact of forced removals continued to create insecurity within the Board.   
The prospects for new units, created after the movement to the Cape Flats, was by no 
means certain or identifiable.  Some units such as the Mitchells Plain FA quickly established 
themselves behind rapidly growing memberships 25  and superior facilities. 26   Other units 
never fulfilled their promised growth.  Atlantis was designed ‘as an ethno-city with its own 
economic base’ with ambitious plans.27  Industrialists had pledged more than R90 million into 
the area and jobs, making everything from egg boxes to engines, were said to be plentiful.28  
Between 1976 and 1983, the town mushroomed from ‘virgin Cape Bush’ to a population of 
45 000.29  Everywhere the town was talked about in glowing terms, with Sydney Louw 
stating that ‘housing is no problem at all’ and gloating of the excellent sporting facilities, 
electricity and tarred roads the area had to offer potential residents.30  The expected growth 
of the town was almost certainly the driving force behind the Atlantis FA being accepted into 
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the Board despite its initial small size and poor administration.  By 1988 the town’s image 
was very different.  As South Africa fell into recession in the 1980s, the expected investment 
and growth had never arrived and Atlantis was described as ‘a city of despair, with poverty, 
unemployment and hunger becoming the order of the day.’31  Correspondingly the Atlantis 
FA had never become the Dominant force within the WPFB that was envisioned in its early 
years.  The administration of the unit remained chaotic; in 1983, an intra-unit competition 
finished with no-one able to say who had won.32  The Atlantis FA remained viewed as one of 
the weakest Board units. 
The communities that sprouted on the Cape Flats out of the ethers of the old often 
exacerbated the class divides that had previously dogged the WPFB.  Mitchells Plain was 
designed ‘as far as possible’ as a settlement for home-owners.33  As the town grew rapidly, 
however, more and more suburbs for rental dwellings were established.   Lentegeur’s make-
up was described as: 
Peculiar to this part of Mitchells Plain is the fact that its residents are 
almost all from District Six and the Bloemhof Flats and unlike the rest of 
Mitchells Plain they are all tenants and not home-owners.34 
The facilities available in the home-owner and rental areas were incomparable.  Ebrahim 
Abdullah described Westridge, a home-owner area, as ‘utopia’ encompassing impressive 
sports facilities, a shopping mall and a large civic centre.35  In Lentegeur the conditions were 
anything but ‘utopian’; the first residents moved to the area in 1979, but in 1981 there were 
still no shops, butchers or pre-school facilities and traffic signs and police patrols were 
described as inadequate.36  The asymmetrical nature of council-provided facilities led to the 
exacerbation of already prevalent class divides within the Board.  Since the early 1960s, a 
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unit such as Cape District had encompassed Christian (St. Johns), Muslim (Bluebells), 
higher-class (Yorkshire AFC) and lower-class (Crusaders) teams.  In Mitchells Plain, 
however, where class segregation was more prevalent, the Lentegeur FA split from the 
Mitchells Plain FA and joined the WPFB as an independent unit in 1984.37   Class divides, 
between ratepayers and renters, were exacerbated.  Middle-classes, the old Dominant of the 
Board, were no longer a fixture in areas such as Lentegeur which gave it a fairly unique, 
distinct culture. 
The Board through its policy of unity desperately attempted to restore immediate stability.  
An even greater threat however faced the WPFB – the uncertainty of government policy.  
Coloureds had almost no say in the future of government policy and the adherents of the 
WPFB had no way of establishing what it would be.  Government policy towards Coloureds 
was so confused and vague that the Board could not adequately plan for future upheavals.  
Government policy encompassed the ostensibly contradictory stances of pushing further 
assimilation with White society while pushing towards further residential segregation and a 
goal of the total separation of racial groups. 
The problem was that Coloureds remained a ‘residual statutory population category’,38 a 
complexity, an inconvenient middle group within the racial hierarchy.  This meant that 
National Party policies rarely focused on Coloureds.  Deborah Posel described the party’s 
priorities: 
The NP (National Party) took office in 1948 with attention focused squarely 
on the phenomenon of African urbanisation and its attendant dilemmas 
and dangers.39 
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Wherever motivation behind Apartheid is located, whether within Afrikaner Nationalism,40 
capitalist pressures41 or consternation at increasing levels of African urbanisation,42 it was 
primarily a product of White-African relations.  Comparatively, Coloureds were a peripheral 
concern.  Their minority status and supposed ‘Europeanised’ culture meant that they were 
not perceived as a threat to White political or economic hegemony.  The two perceived parts 
of Coloured identity, the African and the White, were prioritised at various times at the 
government’s suiting.  When policies were formulated, the majority of the time Coloureds 
were either a marginal concern or used as a pawn to further government interests 
elsewhere.   
In the early 1980s this led the Apartheid government to take up two contradictory positions; 
(restricted) assimilation and total separation which both had the potential to transform the 
workings of the WPFB.  In 1983, a Whites only referendum approved the foundation of a 
Tricameral Parliament, a national Parliament that would have three chambers: one for 
Whites, one for Coloureds and one for Indians.  The Tricameral Parliament by no means 
removed Apartheid; the Parliament ran on a segregated basis and the combined number of 
Coloured and Indian representatives (130) was outweighed by Whites (178).  Even though 
segregation remained within the system, the Tricameral Parliament’s formulation was a 
major shift in government policy and was portrayed as ‘merely a first step in an unspecified 
‘right direction’.’43  The motivation for the move however had little to do with a desire to co-
opt Coloureds into the Dominant system.  The National Party’s chief information officer wrote 
to Andries Treurnicht, leader of the right-wing faction in the National party caucus, in the 
early 1980s asking: 
I would like to know your view on the idea that we at any price have got to 
associate the Coloureds as a bloc of 2.5 million with the whites in order to 
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broaden our own power base, and not surrender them to the “black-power” 
situation.44 
Coloureds were only important insofar as their relationship with the majority Africans, the 
real threat to White hegemony.   
The marginal position of Coloureds within the minds of National Party ideologues produced a 
‘Coloured policy’ that lacked coherence.  This meant that while forming an assimilationist 
policy with the Tricameral Parliament, government officials continued to moot the idea of an 
independent Coloured ‘homeland’ or ‘Colouredstan’.  This was an extension of the extant 
policy towards Africans.  These various ‘tribal’ homelands were conceived as independent 
nations and four were actually declared independent, although no country outside of South 
Africa ever officially recognised them.  Any African assigned to one of these ‘homelands’ 
was regarded as a citizen of the ‘Bantustan’ regardless of whether or not they were born or 
had ever even gone there.  Once a person was declared a Bantustan citizen their South 
African citizenship was terminated.  Connie Mulder, the Minister of Plural Relations and 
Development, stated the ultimate goal of the policy: 
If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as the black people are 
concerned, there will be not one black man with South African citizenship.45 
In the late 1970s and 80s the policy was at its zenith.  In 1976 the Transkei (Xhosa) was 
declared independent, followed by Bophutatswana (Tswana, 1977), Venda (Venda, 1979) 
and the Ciskei (Xhosa, 1981).  Six more self-governing Bantustans, including the powerful 
but geographically divided KwaZulu, were established but never officially declared 
independent.46   
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The position of Coloureds with regard to this policy was unclear.  The ideology behind the 
‘homelands’, if drawn to its logical conclusion, called for the complete political segregation of 
all racial groups.  Coloureds, whatever ‘middling position’ popular imagination placed them 
in, were legally defined as a ‘race’ and officially categorised as separate.   A ‘Colouredstan’ 
however had a fundamental problem: the lack of a discernible Coloured homeland.  The 
homelands for various African ‘tribes’ had some (albeit questionable) historical basis and 
were portrayed as areas Africans had lived in for generations which were now being 
returned to them.  Coloureds however, as a popular Apartheid joke went, had been created 
by Jan van Riebeeck.47  They had no historically justifiable homeland beyond Cape Town, 
which Whites regarded as their ‘Mother City’.  Hendrik Verwoerd, the chief ideologue of 
Apartheid, perhaps best summarised ‘the Coloured Problem’.  He noted that the 
establishment of a separate Coloured homeland was not practically possible.48  However, it 
remained a stated goal of his and his followers.  He explained: 
If we could have settled the Coloureds in a part of the country quite on their 
own, in their own areas like the Bantu, we certainly would have.49 
The prospect of a Coloured homeland and the complete segregation of the Coloured ‘race’ 
remained a vague, ill-defined, but still much discussed prospect throughout the period. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the residential segregation decreed by the Group 
Areas Act approaching completion, the lack of a Coloured ‘homeland’ had in some eyes 
been solved by the establishment of Mitchells Plain.  The town, 32km from the centre of 
Cape Town, was designed as a ‘self-contained’ development which would eventually grow 
into a new city and centre of Coloured life.50  The funding of the project came largely through 
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an R800 million loan from a foreign government given on the condition it would be used for 
the provision of housing for the ‘so-called middle-class Coloured community of Cape 
Town’.51  The town grew at a rate of knots with 33 houses being built a day in the late 
1970s.52   
The birth of Mitchells Plain was believed, inside and outside of government circles, to be 
laying the foundations for a politically separate Coloured homeland.  When the Mitchells 
Plain FA refused to join the WPFB in 1980, Vincent Baartjes, the Secretary of the WPFB, 
warned: 
Mitchells Plain, one suspects, fancies themselves to becoming the grand 
Colouredstan, and further approaches are not expected.  That they will 
become a force should not be underestimated and the situation must be 
watched.53 
It is clear that there was considerable consternation about the future of Mitchells Plain within 
the WPFB.  A ‘Colouredstan’ would have had a profound impact on the Board and all other 
institutions.  Its establishment would have shifted the entire focus of Coloured life.  The 
Fields of Play book describes Green Point Common as ‘the centre of Cape Town’s football 
scene’ and tracks all forced removals by their distance from the common.54  Had Mitchells 
Plain become a self-governing, autonomous Coloured area, then these links to the city, 
already weakened by forced removals, would have been placed under even greater stress. 
The potential impact on the Board, and its traditional power bases in Wynberg, Claremont 
and Maitland, remained speculative and never came to fruition.  Its spectre, however, 
continued to hang over the WPFB.  The Board had to simultaneously plan for a future that 
may have involved complete political separation or assimilation.  Their future, decided by a 
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government in which they had little or no say, remained uncertain.   With this in mind, the 
combat of uncertainty and of government influence became another new emphasis in Board 
policy. 
Part of this new emphasis was to implement the Double Standards resolution.  It combatted 
the uncertainty of the WPFB’s context and returned a measure of control.  The Double 
Standards resolution firstly reinforced loyalty to the Board.  The ‘politicised’ faction, while 
small in number, was highly influential.  Their support of the resolution had caused Cape 
District, generally identified as the Dominant unit, to leave the WPFB accompanied by 
Central, another long-standing member.  Their opposition had even created the possibility of 
the formation of ‘a body in opposition to the Western Province Football Board’ which 
rumours suggested could have the backing of SACOS or even the SASF.55  This Challenger 
group, based as it was around an anti-Apartheid stance, rejected the uncertain schemes laid 
down by the government.  The attained loyalty of the group by implementing the Double 
Standards resolution ensured that the WPFB had a strong ally which took little notice of 
shifts in government policy. 
The resolution provided the WPFB with a tool with which to combat future moves by the 
government.  Both the assimilation policy of the Tricameral Parliament and the total 
separation policy of the ‘Colouredstan’ incorporated the creation of a raft of new 
government-supported positions on ‘racial bodies’.  While the resolution would not have 
protected the institution from the wide-reaching potential ramifications of a ‘Colouredstan’, it 
did mean that the Board retained a level of control in the potential situation.  The WPFB did 
not always remove those who had taken part in government bodies; for example 
Stellenbosch FA head Matt Seegers,, stripped of his life membership from the WPCB in 
1980 for his role on a government-created sports body, faced no reported censorship from 
the WPFB for his actions.56  The resolution did however afford the Board a means to deal 
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with the potential ramifications emanating from uncertain government policies.  It provided a 
clear set of rules that could be applied by the Board if it so wished.   
More intangibly, the Double Standards resolution provided part of a strategy by the Board to 
re-create communal ties post-removals.  John Western stated: 
Can the desired social cohesion be of the Mowbray (pre-removals 
community) kind: the warm, sentimental attachment to neighbourhood and 
to neighbours who are often relatives – part of the image of a “natural” 
community? No – especially because of the short time elapsed since the 
townships’ creation, their enormous scale compared with the Mowbray 
Nonwhite pockets, and their continual turnover in population (44 percent of 
the people I interviewed had moved again since they left Mowbray).  A new 
kind of solidarity is needed, some conscious creation of a certain level of 
concerted action.57 
The resolution took up this role of creating ‘A new kind of solidarity’.  It was not that the 
WPFB was united behind the Double Standards resolution, indeed the resolution and its 
various parts remained contentious; its power lay in the fact that it increasingly became the 
only point of contention.  Previously, the system of play in the Maggot Trophy (inter-club or 
inter-unit) was a particularly controversial issue.  In 1969, after an 8-1 thrashing of the Cape 
FA side by Metropolitan, when it was felt the Cape FA had fielded a greatly weakened side, 
the Cape Herald termed Board soccer a ‘farce’58 and called upon the Board ‘to take steps to 
avoid a recurrence … or immediately close up shop.’59  The issue looked set to bedevil the 
WPFB again in 1981 when there were rumblings of a possible revolt over the absence of a 
1982 inter-club Virginia League.60  The ‘revolt’ however never came to fruition.  Before the 
next meeting of the Board, the 1982 AGM, Cape Town Spurs and Glenville had left the 
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SASF; the AGM did not mention the system of play in the Virginia League and instead 
agreed to accept the application of the Gugulethu FA and to re-affiliate to WPCOS.61  The 
WPFB used the uncertainty, the loss of ties with Spurs and Glenville, to further move 
towards full implementation of the Double Standards resolution. This distracted Board 
adherents from other divisive issues.  It ensured institutional survival.       
The Double Standards resolution was used by the WPFB as part of a strategy to reduce the 
level of uncertainty that the institution faced.  It provided a clear set of rules which, while not 
uniformly applied, were always available.  It ensured the Board held the support of the 
political faction who categorically rejected government influence and was a distraction that 
gave the Board a clear path when uncertainty threatened to derail its goals.  In Board circles 
the resolution was never viewed as a means to bring down the government.  Vincent 
Baartjes strongly repudiated this idea:    
While one subscribes to forcing political changes it is imperative to form the 
appropriate movement; for Sport in this country can never hope to produce 
the desired changes.62   
Double Standards was always a policy that as practised by the Board was meant to allow 
the institution to work effectively within the system.  This, in an Apartheid context where 
Coloureds had little or no say in the workings of government, meant establishing an 
Institutional Settlement that incorporated reducing governmental power over the Board i.e. 
reducing uncertainty.   
The reduction of ‘uncertainty’ and the attainment of Coloured ‘unity’ both relied on an 
asymmetric and flexible implementation of the Double Standards resolution.  This was 
professedly against the spirit of the dogma as intended by SACOS.   The Board, however, 
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was able to utilise the ‘confusion’ within Apartheid sports and society as a whole to 








Chapter 6 – Confusion 
 
Confronted by the formidable pace and breadth of the Nationalists’ 
achievement, many a commentator has turned to the notion of an all-
embracing ‘grand plan’ to explain the making of Apartheid (prior to the 
onset of ‘reform’ in the mid-1970s).  The Afrikaner nationalist vanguard in 
the state is seen as having built the Apartheid edifice brick by brick, 
according to the dictates of a single, systematic long-term blueprint, the 
essence of which was already conceived in the minds of NP leaders on the 
eve of their election victory in 1948.1 
 
In The Making of Apartheid, Posel argues that many have viewed Apartheid as a ‘grand 
plan’ ‘greatly exaggerating the extent of the continuity, control, and long-term planning 
involved.’2  She proposes that Apartheid had no ‘blueprint’; it was a product of conflict and 
compromise, of adaptations and revisions, of ‘Uncertainties, conflicts, failures, and 
deviations’.3  In the previous chapters it has been suggested that the WPFB used the Double 
Standards resolution in a logical and considered manner to fulfil two new Institutional Logics: 
Coloured unity and the reduction of uncertainty.   This was not however part of a ‘grand 
plan’.  Chairman Wally Henkel stated in 1981, that it was ‘never the board’s intention to 
implement the double standards policy until they had fully investigated the matter’;4 the 
resolution within the Board originated as a response to the destabilisation of the wider 
football structure.  Much like Apartheid, the policy evolved within a context of conflict and 
compromise.  This led directly to the WPFB’s inconsistent and heterogeneous 
implementation.  Board adherents often seemed to have little understanding of Double 
Standards, its various tenets or the ideology behind them.  This was a product of the 
WPFB’s confused context; an environment that encompassed a mess of football 
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organisations and an inadequate, skewed media with its own distinct priorities,  who failed to 
adequately reflect or question WPFB activities.  
It seems unlikely that most Board footballers, spectators or even administrators would have 
been able to explain the structure of football in South Africa or even the Western Cape.  The 
Argus described the situation in November 1978:  
The average sports-minded South African, I know, is often puzzled by what 
seems to be the labyrinthine nature of the sports situation in this country – 
a state of affairs that applies particularly to the administration of soccer.5   
The soccer structure was a sea of acronyms; in the Western Cape even if we ignore the 
various units, FASA, SANFA, SASF, WPFA (Hartleyvale), WPFB, WCSA, FPL, NPSL, 
SACOS and WPCOS were all regularly used in reports.  Even more confusingly, the White 
WPFA (Hartleyvale) and Board unit WPFA had the same official name.6  While in earlier 
years distinctions were drawn by their various racial affiliations, by the 1970s the WPFB, 
WCSA and WPFA (Hartleyvale) all espoused the same goal of a united non-racial Western 
Cape football body.  Even the administrators of the various organisations knew little of each 
other; the Vice-President of the WPFA (Hartleyvale), Eric Dalton, admits that ‘we (WPFA 
(Hartleyvale)) didn’t understand the way SACOS ran their football in the Western Cape’.7  
Understanding of the WCSA was even worse; Mike Coetzee, a senior official in the WPSSU, 
in an interview questioned whether Langa even had soccer fields in the 1970s.8  
This is not to argue the Board was a passive recipient of confusion.  The opaque structure of 
football and the media, which focused on the political rather than sporting issues around the 
WPFB, allowed the association considerable leeway.  The Board used the confusion in 
Apartheid society, produced by the state, football bodies and the media, to achieve its 
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sporting goals.  In a similar fashion to the government publicly embracing integrated sport, 
while simultaneously allowing local governments to rule against it, the Board publicly 
embraced the Double Standards resolution while simultaneously allowing its units to flout it.   
The confusion surrounding football in the Western Cape was rooted not just in the 
‘labyrinthine nature of the sports situation’, but in the limitations of the concurrent media.  
Despite the WPFB being the largest sporting institution in the Western Cape, it received little 
media attention and if it was analysed, it came from a separate perspective to that of the 
Board or its adherents. 
SASF-administered football was not televised or broadcast on the radio.9  Content on these 
media streams was stringently controlled by the government-regulated South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).   Due to National Party fears that television ‘would 
become an unmanageable vehicle for American values and communist ideology’, the 
medium was not even introduced to South Africa until 1976.10  SABC, apart from a handful of 
pirate radio stations, held a monopoly on television and radio until the end of Apartheid.   No 
SACOS-administered sport was broadcast on these mediums.  In fact, it was not until the 
early 1980s that any South African football11 (the NPSL) was televised live.12     
This meant that the SASF, FPL and the WPFB were only consumed by those who actually 
attended matches and through second-hand accounts.  Sean Jacobs described the 
situation: 
So FPL teams and players only lived on the field or the retelling of game 
action by other boys who had gone to games – either accompanying their 
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fathers or with their permission. I had to experience the FPL through the 
sports pages of the ‘Extra’ editions.13 
This gave newspapers near-control on how the WPFB and SASF were represented.  In 
particular the political situation surrounding the associations, unless you were a top 
administrator, was filtered almost entirely through the medium.  This left the nature, the tone 
and the language of the story to the press which had its own agendas and manipulated the 
situation to these ends.   
The newspapers that reported on the WPFB can be divided into three main groups: 
Afrikaans language newspapers produced for Whites, English language newspapers 
produced for Whites and the newspapers produced for Coloureds, primarily the Cape 
Herald.  The Afrikaans language newspapers carried almost no discussion of soccer or 
Coloured sport.  Die Burger began producing inserts carrying news of Coloured football in 
1962, but these never did much more than print results.14   Carl Dryding described his role at 
Die Burger as a stringer, someone who is employed only to provide the scores.15  Any match 
reports were not printed in Die Burger proper and were relegated to the ‘Extra’ edition.  This, 
according to Dougie Oakes, was due to Die Burger’s strong government links: 
you know Apartheid was designed to keep people apart and Burger was 
the mouthpiece of the people who were doing that.16 
Since Afrikaans was the language of the Coloured working-class, the lack of reports in the 
Afrikaans language newspapers kept them in the dark over the politics of the Board and 
SACOS.  If an Afrikaans-speaker’s only connection to the WPFB was through newspapers, 
he could have been forgiven for not knowing what the Double Standards resolution was.  
Much less should he have been expected to understand the ideological basis or nuances of 
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the policy.  Afrikaans-speakers, if they did not have personal links with SACOS/WPCOS, 
were sequestered from political discussion and could only view the resolution in local, 
sporting terms.  As politics and sport became more intimately connected, this served as 
another barrier to lower-class Coloureds rising to administrative positions.       
In this context it is not surprising that the Double Standards debate in many units lacked 
substance or sophistication or that units were so starkly divided.  Metropolitan voted 
unanimously to leave the Board in opposition to the policy in 1981 while Cape Flats initially 
voted in 1978 to withdraw from the Board in support of the resolution.  The two units had 
similar membership bases.  Bonteheuwel and Heideveld are less than 4 km apart and were 
both generally regarded as lower-class areas created due to forced removals.  Cape Flats’ 
reaction to the Double Standards resolution was particularly chaotic.  Within a week, in 
March 1978, the unit agreed with little reported opposition to leave the WPFB over its non-
implementation of the resolution before reversing its decision and forcing its Chairman 
Johann Groepe, a strong proponent of the resolution, to resign.17  This divided response 
suggests that lower-class Coloureds still had very little say in WPFB unit administration.  
Decisions and the filtering down of political issues still strongly reflected the interests of a 
middle-class minority that had its own distinct preoccupations.  Metropolitan’s withdrawal in 
particular reflected the personal concerns of a group of Dominant administrators including 
Chairman Bert Erickson who played cricket in the integrated WPCU.    
The coverage of WPFB football in the two major English-language newspapers in Cape 
Town, the Cape Times and the Argus, was only marginally better.  Even compared to 
Coloured politics, Coloured sport was given very little attention.  The Cape Times provided 
only sporadic match reports and rarely discussed WPFB administrative issues.  These 
reports largely took place on Tuesdays and in ‘extra’ editions.  The Argus had slightly more 
extensive coverage including match reports in its ‘extra’ edition every Sunday.  From 1969 
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Ted Doman had a regular Monday column which discussed Coloured sport’s administrative 
issues; however this feature ended its run in 1972.  The sporadic reports that followed 
focused on ‘elite’ WPFB games: the professional FPL teams and the inter-unit Maggot 
Trophy.  For many Coloureds who were more interested in their local unit leagues, these 
competitions were of peripheral interest.  Articles on administrative and political issues were 
erratic and major events within Board circles such as the affiliation of UCT passed without 
comment from either newspaper.18 
The WPFB was largely only reported on when it affected White football or transcended sport 
and entered the news section.  A front-page Cape Times article on trouble at a Spurs-
Glenville derby in 1972 was couched in almost apocalyptic language.19  The situation was 
described as ‘war’ and it was claimed that ‘The rioters seemed immune to both dogs and 
bullets’.20  While the security measures at the game are unknown, it seems likely the clash 
was exaggerated.  At a game between Cape Town City and Spurs in 1978, there were just 
twenty-four policemen present to administer a 20 000 crowd.21  Bearing in mind the probable 
small police contingent present at the match, it seems unlikely that clashes between the 
police and spectators in 1972 were as widespread as reported.  It is more likely that the 
event was hyped-up to fit a prevailing view of Coloured fans as ‘unrespectable’ which had 
seen Cape Town City ban ‘Non-Whites’ from several of their games earlier in the season.22   
It was not that the newspapers were pro-Apartheid.  The Cape Times was generally 
perceived (within the White context) to be a liberal newspaper with a qualified anti-Apartheid 
stance.   A former editor of the Cape Times compared the stance of the paper to that of the 
Argus: 
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The Argus has always been accepted as part of a powerful national 
organisation with a power-base in Johannesburg.  Until recently this has 
been evident in the comparatively muted tone of its expression of editorial 
opinion.  This contrasted with the more forthright attitude which has 
established the unique position of the Cape Times.23 
The claim of the Cape Times to be a true ‘opposition press’ has been questioned,24 but the 
paper did run strongly critical articles and editorials on subjects such as forced removals, the 
destruction of District Six25 and the Soweto Uprisings.26   
The reason articles were not written on the WPFB, and Coloured sport in general, was not 
due to political aversion to the SASF’s non-racialism.  Both papers, like the majority of the 
established White press, were ‘owned and controlled by whites, aimed at or intended for 
whites, concerned almost exclusively with the political, economic and social life of the white 
population, and consumed mainly by whites’. 27   Regardless of their strong Coloured 
readerships, both papers marketed themselves primarily towards Whites.  After its purchase 
of the Cape Herald in 1970 the Argus Group quite openly promoted the Argus as White and 
the Cape Herald as Coloured.  The Cape Times, despite liberal leanings, remained White in 
makeup in a similar manner to the WPFB remaining Coloured despite a professed non-racial 
stance.  The sports papers of these newspapers therefore focused on White football, the 
NFL, the WPFA (Hartleyvale)-administered Cape Western League and other well-supported 
associations such as the International Football Association (IFA).28  It should be noted that 
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while many Coloured fans supported Hellenic and/or Cape Town City, Whites were 
seemingly banned from Athlone Stadium for FPL games. 29   WPFB football, generally 
perceived to be of lower quality than ‘White’ football, was viewed by the newspapers to be of 
little interest to its target readership.  Unless Coloured/African football came into contact with 
Whites, it was generally disregarded.     
All of this meant that the White community, who received most of their news from the Argus 
and the Cape Times (or from SABC-controlled radio/TV outlets), lacked knowledge of the 
WPFB or the way it administered its football.  Even within the WPFA (Hartleyvale) in the late 
1980s, Eric Dalton, the former Vice-President of the White association, noted that many 
misunderstood the WPFB and its structure: 
Like most people involved in the football association we didn’t know much 
and uh … um we didn’t understand a lot of the way football was run in the 
football board and it still comes up today;  now 20 odd years down the line.  
You know different ways they have running meetings, different ways they 
have of um … instilling discipline and things like that.30 
The idea that leading White football administrators did not understand how the WPFB 
worked suggests that the average White reader would not have either.  This created a 
vicious circle: the lack of understanding within White circles led to few articles on the WPFB 
which led to even poorer knowledge of Board soccer. 
This lack of knowledge was exacerbated by a general aversion to what was termed the 
politicisation of sport.  Coloured reporter Dougie Oakes described the situation: 
DO: The thing is papers like the Burger and Argus, Cape Times, they didn’t 
mind carrying the match reports.  That was…they had no problem with 
that, but as soon as it came to the area of…. 
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FC: controversial stuff  
DO: then it became a problem.31 
The aversion, while part of a limited oppositional strategy to Apartheid wherein ‘targets of 
dissent were carefully selected and comprised an insignificant proportion of the news’,32 was 
also a reflection of the divide between White and Black politics.  The 1976 adaption of the 
governmental sports policy to allow mixed sport at club level was viewed by the government 
and SACOS as an attempt to buttress Apartheid, ‘as a means of buying time for (the) 
Government’s general policies’.33  However, it was perceived in many White circles as a 
‘liberal’ move which removed some of the most stringent restrictions of ‘petty’ Apartheid and 
as a first step towards removing the system.  The uneasy alliance behind the new sports 
policy was summarised by anti-Apartheid journalist Donald Woods.  He described a meeting 
between himself and the Sports Minister Piet Koornhof: 
I wanted to end sports apartheid in order to hasten the breakdown of 
general apartheid, while he (Koornhof) wanted to end sports apartheid in 
order to prolong general apartheid.34 
The liberal, English-speaking press including the Cape Times embraced integrated sport as 
a qualified step in breaking down general Apartheid.   
This created a significant divide from SACOS who (with opposite politics) viewed the end of 
‘sports apartheid’ from Koornhof’s perspective.  To SACOS it was a cosmetic change that 
barely altered the realities they were facing; in short there could be ‘no normal sport in an 
abnormal society’.  The majority of the White English-speaking press therefore took up an 
antagonistic position to SACOS whom they saw as ‘politicised’ and as a barrier to ‘normal 
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sport’: a 1976 Cape Times column, termed the Federation unfit for unity talks because it was 
‘an organisation with a politician at the helm’.35  The politicisation of sport was generally 
portrayed as the reason behind the international sporting boycott36 which, while of peripheral 
concern to Coloureds and the WPFB, caused huge shockwaves in the White community.  
Nauright has described sporting sanctions as having ‘perhaps the most potent role in 
undermining white South African confidence and complacency.’37  The Double Standards 
resolution was seen as another means of bringing politics into sport, a sphere in which it had 
no natural place.  When Bluebells brought the resolution into the WPFB by refusing to take 
the field in the Mahoney incident, the Argus’ only printed quote stated ‘It is a sad state of 
affairs if they bring politics into sport’.38 
Adding to the opposition to SACOS in the White English newspapers was the divide 
between the perceived importance of professional and amateur football.  From a White 
standpoint, the unity talks of the late-1970s were viewed not only as beneficial, but as 
essential to the survival of their professional soccer.  As seen in Chapter 3, unity was 
proclaimed as both the remedy to the NFL financial crisis and as a path to return to FIFA.  
The future of the WPFA (Hartleyvale) amateur football was a secondary issue.  The 
problems the WPFB had with integration, the unit system, the future of its clubs, the 
continued inequity of the appropriation of facilities and the possible requirement of permits 
etc., were primarily amateur concerns.  These issues were hardly mentioned in the White 
press who viewed integration from an almost exclusively White and predominantly 
professional perspective.  Separate sporting concerns continued to divide the two groups. 
When the WPFB decided to reject the Double Standards resolution and leave SACOS in 
1978 the Argus struck a particularly triumphalist tone: 
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What seems to be the first crack in the hitherto solid front presented by the 
(self-styled) non-racial elements in South African sport has become visible  
with the decision of the Western Province Football Board, an important 
body representing hundreds of soccer players, to reject a South African 
Council of Sport (Sacos) directive on ‘double standards’.39 
The quote is striking in its lack of knowledge of the WPFB and SASF.  The Board’s refusal to 
implement Double Standards was hardly ‘the first crack in the hitherto solid front’; the SASF 
had been suspended by SACOS eight months earlier and had been formally expelled from 
the Council.  It should also be noted that the WPFB catered for at least 15 000 players not 
the hundreds claimed here.40  The article goes on to accuse the Double Standards resolution 
of being politically motivated and being against the desires of football players in the 
province.41  The claim that the majority of Board players were against the resolution was 
directly contradicted elsewhere.42   
The WPFB and the Argus viewed the rejection of the Double Standards resolution in 
different terms.  The article published a statement by WPFB Chairman, Wally Henkel: 
And, he added with logic, that if people were sincere in their belief in the 
resolution, then they should apply it to all facets of their lives – not sport 
alone.43   
The report noted that this rejection created the potential for fresh unity talks.  The WPFB did 
not connect the two events.  To the Board all hopes of integration had been extinguished by 
the White WPFA (Hartleyvale)’s refusal to disband and join the Board at the end of 1977.  
Instead the Double Standards resolution was, as Henkel was reported to have also stated in 
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the Cape Herald, rejected because ‘soccer players were interested only in playing soccer’.44  
The Argus report, despite quotes from Coloured administrators, views the issue from a White 
perspective: how the decision affects integration prospects.  The Argus article ignores the 
impact of the resolution on the WPFB, its members and its units.   
The Cape Times article on the Board’s withdrawal from the SASF was less triumphalist, but 
still portrayed the decision as the only reasonable outcome.45  It states that even units that 
were in favour of the resolution, Stellenbosch, Cape FA and Ocean View, were still ‘divided 
on the issue’.46  This was accurate, but the critique gives no indication that this was equally 
true of the unions who opposed the resolution or that Cape District had already left the 
Board over its refusal to implement.  The piece also prints a quote from Ronald Harrison, a 
delegate from Cape Flats stating:  
It is a sad day when soccerites are being used in a game of political chess 
as pawns.47  
In the White context, the phrase ‘political chess’ brought connotations of SACOS’s rejection 
of unity talks and politicisation of sport, but to adherents of the WPFB this phrase probably 
meant something different.  Chairman Wally Henkel criticised the resolution as a reflection of 
‘political fighting behind the scenes’, a veiled reference to the divide between Norman 
Middleton and Hassan Howa.48  It is likely that ‘political chess’ was referring to political 
infighting within SACOS rather than integration talks which a Board meeting had 
categorically rejected earlier in the year.49  The White newspapers and their White readers 
who received little to no coverage of SACOS or the Howa-Middleton divide lost this context.  
The issue was therefore distorted.  
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Once Double Standards had been implemented, reporting on the WPFB returned to previous 
sporadic levels.  Cape Town Spurs and Glenville leaving the FPL and going over to the 
SANFA-administered NPSL in 1982 made it even worse.  Glendene and Santos, the two 
new Western Cape FPL teams, were barely mentioned.  Articles were largely restricted to 
match reports; the only exception being when teams or organisations stood against the 
Double Standards resolution.  For instance the Cape Times ran an article on the withdrawal 
of Metropolitan which opened by stating that the withdrawal had ‘brought to an end an 
association of nearly 50 years’.50  The Double Standards resolution, despite its tendency to 
unify as described in Chapter 4, was depicted as tearing apart the Board and the Coloured 
community.  The fact that Metropolitan had been struggling for survival for the last decade 
due to the impact of forced removals was overlooked.   
None of this is to say that the Coloured readership of these newspapers imbibed these 
messages uncritically or viewed the articles in the manner of a White audience.  All texts are 
constructed ‘through an interaction between producer, text and consumer’ and Coloured 
readers and/or WPFB members may have come away with very different views to the ones 
intended by reporters.51  Some may have agreed that integration was the way forward but 
others, incensed at the lack of knowledge of Coloured affairs in the newspapers, may have 
gone in the other direction.  The political impact of the sporadic and skewed reporting of the 
WPFB in the two newspapers is unclear.  Its main identifiable effect was not so much in what 
it reported as what it didn’t.  By only analysing the Double Standards resolution in its effect 
on integration, hopes of which at an official level were all but extinguished, the newspapers 
portrayed the resolution as only outlawing playing for or amalgamating with a White body.  
The focus remained on the official level, and the impact of the resolution on individuals, 
clubs or units in the WPFB was not explored.  Grassroots WPFB decision-making was 
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ignored which gave the Board, from this side at least, a free reign over how it implemented 
the resolution. 
The third major newspaper type that reported on the WPFB was the Coloured newspapers 
of which the Cape Herald was the most prominent.   The Cape Herald was bought by the 
Argus Group in 1970 and worked out of the same building as the Argus; however it held 
editorial control over its own content.  One reporter stated that ‘there was no way (there 
would be editorial interference), they didn’t know what we would do’.52  The newspaper on 
occasion even criticised the Argus; as it did when the latter paper claimed the end of 
segregation at the Newlands Rugby Ground53 whilst simultaneously printing an advert asking 
for Coloureds to buy tickets from a separate location to Whites.54    
While no editorial influence was exerted on a day-to-day basis, the Argus Group kept the 
news section relatively short.  This meant that reporters who were interested in politics were 
pushed towards the larger sports section.  Dougie Oakes, for instance, claims that he really 
had little interest in sport.  His passion was politics; he later became a Foreign 
Correspondent and News Editor.55  His weekly column therefore predominantly focused on 
the politics surrounding SACOS and the Double Standards resolution.  It very rarely 
mentioned matches or scores.  Thus the Cape Herald sports section became highly 
politicised.   
Its politics were ‘a very, very strong SACOS line’.56  When the WPFB left the Federation, the 
Cape Herald printed some quotes from Northerns President Les Mondo which were critical 
of the Double Standards resolution and asserted: 
White sportsmen are sincere in wanting to play mixed sport but it is the 
Government who is stopping them.57 
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Oakes went on the offensive with Mondo.  He stated that if the Northerns President wanted 
to leave and join a White union, then he was welcome.  Then he would witness how many 
Whites were willing to play in Bishop Lavis.58  While no examples could be found of a team 
from Bishop Lavis being successful in White sport, Metropolitan Chairman Bert Erickson’s 
Bonteheuwel-based Avendale Cricket Club seems to have been a member of the integrated 
WPCU without issue.  Oakes, however, does not even contemplate the idea that there could 
be ‘normal sport’ in an ‘abnormal society’.  A club leaving the WPFB was always portrayed 
as signing a suicide note.  Oakes termed the flight of Stephanians to the WPFA (Hartleyvale) 
as ‘Sad.  For, a move to the rival association will almost certainly spell doom for the 56 year-
old club.’59  The club successfully moved to the WPFA (Hartleyvale) and still exists today.     
The problem was that while many members of the WPFB judged actions by their impact on 
sport, Oakes, due to his background, analysed disputes by their political considerations.  
When Metropolitan withdrew from the Board, after refusing President Bert Erickson’s offer to 
resign due to his role in the integrated WPCU, Oakes stated that it was: 
One of the most short-sighted decisions that could ever have been taken 
… (it) would kill the sport in the Bonteheuwel area. 
It is a blatant insult to ask black sportsmen to play cricket at a ground like 
Newlands on a Saturday afternoon – and then send him back to his sub-
standard home in the townships the Saturday evening.60 
Metropolitan had voted unanimously to back their eighteen-year President in the dispute.61  
Far from ‘kill the sport in the Bonteheuwel area’, only one club (Sea Point Swifts) left the unit 
in the year it spent outside the Board.  While Oakes linked his opposition to ‘normal sport’ to 
economic and political issues, there is little evidence that the members of Metropolitan did 
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likewise.  The extant evidence suggests that the members of Metropolitan were more 
interested in supporting their President and other leading administrators than in political 
concerns.    
Everything Oakes (and other columnists) wrote valorised the Double Standards resolution 
and downplayed sporting concerns.  In April 1981 the Cape Herald printed an article virtually 
canonising Glenville owner/manager Fred Eagles for keeping the club afloat in the FPL, 
praising him for, amongst other things, taking a bond out on his house to ensure Glenville’s 
survival.62  When Eagles and Glenville left the SASF-administered FPL to join the SANFA-
connected NPSL just ten months later, Oakes argued that the WPFB was ‘well rid of Fred 
Eagles’ and his disruptive nature.63   No mention was made of the fact that Glenville’s 
crowds rarely reached 50064 and Eagles had been forced to send a letter to the Argus 
almost four years earlier begging for money declaring: 
Because of high costs, inclement weather (which resulted in poor gates) the 
club finds itself in an embarrassing position financially.65 
Just as Cape Town City’s decision to join the SASF in 1978 was described as a desperate 
‘last roll of the dice’,66 Glenville had been left with little choice but to try something.  While in 
1982 the NPSL received an additional R250 000 from SABC to televise its matches,67 
Distillers Corp. had withdrawn its R80 000 FPL sponsorship and the league had been left 
without a sponsor.68  The flight to the NPSL was a last ditch attempt to save the club, to save 
the institution.69  For Oakes and more generally the Cape Herald, who stopped covering 
Glenville after their ‘defection’, the only consideration was how the club had harmed the non-
racial struggle.    
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Dougie Oakes and the Cape Herald reporters essentially followed an ideology that drew on 
the legacies of the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), a Coloured political movement 
based on ‘noncollaboration and nonracialism’ that was prevalent in the Western Cape in the 
1950s.70   The ideology witnessed a rebirth in the 1980s with political groups such as the 
New Unity Movement and other organisations such as SACOS co-opting the NEUM’s 
strategy and tactics.71  Nasson described the organisation’s outlook: 
For an organization that saw as its mission the triumph of the working-class 
in South Africa, the NEUM’s leadership, ironically, had relatively little direct 
contact with trade union or other working-class organizations.  Its claim to 
being an authentic and distinctive national liberation movement rested 
more in the power of its ideas and arguments than in its organizational 
strength.72 
The Cape Herald reporters took a similar viewpoint.  The argument, the ideas and the 
illusion of unity behind non-collaboration and non-racialism were more important than the 
reality on the ground.  The reporters such as Oakes, who had comparatively less interest in 
sport than politics, judged actions only by their impact on the wider liberation struggle.  For 
both political and personal reasons, the group desired to portray SACOS and its members 
as four-square behind the Double Standards resolution.  Personally, it increased their 
chances of being able to write on politics itself, a desire that reflected and helped to 
construct their political, non-collaborationist position. 
This led to all opposition essentially being ignored.  When Stephanians passed over to the 
White WPFA (Hartleyvale), the move did not ‘spell doom for the 56 year-old club.’73  The 
Cape Herald however, as the only major media outlet intended for Coloureds, was able to 
make them disappear.  In the WPFA (Hartleyvale) the club became little more than a mid-
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lower Cape Western League club and received little coverage in the White newspapers; 
meanwhile the Cape Herald stopped running any articles on the club at all.  While 
Stephanians members and those in the Alliance community may have known that the club 
had carried on and was successful, this was not portrayed to those further removed from the 
situation in Mitchells Plain, Heideveld, etc. 
All of this meant that the Cape Herald, despite its support of the Double Standards 
resolution, had no interest in exposing the limits of the resolution as it was implemented in 
the WPFB; to do so would have exposed the limits of the liberation struggle.  Their goals, 
much like the WPFB’s, relied on Coloured unity.  This meant that the issues, noted in 
chapter 3, surrounding the implementation of the resolution were not exposed: Alliance 
President Sydney Lotter’s allowance of Joe Schaffers playing cricket in the White WPCU, 
the lack of effective community ostracism of ‘defectors’, the use of Double Standards 
contravener ex-Atlantis President Sydney Louw to take photos by the Board all went 
unreported.  The Cape Herald had no inclination to report on events which negatively 
impacted their personal/political goals.  While analysis of local WPFB units improved in the 
mid-1980s when the Argus Group replaced the Cape Herald with Coloured community 
newspapers such as The Plainsman (Mitchells Plain) and The Atlantan (Atlantis),74 these 
papers were essentially community mouthpieces and rarely criticised local institutions (such 
as their football associations).  Other independent Coloured newspapers that were produced 
in the 1980s such as Grassroots had similar outlooks to the Cape Herald.  In Grassroots, 
non-racialism ‘was proclaimed as the accepted norm’ and any suggestion otherwise was 
unpublished.75   
All of this provided the opportunity for the WPFB to publicly support the implementation of 
the Double Standards resolution and allow the units that so desired, such as Cape District 
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and Ocean View, to enact the policy to its extremes.  Meanwhile the more conservative 
units, such as Alliance and Metropolitan, were assured that it was ‘never the board’s 
intention to implement the double standards policy’ and allowed to flout the laws of the 
resolution when they so wished.76  This allowed the Board to remain within the SASF (and 
SACOS) while retaining Coloured unity and increasing its control in the midst of uncertainty.  
The institution was able to prolong its position and continue its football.      
Criticism of this stance from the SACOS Executive level was almost non-existent.  This 
reflected the inadequacies of the media but also that SACOS, as an organisation, became 
increasingly divided on many issues surrounding the resolution.  The resolution, as Douglas 
Booth demonstrates, was rife with ‘political antinomies’ which made its full implementation 
both difficult and often inadvisable.77  From 1981 it banned students who attended private 
White Schools.  However students who attended ‘racial’ universities, including UCT and 
UWC, were allowed to continue SACOS membership.  Hassan Howa explained:  
It was acceptable for blacks to study at UCT because their knowledge 
would be needed by their community and in fact was essential to their 
community.78 
SACOS consistently argued against the provisions provided by the Bantu Education Act and 
that the provision of Black education was inadequate in comparison to White schools.  Quite 
why the better education provided at UCT was needed, but that provided at a private White 
school was not, was never adequately explained and remained a point of contention within 
SACOS.  Cynical observers pointed to the fact Howa’s children attended UCT.79  This meant 
that when a situation arose such as that of Herschelle Gibbs, who attended a private White 
school and played junior football in Cape District, SACOS remained mum.  A Cape District 
official’s argument that ‘we are here to teach the children soccer and not politics’ was similar 
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ideologically to Howa’s condoning the use of White universities.80  Forcefully stepping in 
behind or against Gibbs would have caused serious disunity in the fragile SACOS alliance81 
and despite criticism from its provincial council, WPCOS, the decision was made not to rule 
against Gibbs’ club Yorkshire AFC.   
SACOS was equally divided on the issue of the Industrial Leagues.  The leagues, in Cape 
Town, encompassed mostly Coloureds, but were created and largely run by White 
businesses and had always been contentious.  While they were officially classified as ‘rebel 
leagues’, it was often suggested that refusing to play was tantamount to risking your job.  
The WPFB’s policy was inconsistent; it sanctioned a game between an Industrial league XI 
and Glenville in 1972,82 banned dual affiliation in 197683 and then accepted the Northern 
Suburbs and Southern Suburbs Industrial Leagues as affiliates in 1980. 84   The SASF 
outlawed the Industrial Leagues in 1981, but there is no evidence that any WPFB player was 
admonished for playing in the leagues.  It seems unlikely that dual affiliation did not continue; 
the Industrial associations had always relied on Board players.  This never seems to have 
become a problem with SACOS, perhaps because the issue heavily divided the Council 
itself.  In 1980 Hassan Howa allowed Graham Lawrence and Vincent Geary of South 
Peninsula to play for Defence in the Defence Forces Cup stating that ‘their work depends on 
them doing so’.85  Dougie Oakes, the Cape Herald columnist, branded the decision ‘a joke’ 
and termed the concept ‘doubtful’.86  This combined with the lack of reporting meant that the 
Double Standards resolution, particularly its more controversial parts, were allowed to go 
unenforced.     
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The position of the WPFB vis-à-vis the Double Standards resolution had many parallels to 
the sports policy practiced by the National Party government.  Murray and Merrett described 
the Sports Minister Dr. Piet Koornhof’s policy: 
Mixed signals about mixed sports thereafter proliferated as Koornhof 
sought to sell and explain the government’s new sports policy to hugely 
different constituencies at home and abroad.  The heart of the matter was 
whether the ‘multi-national’ formula at club level might allow mixed clubs 
and teams.  At the Cape National Party congress in Cape Town in August 
1977, Koornhof gave the assurance that ‘mixed sport at club level remains 
contrary to party policy’ and that the government’s sports policy would ‘in 
no way threaten the identity or self-determination of the race groups’.  Yet 
in Panorama, a Department of Information magazine designed for 
distribution abroad, he was quoted as affirming that ‘there is no law 
prohibiting mixed race clubs in any sport in South Africa’, and that ‘a club 
has the right to decide at all times who shall and who shall not be allowed 
to join that club’.87 
The WPFB followed a similar track.  It assured the Double Standards resolution’s 
proponents that it was being fully implemented and made all the public moves required such 
as re-affiliating to the SACOS provincial council WPCOS.  Meanwhile, the Board never 
(according to the extant evidence) punished or censured an administrator who was not 
implementing the resolution in full. 88   It was only when the press, who had their own 
priorities, got hold of a story that the WPFB did anything at all, e.g. push Atlantis to terminate 
the membership of Sydney Louw for his position on an LMC. 
The motivations for the WPFB and the government in these actions were broadly similar.  
Both wanted to ‘project an image of substantive reform to the outside world’ while 
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maintaining their general policies.89  The government allowed and, by sanctioning SABC to 
televise matches after 1982, outright supported the racially mixed NPSL professional league.  
The league administered chiefly by SANFA, incorporated teams from across the racial 
spectrum of Apartheid: the White Durban City, African Kaizer Chiefs and Orlando Pirates 
and (after 1982) the Coloured Cape Town Spurs.  Steadily teams increasingly utilised 
racially mixed sides.  Despite professed national government support for the project and 
racially mixed sport in general, nothing was done to stop local authorities, particularly in the 
Transvaal, ruling against mixed sport.   In 1978, it was declared illegal for White supporters 
to travel to Soweto.90  In the same year, the Pretoria City Council declared that council-
owned grounds were off-limits to non-White players.91  Mixed sport, as Christopher Merrett 
has demonstrated, had never technically been illegal; it was other discriminatory laws that 
had made the practice difficult.92   The status quo remained. 
The WPFB implemented the Double Standards resolution in a similar manner.  It attempted 
to return to the Institutional Settlement, detailed in Chapters 1 and 2, it had held before the 
destabilising events of the late 1970s.  In these years, there was no rule against joining 
White football (or other sports) associations because the potential did not exist.  The Double 
Standards resolution as initially passed by SACOS in April 1977 stated that: 
No person, whether he is a player, an administrator or a spectator, 
committed to the Non-Racial principle in sport, shall participate or be 
associated with any code of sport which practice, perpetuate or condone 
racism or multi-nationalism.93 
On a basic level this returned the Board’s stability, it attempted to regain Coloured unity and 
limit the threat posed from outside.  The status quo remained. 
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The WPFB had no impetus from the media, the SASF, SACOS or its own ideology to 
investigate allegations that would have negatively affected the Board’s ability to continue its 
soccer.  Hassan Howa’s WPCB stripped the head of the Stellenbosch FA, Matt Seegers, of 
his life membership in 1980 due to accusations that he served on a government created 
sports body in Stellenbosch and allowed his players to play in the White Boland Cricket 
Union.94  There is no evidence that the WPFB even investigated the matter.  The primary 
goals of the Board, the survival of its football and of the institution itself, of attaining Coloured 
unity and of reducing uncertainty were not served by removing the long-time administrator 
Matt Seegers for such an offence.  The Cape Herald, despite reporting on Seegers’ reproach 
by the WPCB, never questioned his position in the WPFB.  The White newspapers did not 
report the incident at all.  The WPFB, lacking any practical check on its power, was able to 
move along as if nothing had happened.  The resolution was allowed to be implemented only 
when it suited the WPFB and its football-based outlook. 
It was not only for high profile administrators such as Seegers that the WPFB bent its rules.  
When Joe Schaffers decided to go across to the White WPCU, he went and told Hassan 
Howa of his decision. 95   He was told that he would be ostracised, but Schaffers was 
committed to moving to the Landsdowne cricket club anyway.  It was an experience that 
brought with it huge personal achievement for Schaffers: 
And I said in my 4th or 5th game, playing for Landsdowne I took seven 
wickets for four runs and the four runs were byes.  And they couldn’t 
believe what was happening.  We played against Police, P.W. Botha was 
on the field then, he was watching the game.  We hit the shit out of Police 
in that game cos there was this feeling we were going to show you.  And 
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they came into the dressing room after to shake hands and say well done.  
But they saw what we could do.96   
Schaffers had made his decision; to the WPFB however, it was not beneficial to lose a 
player, who had previously represented the Alliance unit in the Maggot Trophy.  As his unit 
President Sydney Lotter stated ‘it’s completely divorced from the sport of soccer; and it’s 
cricket’.97  Alliance, with little or no thought to politics, but with eyes on the survival of its 
league, its soccer, chose to allow Schaffers to continue to play.  In doing so Coloured unity 
was retained, the uncertainty created by the more volatile cricketing situation was 
diminished, the loyalty to the WPFB was protected, Coloured football survived. 
The Double Standards resolution has been described as creating a situation wherein:     
Sport in South Africa (was) distinctively politicised, to a degree rare in 
Africa or in other societies.98 
In the WPFB this had not occurred.  Politics had not subsumed the sporting institution.  
Instead, while it played a significant role in organisational decision-making, sporting 
concerns remained pre-eminent.  Predominantly the Board utilised the politics of the Double 
Standards resolution in order to effectively realise its institutional, sporting goal ‘to promote, 
further and control amateur Association Football in the Western Province.’  This meant 
utilising the ‘confusion’ within Apartheid society to partially implement the resolution in order 
to ensure its institutional survival through the promotion of Coloured ‘unity’ in the short-term 
and the reduction of ‘uncertainty’ in the long-term.  With these methods the WPFB was able 
to retain its status within the Coloured community. 
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The WPFB, the Double Standards resolution and SACOS 
 
The WPFB’s commitment to the Double Standards resolution did not last long.  As a means 
to promote Coloured unity and reduce uncertainty and therefore ensure institutional survival 
the resolution, enacted in 1980, had proven inadequate for purpose by the late 1980s.  
While punishments for defections had become increasingly severe, players and clubs 
continued to leave the Board.  Major clubs continued to make overtures to the White WPFA 
(Hartleyvale); two of Cape FA’s biggest clubs, Aurora FC and Vanguard Spurs, were 
rumoured to have had talks over a potential move. 1   Knowledge of the resolution also 
remained low.  To accompany a 1987 edict that anyone found guilty of ‘defection’ would be 
given a life ban, Chairman Vincent Baartjes was forced to write a series of articles clarifying 
what the term meant.2     
The WPFB decided to return to a strategy of integration.  In 1985 tentative approaches were 
made to the African WCSA and in 1988 talks began with the White WPFA (Hartleyvale).  In 
these moves the Board led SASF policy.  Following the WPFB becoming ‘the first (provincial 
association) in the country’ to enter talks with its local SANFA affiliate (the WCSA),3 SANFA 
and the SASF amalgamated in 1986.  The 1988 talks with the WPFA (Hartleyvale) similarly 
paved the way for the opening of wider talks between the SASF and the White body’s parent 
organisation FASA.  Facilitated by the SASF severing its SACOS ties and joining the newly 
formed pro-integration National Sports Congress (NSC), in May 1989 it was announced that 
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all of the major footballing bodies had ‘committed themselves to the formation of a single 
controlling body’.4  The SASF official statement read: 
Football is just one social aspect of the society we live in.  It therefore 
cannot exist in isolation.5 
The Double Standards resolution and non-collaborationist ideology were jettisoned.  As part 
of a wider context of integration that included the unbanning of the ANC and PAC and the 
release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, the unified South African Football Association (SAFA) 
was established in 1991.  Football was the first major South African sport to unify.6 
In a sense the Double Standards resolution fulfilled its purpose of ensuring the survival of 
the WPFB’s football and position in the Western Cape.  Vincent Baartjes, then Chairman of 
the Board, was given a pre-eminent role in unity talks and went on to have various Executive 
positions in SAFA.  The unity agreement also ensured the survival of many old Board units, 
even if in a curtailed form as a Local Football Association (LFA); as of 2015, LFAs include 
Cape District, Metropolitan, Atlantis, Mitchells Plain and Northerns.  While many clubs were 
forced to amalgamate, e.g. the Alliance clubs Wymo and St. Lukes,7 or fold, many others 
survived and flourished after integration.  Clubs such as Battswood (Cape District), Bluebells 
(Cape District), Sea Point Swifts (Metropolitan/WPFA), Parkhurst (Mitchells Plain), Norway 
Parks (WPFA) and Bluegum United (Metropolitan) all have long since survived the transition.   
While some integration has occurred, the WPFB’s goal to retain Coloured unity has largely 
succeeded.  Due to the policies of SAFA and the legacies of residential segregation, 
historically Coloured clubs for the most part remain in certain LFAs with Whites and Africans 
in others.  The Cape Town Tygerberg LFA for instance was formed out of the old White 
WPFA (Hartleyvale) and retains the membership of the majority of the former Cape Western 
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League clubs including Clyde Pinelands, Fish Hoek, Camps Bay and UCT.8  Little seems to 
have changed since Jasper Raymond’s description of the WPFB in the early 1980s: 
We (the WPFB) want to have pink elephants in this District and we want 
green elephants in that District and somehow subtly, they were trying to 
achieve that kind of situation.9 
Historians have generally viewed SACOS and its ‘no normal sport in an abnormal society’ 
ideology as a failure.  The group was never able to gain the support of the vast majority of 
Black sportsmen and the organisation was marginalised within and eventually destroyed by 
the ‘negotiated political settlement’ that ended Apartheid.10  John Nauright has termed the 
group: 
unable for a variety of reasons, both of its own making and beyond its 
control, to generate alternative structures or models for sport within South 
Africa, especially in disadvantaged communities.11  
Douglas Booth has taken a similar viewpoint, terming the non-collaborationist strategy built 
around the Double Standards resolution as erroneous.12 
The experiences of the WPFB provide a different perspective; in sporting terms the Double 
Standards resolution, perhaps the defining legislative act of SACOS, succeeded.  It ensured 
the survival of the Board and its football.  By drawing no distinction between politics and 
sport, SACOS drew a fundamental division in viewpoints between and even for certain 
members.  At times the adherents of the WPFB primarily identified SACOS as part of the 
‘liberation struggle’, a weapon against the ‘abnormal society’ created by Apartheid.  At 
others, the organisation was treated as a sporting institution and utilised consciously and 
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subconsciously to safeguard the extant interests of (mostly Coloured and Indian) sports 
associations and protect them from a National Party sports policy which, despite moves to 
‘normalise sport’, still claimed to ‘in no way threaten the identity or self-determination of the 
race groups.’13  This group, far from utilising non-collaboration as a ‘principle rather than a 
strategy’, used it as a means to achieve its sporting goals.14  Sport was not exclusively 
politicised, just as often politics were utilised to ensure institutional, sporting survival. 
The WPFB it could be argued represented a fairly unique position within the SASF due to its 
almost exclusively Coloured base and its position as representative of the majority 
population group in its area.  This does not however make the conclusions drawn from this 
case study null and void for the rest of SACOS.  While regional variations should not be 
ignored, Chapter 5’s focus on uncertainty essentially demonstrated the fears of the 
disenfranchised (but semi-privileged) minority; this outlook permeated SACOS as an 
organisation as most of its members were drawn from the Indian and Coloured communities.  
Even Chapters 4 and 6 which make conclusions drawn from specific instances within the 
Coloured community (and particularly the Western Cape) arguably better reflect a general 
response by a disenfranchised community rather than distinct Western Cape Coloured 
experiences.  The WPFB remained associated with the Coloured community more through 
circumstance than design.  The example of the Western Cape should also not be 
disregarded as ‘abnormal’ since it was this region that produced the architect of the Double 
Standards resolution and organisation’s President, 1977-81, Hassan Howa.  The Western 
Cape, due to Howa, the WPCB (of which Howa was founder and President) and WPCOS is 
often seen as the most radical area within the SACOS movement.15  The experiences of the 
WPFB, despite the proliferation of dual affiliation with the ‘radical’ WPCB, suggest this wasn’t 
the case.  This calls for a more nuanced approach to non-collaborationism and non-racialism 
within the SACOS movement. 
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The outlook of the WPFB and its adherents suggests that SACOS and its ideology need to 
be viewed as representative of unique sporting concerns that stemmed from the socio-
economic, political and cultural context that the organisation and its units had been founded 
in and grown out of.  In this respect, SACOS or the WPFB should not be viewed as 
‘abnormal’ sport.  SACOS policies can be analysed in the same manner that Richard Holt 
examines British sport, class, nationalism, commercialisation and religion in his 1988 
monograph Sport and the British.16  This allows for SACOS and the identities created within 
to be returned to the narratives of South African sports history as more than a political 
adjunct.  It is hoped that future studies will take account of SACOS as a ‘normal’ (or as close 
to ‘normal’ as was possible in Apartheid) sporting body and at the very least use the 
experiences of the organisation as an addendum to the groups already studied in the works 
of Alegi, Merrett, Nauright et al.  It is hoped that this will provide a deeper understanding of 
the motivations and outlook of these organisations as well as of SACOS itself. 
 
The WPFB, SACOS and the anti-Apartheid Movement 
 
SACOS, identified as a ‘voice against apartheid sport’ and implicitly the state,17 has been 
viewed as having ‘placed sport right in the front trenches of the fight for freedom in South 
Africa.’18  The ‘struggle’ in sports has generally been analysed in the same vein as the 
political struggle: ‘from the start opposed to racism and underpinned by ideas of equal 
opportunity’.19  It has been demonstrated that the WPFB and the Apartheid state were by no 
means only oppositional; their methods, their means and occasionally their goals 
overlapped. 
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The WPFB’s attempts to establish and maintain Coloured unity and the government sports 
policy became two sides of the same coin.  While legalising and professing support for 
mixed sport, at a National Party Congress in 1977 the Sports Minister, Piet Koornhof, 
maintained that it ‘remain(ed) contrary to party policy’.20  As the WPFB wrestled with the 
decision to implement the Double Standards resolution, many of the laws that affected non-
racial sport, the Group Areas Act, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, the Urban 
Areas Act, etc., continued to affect their sport.21  The WPFB, while it publicly espoused the 
rhetoric of non-racialism, remained committed primarily to sport within its own community.  
As Chapter 4 demonstrates, the limited moves to co-opt African and White groups were 
consistently overshadowed by attempts to retain Coloured unity.  Claims to support mixed 
sport were belied by the group’s actions.   
Chapter 5 however demonstrates that despite these similarities, the WPFB viewed itself as 
anti-Apartheid.  While it may not have located itself as part of a wider ‘liberation struggle’,22 
the Board, by (predominantly) rejecting ‘racial sport’ and ‘racial’ bodies, was anti-
government.  This suggests that extra work is needed to delineate the meanings of the ‘anti-
Apartheid movement’ and the ‘liberation struggle’.  The two phrases are too often conflated 
and attributed the goal of emancipation uncritically.  As historians, particularly in South 
Africa, have held a tendency to embrace ‘emancipation as an ethical value’,23 groups often 
are evaluated only by their adherence to perceived non-discriminatory practices at the 
expense of their distinct institutional priorities.24 
The problem with this view, as shown by the case of the WPFB and SACOS, is analysis 
depends on your perspective.  While Avis Smith has demonstrated that women played a role 
in the non-racial sports movement,25 SACOS overwhelmingly represented a masculine ideal 
                                                          
20 Piet Koornhof, Sunday Tribune, 21/8/77, cited in Murray and Merrett,  Caught Behind, 165. 
21 Murray and Merrett, Caught Behind, 166. 
22 See Jarvie, Class, Race, 64. 
23 See Booth, “Beyond History”. 
24 See Cleophas and van der Merwe, “Contradictions”. 





wherein gender liberation was not discussed.  The practice of ‘passing out’ parades and 
other discriminatory practices built around race and religion in the WPFB had reduced by the 
1980s, but interviews suggest that they still unofficially occurred. 26   The Board’s 
administration retained a strong association with the upper-classes and often utilised 
discrimination to protect their positions and accompanying status.   
While studies focusing on the ANC have begun to demonstrate that the internal party politics 
of the group were much more complex than previously believed,27 this has not in general 
been widened into questioning the meaning and categorisation of the anti-Apartheid 
movement or the liberation struggle.  As the conflation of SACOS with emancipation has 
shown, the current approach is inadequate and paradoxical.  The approach suggested here 
is to follow the framework set out by Timothy Gibbs in Mandela’s Kinsmen.28   In examining 
the role of the ‘Bantustan’ (government-created African homelands) authorities within the 
liberation struggle in the early 1990s, Gibbs suggests that the antithetical position between 
‘Bantustan stooges’ and ‘nationalist liberation movements’ needs to be done away with.29  
Focusing on the case of the head of the Transkei30 Defence Force, Bantu Holomisa, Gibbs 
demonstrates that Holomisa made use of a similar web of connections in his role as a 
collaborator with ‘apartheid murder squads’ and after his ‘Damascene conversion to the 
ANC’.31  This suggests that the artificial barriers and extant categorisation of the ‘liberation 
struggle’ is inadequate. 
It is felt that a similar approach is required for sports history in South Africa.  Sport acted as 
a distinct institution in its own right which, while connected to politics, had its own particular 
unique interests.  Attempts to place sport into categories created with regard to politics are 
                                                          
26 Interview with Ahmed Fransman and Fanie Stuurman, 21/5/08 and Interview with Joe Schaffers, 11/2/15. 
27 See Arianna Lissoni, Jon Skose, Natasha Erlank, Noor Nieftagodien and Omar Basha (ed.), One Hundred Years 
of the ANC: Debating Liberation Histories Today (Wits, Wits University Press, 2012), Dale McKinley, The ANC 
and the Liberation struggle: A Critical Political Biography (London, Pluto Press, 1997),  Anthea Jeffrey, People’s 
War: New Light on the Struggle for South Africa (Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 2009). 
28 Gibbs, Mandela’s Kinsmen. 
29 Ibid., 6. 
30 A Xhosa homeland. 





therefore inadequate and the definition of the liberation struggle must be re-evaluated to 
either take account of this or to place the sports struggle into a different category altogether.  
In this manner, we can hope to create both a deeper understanding of the anti-Apartheid 
movement/liberation struggle and to ascertain why certain political ideologies were 
embraced by particular sports organisations and not by others.32   
 
The WPFB and Coloured Identity 
 
Mohammed Adhikari’s Not White Enough, Not Black Enough makes two main arguments on 
Coloured identity: that ‘through the era of white supremacy, Coloured identity is better 
understood as having been stable’ and that this identity was in the ‘first instance a product of 
its bearers’.33  While the impact of Black Consciousness in the 1970s is not denied, through 
an analysis of James Matthews’ poetry, Adhikari demonstrates that Coloured rejectionism 
was ‘superficial’ and that, regardless of the influence of the movement, the identity 
endured.34  The experiences of the WPFB largely fit these arguments.  The WPFB, despite 
professed non-racialism, never jettisoned its Coloured identity and in fact actively pursued 
Coloured unity.  As a sporting institution created within a context of discrimination, 
regardless of its adherents’ views on racial classifications, its wellbeing had become in some 
senses rooted in the stability of Apartheid segregation laws.  While the WPFB was by no 
means separate from the machinations of wider Apartheid society, first and foremost this 
was an institutional culture produced and preserved by Coloureds themselves.  Certainly the 
identity espoused by the institution was far from simply imposed from outside.35 
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Largely, the case study of the WPFB follows the Adhikarian notions of what encapsulated 
this stable Coloured identity: an intermediate status, marginality, assimilationism and 
negative connotations. 36   After the Double Standards affair, the WPFB encapsulated 
intermediate status.  Consistently players and clubs ‘defected’ from the Coloured WPFB to 
the superior facilities and finances of the White WPFA (Hartleyvale).  Meanwhile, the 
community’s ‘relative privilege’ meant that they could attract the Gugueletu FA, White Spurs 
and other teams and players from the African WCSA.37   Chapter 5 demonstrates that 
‘marginality’ remained a key component of Board identity.   
The WPFB however does not provide any evidence of assimilationism or negative 
connotations being major factors in institutional decision-making.  For the latter, it could be 
argued that football was a fairly unique sphere of influence wherein, despite inferior facilities, 
Coloureds could be said to be playing on a level playing field to Whites.  The case study 
does though suggest that assimilationist hopes were not as ‘remarkably resilient’ as Adhikari 
declares.38  Not White Enough bases its argument on a supposition that Coloured society 
remained rooted in the ideals of nineteenth-century Cape Liberalism.39  This ideology is 
categorised primarily as referring to the twin beliefs that society ‘was on a path of inevitable 
progress toward … social harmony and prosperity’ and that all people were capable of 
achieving this ‘civilization’.40 
This cannot be said to have been the case in the WPFB.  The implementation of the Double 
Standards resolution was primarily an attempt to ensure the survival of the institution and its 
football within the Apartheid context.  There is no evidence that the WPFB saw the 
attainment of ‘social harmony and prosperity’ as inevitable or that acceptance into White 
society was something they ‘still needed to earn’.41  The Board only entered integration talks 
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on the grounds that White organisations would disband and affiliate into existing Board 
structures.  Far from viewing White society as ‘aspirational’, this act placed their own 
structures as superior.  The fear that Coloureds would be marginalised within an integrated 
football structure suggests that a future of ‘social harmony and prosperity’ was not taken as 
a given. 
Perhaps, what is needed is a more thorough examination of the meanings of both 
marginality and assimilationism.  The WPFB held many characteristics that could be 
identified as assimilationist, the administration’s links to the Coloured middle-classes and the 
interest in social uplift chief among them.  Indeed the initial communal take-up of football 
could be viewed as an attempt to be accepted into the working-class English-speaking White 
community.  By the 1970s, however, the actions of the WPFB, including the implementation 
of the Double Standards resolution, suggest that assimilation was anathema to their goals.  
As the institution became more and more established, connections to the WPFB became 
deeper.  Players developed profound loyalties to their clubs.  Supporters developed rivalries.  
Administrators sought to hold on to their positions.  This served to divorce the adherents of 
the WPFB from those of the other footballing associations in the Western Cape.  
Assimilationism was not only unsupported, but outright rejected.   
The experiences of the WPFB suggest that while Adhikari’s four main components of 
Coloured identity are not without merit, they need to be re-evaluated – particularly Adhikari’s 
notion that these constituents were fairly stable.  Coloureds had (for a multitude of reasons) 
established their own separate institutions including the WPFB.  These institutions, oases of 
control, areas where they weren’t marginalised, where negative connotations did not hold 
sway and the South African racial hierarchy could be questioned, became particularly 
influential.  Institutional survival became a goal within itself.  The importance attributed to the 
WPFB’s survival overrode all of the components of Coloured identity that Adhikari identifies.  
It is suggested that this process in the Coloured (and for that matter others as well) 






The WPFB, SACOS, Politics and Sport 
 
In the introduction, it was suggested that the side-lining of SACOS in the extant South 
African sports historiography is due to its (partly self-imposed) identification as ‘abnormal’: as 
captured by politics.  This was not the case.  WPFB decision-making was made in a very 
similar fashion to that of other sports organisations categorised as ‘normal’.  For example the 
WPFB’s use of the politics within the Double Standards resolution to serve its sporting goals 
has parallels to Scottish clubs Rangers and Celtic exploiting sectarian divides to fuel the 
growth of their clubs.42  Celtic, by flying the Irish flag, and Rangers, by not selecting Catholic 
players until Maurice “Mo” Johnston in 1989, used their surrounding context to further 
connections to communities and their sporting goals.  SACOS sport, a reflection and 
constructor of its own context, was not ‘distinctively politicised’;43 it was, like any sporting 
institution, a combination of its own priorities and those of wider society.   
The case study of the WPFB should serve as a stark reminder that politics can never 
completely define sport.   Sport, whatever political connotations can be drawn from within, 
has distinct goals.  With this separation, grows a connection among its adherents to the 
peculiarities of the game and its institutions.  The co-option of football by the Coloured 
communities of the Western Cape may have initially represented assimilationist hopes of 
entering White society, but as the institution grew this initial thrust disappeared.  Members 
increasingly invested their money, their time and their passions into their chosen club and/or 
the Board itself in a manner unmatched by their relationship to economics, politics or 
religion.  In this context the adherents of the WPFB, its players, administrators and 
supporters refused to allow the institution to die.  They refused to allow their clubs to vanish.  
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They refused to allow their football to end.  Politics was used as a vehicle to serve the 
interests of the sport.  Sport was given primacy. 
The relationship of sports and politics then must be seen as reciprocal, wherein each side 
attempts to utilise the power of the other.  It should be viewed far more akin to how we view 
politics and the state.  Alan Lester et al. describe the state: 
Rather than viewing this modern, post-1910 state as an institution prone to 
being ‘captured’ and used in the interests of one class or another, we see it 
as having its own ‘particular interests associated with territorial 
sovereignty.’44 
This is essentially, the manner in which the WPFB acted.  It was never wholly captured by 
politics or the interests of any single group, it retained its own particular interests associated 
with its sporting objectives.  Within this, the WPFB used its part-implementation of the 
Double Standards resolution to ensure that it retained the ability to co-ordinate its units.  This 
provided the Board sufficient autonomy within which to achieve its goals.   
The relationship of sport and politics should therefore be viewed in a similar manner to how 
Alan Lester et al. suggest we should view the state and politics.  Sport and its institutions 
can never be wholly captured by political interests because it has its own peculiar goals.  
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